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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U.
Traffic Safety Facts 1994: A Compilation of Motor Vehicle Crash Data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System and the General Estimates System
paperback. Good. Access codes and supplements are not guaranteed with used items. May be an ex-library book. paperback
书商的参考编号 : 1493750267.G ???????? : 1493750267 9781493750269
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U.
Traffic Safety Facts 2009: A Compilation of Motor Vehicle Crash Data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System and the General Estimates System DOT HS 811 402
paperback. Good. Access codes and supplements are not guaranteed with used items. May be an ex-library book. paperback
书商的参考编号 : 1493507834.G ???????? : 1493507834 9781493507832
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration U.
Traffic Safety Facts 1997: A Compilation of Motor Vehicle Crash Data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System and the General Estimates System
paperback. Good. Access codes and supplements are not guaranteed with used items. May be an ex-library book. paperback
书商的参考编号 : 1493693573.G ???????? : 1493693573 9781493693573
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Traffic Safety Facts 2003: A Compilation of Motor Vehicle Crash Data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System and the General Estimates System
paperback. Good. Access codes and supplements are not guaranteed with used items. May be an ex-library book. paperback
书商的参考编号 : 1492391468.G ???????? : 1492391468 9781492391463
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U.
Trends in Non-Fatal Traffic Injuries: 1996 - 2005: NHTSA Technical Report DOT HS 810 944
paperback. Good. Access codes and supplements are not guaranteed with used items. May be an ex-library book. paperback
书商的参考编号 : 1492765740.G ???????? : 1492765740 9781492765745
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National Institutes of Health; Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration
NIH/ADAMHA-Industry Collaboration Directory
Washington DC: National Inst of Health 1989. very good. 193 wraps list of acronyms list of PHS keywords list of industrial keywords National Inst of Health paperback
书商的参考编号 : 49733
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National Institutes of Health, Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration
NIH/ADAMHA Technology Transfer: The Federal Technology Transfer Act and Collaboration with Industry
Bethesda MD: NIH 1989. good. three-ring binder approximately 1 inch of material including tabbed dividers acronyms glossaryThis contains an overview of Technology Transfer at NIH/ADAMHA. NIH unknown
书商的参考编号 : 54456
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National Nuclear Security Administration
2003-2004 Applied Engineering Testing & Manufacturing Capabilities
Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration c2004. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. DVD. Very Good/In plastic case. Face of the CD/DVD states: To open double cline the "My Computer" icon on the desktop double click Drive D: double click ;nnsa catalog". There are images of weapons and platforms and technology images. Additional text reads The Nation's Applied Technology Complex. National Security Solutions Provider. Many customers many capabilities one enterprise. The National Nuclear Security Administration issued this catalogue in 2003-2004 and an updated version in 2005 to present information that its Nuclear Security Enterprise provided complete integration of design development application testing and production and that it provided customers of the Nuclear Weapons Complex with access to unsurpassed expertise. Customers were assured that they would receive more than the highest quality product; they were assured of security and safety throughout the entire process--from design to manufacturing to final delivery. NNSA asserted that it was this complete suite of design manufacturing and testing technologies that made it unique. At the time it was encouraging DOD Intelligence Community agencies and others with appropriate requirements to explore working with the NNSA and its management and operating contractors. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
书商的参考编号 : 85216
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National Nuclear Security Administration
ADAPT Campaign; 90-Day Study Report
Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration 2002. Contemporary Xerox-style copy. Staplebound. Good. 4 18 18 pages of Risk & Opportunity Assessment 19-21 pages Fold-outs. This 90=day study was commissioned at the request of NA-12 senior management with the express purpose of finding weaknesses in the current ADAPT Campaign-level management and administrative processes and developing fixes alternatives and/or instituting new processes. The study was facilitated by experts from Westinghouse Savannah River Corp. and used their approach to systems engineering. The core members of the analysis team consisted of the seven ADAPT site manages and three MTE Major Technical Effort managers. The team was lead by the NA-12 Campaign Manager in collaboration with the NA-11 and NA-12 HQ ADAPT leads. The team developed a new vision for ADAPT with the future of the Nuclear Weapons Complex NWC in mind. Supporting the vision was a set of eleven goals that were intended to support a balance between short-term vs. long-term development needs efficient processes and procedures vs. effective stewardship and optimization of limited funds site-unique capability improvement vs. increased multi-site cooperation and collaboration; and improved communication of priorities problems expectations and requirements both from and to designers weapons program managers other campaigns and senior management. One of NNSA's core missions is to ensure the United States maintains a safe secure and reliable nuclear stockpile through the application of unparalleled science technology engineering and manufacturing. The Office of Defense Programs carries out NNSA's mission to maintain and modernize the nuclear stockpile through the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. The Stockpile Stewardship Program enables NNSA to extend the lifespan and ensure the continued safety reliability and effectiveness of weapons that have reached the end of their original design life through life extension programs. These life extensions address aging and performance issues enhance safety features and improve security.<br/><br/>As with any complex mechanical system components in nuclear weapons degrade over time even when kept in storage. A life extension program comprehensively analyzes all of a weapon's components and determines whether to reuse refurbish or replace them to extend the service life of the weapon. When planning life extension programs NNSA must develop specific solutions to extend the lifetime of each weapon type because each is unique. Life extension programs also require NNSA to certify the weapon's protected period its new lifetime for 20 to 30 years. By extending the time that a weapon can safely and reliably remain in the stockpile NNSA is able to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent without producing new weapons or conducting underground nuclear explosive tests.<br/><br/>NNSA also conducts alterations of weapons at the system sub-system or component level to make sure the weapons is safe secure and effective. An alteration is a limited scope change that affects assembly tests maintenance and/or storage of weapons. An alteration may address identified defects and component obsolescence however it does not change a weapon's operational capabilities. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
书商的参考编号 : 80753
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National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Programs, Office of Advanced Simulation and Computing
Advanced Simulation and Computing Program Plan FY06; NA-ASC-106R-05-Vol. 1-Rev ; SAND 2005-5961P
Albuquerque NM: Sandia National Laboratories 2005. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. Wraps. Very good. 2 ii 32 4 pages. Footnotes. Illustrations color. Appendices A-E includes Glossary Visuals. Tables. ASC Timeline. Cover has minor wear and soiling. The Advanced Simulation and Computing Program ASC is a cornerstone of the Stockpile Stewardship Program providing simulation capabilities and computational resources to support the annual stockpile assessment and certification to study advanced nuclear-weapons design and manufacturing processes to analyze accident scenarios and weapons aging and to provide the tools to enable Stockpile Life Extension Programs SLEPs and the resolution of Significant Finding Investigations SFIs. This requires a balanced resource including technical staff hardware simulation software and computer science solutions. This Program Plan describes the ASC strategy and the deliverables required to accomplish the FY 2006-2010 multifaceted objectives defines program goals introduces the new national work breakdown structure and details the new subprograms their strategics and their associated performance indicators. The plan also includes ASC Level 1 Milestones and the top ten risks. To ensure synchronizations with the SSP's needs the Program Plan will be reviewed and updated annually. The Advanced Simulation and Computing Program or ASC is a super-computing program run by the National Nuclear Security Administration in order to simulate test and maintain the United States nuclear stockpile. The program was created in 1995 in order to support the Stockpile Stewardship Program or SSP. The goal of the initiative is to extend the lifetime of the current aging stockpile. After the United States' 1992 moratorium on live nuclear testing the Stockpile Stewardship Program was created in order to find a way to test and maintain the nuclear stockpile. In response the National Nuclear Security Administration began to simulate the nuclear warheads using supercomputers. As the stockpile ages the simulations have become more complex and the maintenance of the stockpile requires more computing power. Over the years due to Moore's Law the ASC program has created several different supercomputers with increasing power in order to compute the simulations and mathematics. Within the ASC program there are six subdivisions each having their own role in the extension of the life of the stockpile. Facility Operations and User Support: The Facility Operations and User Support subdivision is responsible for the physical computers and facilities and the computing network within ASC. They are responsible for making sure the tri-lab network computing storage space power usage and the customer computing resources are all in line. Computational Systems and Software Environment: The Computational and User Support subdivision is responsible for maintaining and creating the supercomputer software according to NNSA's standards. They also deal with the data networking and software tools. The ASCI Path Forward project substantially funded the initial development of the Lustre parallel file system from 2001 to 2004. Verification and Validation: The Verification and Validation subdivision is responsible for mathematically verifying the simulations and outcomes. They help software engineers write more precise codes in order to decrease the margin of error when the computations are run. Physics and Engineering Models: The Physics and Engineering Models subdivision is responsible for deciphering the mathematical and physical analysis of nuclear weapons. They integrate physics models into the codes in order to gain a more accurate simulation. They deal with the way that the nuclear weapon will act under certain conditions based on physics. They also study nuclear properties vibrations high explosives advanced hydrodynamics material strength and damage thermal and fluid response and radiation and electrical responses. Integrated Codes: The Integrated Codes subdivision is responsible for the mathematical codes that are produced by the supercomputers. They use these mathematical codes and present them in a way that is understandable to humans. These codes are then used by the National Nuclear Society Administration the Stockpile Steward Program Life Extension Program and Significant Finding Investigation in order to decide the next steps that need to be taken in order to secure and lengthen the life of the nuclear stockpile. Advanced Technology Development and Mitigation: The Advanced Technology Development and Mitigation subdivision is responsible for researching developments in high performance computing. Once information is found on the next generation of high performance computing they decide what software and hardware needs to be adapted in order to prepare for the next generation of computers. Sandia National Laboratories paperback
书商的参考编号 : 79903
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National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, Office of Public Affairs
Apollo Astronauts Train at the Nevada Test Site; Nevada Test Site History DOE/NV - -772 - Rev 1
Las Vegas NV: National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Office of Public Affairs 2004. Presumed First printing for Rev 1. Single sheet printed on both sides. Very good. Format is approximately 8.5 inches by 11 inches. Illustrations and text on both sides. The Nevada Test Site was the primary testing location of American nuclear devices from 1951 to 1992; 928 announced nuclear tests occurred there. Of those 828 were underground. Sixty-two of the underground tests included multiple simultaneous nuclear detonations adding 93 detonations and bringing the total number of NTS nuclear detonations to 1021 of which 921 were underground. The site is covered with subsidence craters from the testing. The NTS was the United States' primary location for tests smaller than 1 Mt 4.2 PJ. 126 tests were conducted elsewhere including most larger tests. Many of these occurred at the Pacific Proving Grounds in the Marshall Islands. The last atmospheric test detonation at the Nevada Test Site was "Little Feller I" of Operation Sunbeam on July 17 1962. Before Neil Armstrong stepped foot on the moon on July 20 1969 Armstrong and astronauts Dick Gordon Buzz Aldrin Dave Scott and Russell "Rusty" Schweikart left their footprints on the Nevada Test Site now known as the Nevada National Security Site NNSS as part of their lunar training. Their three-day visit began on February 16 1965. It was the first training mission by a group of astronauts from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA. Their mission was to carry out geological and geophysical studies at<br /> Sedan crater and Buckboard Mesa which later aided the astronauts in observing and collecting material from the moon's surface and helping expand knowledge and understanding about our solar system. During their visit to the Nevada Test Site astronauts were briefed by geologists from the Atomic Energy Commission's Nevada Operations Office Special Projects Branch and the United States Geological Survey Astrogeology Branch. The first group of astronauts visited Sedan crater on the first day where they practiced making geophysical observations around the lip of the crater. On the second day they flew by helicopter over the rough Nevada terrain near the western edge of the site. While there they stopped and studied the geology of the ancient volcanic formations made by the Timber Mountain caldera the largest caldera known in the United States whose features are similar to those on the surface of the moon. National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, Office of Public Affairs unknown
书商的参考编号 : 81039
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National Nuclear Security Administration
Applied Engineering Testing & Manufacturing Capabilities.; Multisite Integration Science with a Purpose National Security Asset Advanced Technologies
Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration 2002. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. DVD. Very good. The National Nuclear Security Administration's NNSA nuclear weapons complex NWC has identified developed and deployed successful high-value technologies in support of national security. The production plants testing facilities and national laboratories are a reservoir of technological capabilities unmatched in depth or breadth by any other institution. Cooperation between facilities involves interdisciplinary cross-facility knowledge exchanges at all levels of design and development to build perfectibility into the product. For example the Interplant Technology Team IPTT facilitates technical integration between NWC sites. This team promotes inter-site cooperation by helping to coordinate and focus resources that provide technology solutions. Reporting directly to the IPTT the Network of Senior Scientists and Engineers NSSE comprised of five scientists and engineers from each site meet quarterly to acknowledge and reward scientific excellence and to promote technical cooperation. The NWC is the steward of the Nation's defense nuclear mission-the military application of nuclear energy and the reducing of global danger from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The ability to address the threat of nuclear biological and chemical attacks and to protect high-value assets has assumed a higher priority. To that end the NNSA focus is on products and technologies that are immediately deployable. We can provide the crucial advantage needed to meet the terrorist threat in all conceivable forms and advance our national knowledge base to maintain the technological edge. This catalog of capabilities highlights those proven field-tested applications for deterrence and for rapid-response. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
书商的参考编号 : 75970
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National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, Office of Public Affairs
Atmospheric Tests at the Nevada Test Site; Nevada Test Site History DOE/NV - -716 - Rev 1
Las Vegas NV: National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Office of Public Affairs 2005. Presumed First printing for Rev 1. Single sheet printed on both sides. Very good. Format is approximately 8.5 inches by 11 inches. Illustrations and text on both sides. The Nevada Test Site was the primary testing location of American nuclear devices from 1951 to 1992; 928 announced nuclear tests occurred there. Of those 828 were underground. Sixty-two of the underground tests included multiple simultaneous nuclear detonations adding 93 detonations and bringing the total number of NTS nuclear detonations to 1021 of which 921 were underground. The site is covered with subsidence craters from the testing. The NTS was the United States' primary location for tests smaller than 1 Mt 4.2 PJ. 126 tests were conducted elsewhere including most larger tests. Many of these occurred at the Pacific Proving Grounds in the Marshall Islands. The last atmospheric test detonation at the Nevada Test Site was "Little Feller I" of Operation Sunbeam on July 17 1962. One hundred atmospheric nuclear tests were detonated at the Nevada Test Site originally the Nevada Proving Grounds between 1951 and 1963. The first Nevada series code-named Ranger was conducted during January and February 1951 immediately after President Harry S. Truman had approved the establishment of a continental test site in Nevada. During the early years testing schedules remained on a campaign basis alternating between the Nevada Test Site NTS and the Pacific Proving Ground. <br/><br/>In the early days of testing there was an urgent need to understand the science and engineering of these powerful new weapons their use on the battlefield and their effects. Tests were conducted for a variety of reasons-to test and prove new designs to assess the effects of nuclear weapons to develop warheads for specific delivery systems. Meteorologists monitored weather patterns pilots flew airplanes through the radioactive clouds to sample radiation levels and scientists "chased" fallout clouds across the Nevada desert to better understand offsite impacts. Ranger the first test series at the NTS was conducted in early 1951 with nuclear devices designed by Los Alamos scientists and airdropped from bombers out of Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque New Mexico. The next NTS series Buster-Jangle was a joint Los Alamos-Department of Defense DoD operation conducted during October-November 1951. The series tested both new weapons configurations and weapons effects. The DoD tests were designed to better understand the cratering capabilities of nuclear weapons for the battlefield. The test code-named Sugar was the only test ever detonated at the surface on the ground in Nevada-as opposed to an airdrop tower or balloon shot. It created a crater twenty-one feet deep and ninety feet wide. Buster-Jangle also involved the first troops from the U.S. Army's Atomic Maneuver Battalion stationed at Camp Desert Rock outside the test site town of Mercury. Between 1951 and 1955 thousands of military personnel from all service branches served at Desert Rock participating in maneuvers at the test site witnessing atomic blasts from trenches marching toward ground zero after detonations and collecting radiation effects information. National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, Office of Public Affairs unknown
书商的参考编号 : 81038
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National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, Office of Public Affairs
Atomic Culture; Nevada Test Site History DOE/NV - -1042
Las Vegas NV: National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Office of Public Affairs 2005. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. Single sheet printed on both sides. Very good. Format is approximately 8.5 inches by 11 inches. Illustrations and text on both sides. The Nevada Test Site was the primary testing location of American nuclear devices from 1951 to 1992; 928 announced nuclear tests occurred there. Of those 828 were underground. Sixty-two of the underground tests included multiple simultaneous nuclear detonations adding 93 detonations and bringing the total number of NTS nuclear detonations to 1021 of which 921 were underground. The site is covered with subsidence craters from the testing. The NTS was the United States' primary location for tests smaller than 1 Mt 4.2 PJ. 126 tests were conducted elsewhere including most larger tests. Many of these occurred at the Pacific Proving Grounds in the Marshall Islands. The last atmospheric test detonation at the Nevada Test Site was "Little Feller I" of Operation Sunbeam on July 17 1962. Since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki people in the United States and around the world have reacted to the atomic bomb with joy devastation hope fear and many other emotions. We have used cultural expressions to convey these sentiments a phenomenon known as atomic culture. Atomic culture has manifested itself in popular culture such as films music and fashion and in high culture such as literature poetry and theater. Atomic culture is also prevalent in the daily lives of Americans becoming so ordinary that we don't even notice the extent to which the bomb has permeated our society. The word 'atomic' became an adjective that was short hand for anything powerful or modern. Between 1951 and 1962 atomic tests at the Nevada Test Site affected popular films novels music television art and advertising. Hundreds of titles of popular songs mention the atom bomb in one form or another as did many movies and pulp novels that used atomic war or testing as their main plot points. National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, Office of Public Affairs unknown
书商的参考编号 : 81040
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National Nuclear Security Administration, B53 SS-21 Dismantlement Team
B53 SS-21 Dismantlement Team Patch; Last of the Big Dogs
Amarillo TX: National Nuclear Security Administration Pantex Plant c2011. Presumed First thus. Patches. Very good. The patch is about 3.5 inches by 3.5 inches but the top is rounded so it is more like an arched window than a full square. It has a black border. The center has the image of the bomb a big dog and the text "B53" and "Last of the Big Dogs. On an orange border in black letters is "NNSA SS-21 Dismantlement DOE Pantex LANL LLNL SNL Y12 OST" From Wikipedia: The Mk/B53 was a high-yield bunker buster thermonuclear weapon developed by the United States during the Cold War. Deployed on Strategic Air Command bombers the B53 with a yield of 9 megatons was the most powerful weapon in the U.S. nuclear arsenal after the last B41 nuclear bombs were retired in 1976. The B53 was the basis of the W-53 warhead carried by the Titan II Missile which was decommissioned in 1987. Fifty B53s were retained during that time as part of the "hedge" portion of the Enduring Stockpile. The last B53 was disassembled on 25 October 2011 a year ahead of schedule. Development of the weapon began in 1955 by Los Alamos National Laboratory based on the earlier Mk 21 and Mk 46 weapons. In March 1958 the Strategic Air Command issued a request for a new Class C bomb to replace the earlier Mk 41. A revised version of the Mk 46 became the TX-53 in 1959. The Mk 53 entered production in 1962 and was built through June 1965. It entered service aboard B-47 Stratojet B-52G Stratofortress and B-58 Hustler bomber aircraft in the mid-1960s. From 1968 it was redesignated B53. Some early versions of the bomb were dismantled beginning in 1967. The B53 was also intended to be retired in the 1980s but 50 units remained in the active stockpile until the deployment of the B61-11 in 1997. At that point the obsolete B53s were slated for immediate disassembly; however the process of disassembling the units was greatly hampered by safety concerns as well as a lack of resources. In 2010 authorization was given to disassemble the 50 bombs at the Pantex plant in Texas. The process of dismantling the last remaining B53 bomb in the stockpile was completed in 2011. It was intended as a bunker buster weapon using a surface blast after laydown deployment to transmit a shock wave through the earth to collapse its target. Attacks against the Soviet deep underground leadership shelters in the Chekhov/Sharapovo area south of Moscow envisaged multiple B53/W53 exploding at ground level. It has since been supplanted in such roles by the earth-penetrating B61 Mod 11 a bomb that penetrates the surface to deliver much more of its explosive energy into the ground and therefore needs a much smaller yield to produce the same effects. The B53 was intended to be retired in the 1980s but 50 units remained in the active stockpile until the deployment of the B61-11 in 1997. At that point the obsolete B53s were slated for immediate disassembly; however the process of disassembling the units was greatly hampered by safety concerns and a lack of resources. The last remaining B53 bomb began the disassembly processes on Tuesday 25 October 2011 at the Energy Department's Pantex Plant. National Nuclear Security Administration, Pantex Plant unknown
书商的参考编号 : 74113
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National Nuclear Security Administration
Baseline Security Manual
Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration 2006. Change 1. Spiral bound. Very good. 38 pages plus approximately 100 pages of attachments which have no dissemination restrictions. Stated as Official Use Only and that the permission of the Government Program Manager was required for reproduction and that distribution was restricted to Program personnel. Name of previous owner was taped to top right of cover page. It has become unattached but is present with this document. The Secretary of Energy has approved the establishment of GRIM RETORT hereafter referred to as the Program and the implementation of security measures above normal collateral and restricted data security requirements. The purpose of this Manual is to establish the baseline security requirements and procedures for all National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA Special Access Programs SAPs. Additional or supplementary security requirements for individual SAPs may be stipulated in specific documentation such as Program Plans Classification Guides Program Security Manuals Operations Security OPSEC Plans etc. Attachments includes information such as References Definitions SAP Indoctrination Agreement Annual Security Refresher Briefing OPSEC Plan Model and Self-Assessment Checklist. Special Access Programs SAPs in the U.S. Federal Government are security protocols that provide highly classified information with safeguards and access restrictions that exceed those for regular collateral classified information. SAPs can range from black projects to routine but especially-sensitive operations such as COMSEC maintenance or Presidential transportation support. In addition to collateral controls a SAP may impose more stringent investigative or adjudicative requirements specialized nondisclosure agreements special terminology or markings exclusion from standard contract investigations carve-outs and centralized billet systems. Within the Department of Defense SAP is better known as "SAR" by the mandatory Special Access Required SAR markings. Two types of SAP exist—acknowledged and unacknowledged. The existence of an acknowledged SAP may be publicly disclosed but the details of the program remain classified. An unacknowledged SAP or USAP is made known only to authorized persons including members of the appropriate committees of the United States Congress. Waived SAPs are a subset of unacknowledged SAPs in the Department of Defense. These SAPs are exempt by statutory authority of the Secretary of Defense from most reporting requirements and within the legislative branch the only persons who are required to be informed of said SAPs are the chairpersons and ranking committee members of the Senate Appropriations Committee Senate Armed Services Committee House Appropriations Committee and the House Armed Services Committee. Oftentimes this notification is only oral. A SAP can only be initiated modified and terminated within their department or agency; the Secretary of State Secretary of Defense Secretary of Energy Secretary of Homeland Security the Attorney General the Director of National Intelligence; their principal deputies e.g. the Deputy Secretary of State in DoS and the Deputy Secretary of Defense in DoD; or others designated in writing by the President. These offices are better known as 'classification authorities.' They retain the right to declassify or revise classification levels. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
书商的参考编号 : 80756
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National Nuclear Security Administration
Challenge Coin/Commemorative Coin. 60th Anniversary of U.S.-U.K. Mutual Defense Agreement
Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration 2018. Presumed First Edition First minting thus. Coin/Medal. As new. Approximately 2.25 inches in diameter. Front side has a black band at the outer edge with Mutual Defense Agreement at the top 60 years of partnership and Security at the bottom and the center image has the flags of both nations large number 60 and smaller dates 1958 and 2018. The back side has the same black band and text and the center has the following text: Here we are together defending all that to free man is dear. Prime Minister Winston Churchill Addressing the U.S. Congress December 24 1941. The 1958 US-UK Mutual Defense Agreement or UK-US Mutual Defence Agreement is a bilateral treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom on nuclear weapons cooperation. The treaty's full name is Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. It allows the United States and the UK to exchange nuclear materials technology and information. While the US has nuclear cooperation agreements with other countries including France and some NATO countries this agreement is by far the most comprehensive. Harold Macmillan called it "the Great Prize" National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
书商的参考编号 : 75706
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National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, Office of Public Affairs
Civil Effects Tests; Nevada Test Site History DOE/NV - 714 Rev 1
Las Vegas NV: National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Office of Public Affairs 2004. Presumed First printing for Rev 1. Single sheet printed on both sides. Very good. Format is approximately 8.5 inches by 11 inches. Black and White illustrations and text on both sides. The Nevada Test Site was the primary testing location of American nuclear devices from 1951 to 1992; 928 announced nuclear tests occurred there. Of those 828 were underground. Sixty-two of the underground tests included multiple simultaneous nuclear detonations adding 93 detonations and bringing the total number of NTS nuclear detonations to 1021 of which 921 were underground. The site is covered with subsidence craters from the testing. The NTS was the United States' primary location for tests smaller than 1 Mt 4.2 PJ. 126 tests were conducted elsewhere including most larger tests. Many of these occurred at the Pacific Proving Grounds in the Marshall Islands. The last atmospheric test detonation at the Nevada Test Site was "Little Feller I" of Operation Sunbeam on July 17 1962. The Civil Defense Apple-2 shot on May 5 1955 was intended to test various building construction types in a nuclear blast. An assortment of buildings including residential houses and electrical substations were constructed at the site nicknamed "Survival Town". The Federal Civil Defense Administration FCDA also paved streets set up a radio station and a telephone system and scattered the so-called "Survival Town" with automobiles and fire trucks. The buildings were populated with mannequins and stocked with different types of canned and packaged foods. Not all of the buildings were destroyed in the blast and some of them still stand at Area 1 Nevada Test Site. A short film about the blast referred to as "Operation Cue" was distributed by the FCDA. The houses are still standing at 37.04476°N 116.07416°W at the east and west ends of the road loop. They are stops on the Nevada National Security Site NNSS tour. From declassified documents dated February to May 1956 the Apple-2 shot as part of Operation Teapot Project 35.5 "Effects of Nuclear Explosion on Records and Records Storage Equipment" was staged on the Nevada Test Site to determine the effects of nuclear explosions on various types of records and record storage equipment. National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, Office of Public Affairs unknown
书商的参考编号 : 81036
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National Nuclear Security Administration
Departure Ceremony for Marty Schoenbauer May 28 2008
Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration 2008. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. Single sheet printed on both sides. Very good. This is an approximately 8.5 inch by 11 inch sheet of stiff card paper folded at the center to create four 5.5 by 8.5 inch panels. Illustrations are on the front and back panels. Text is on all panels. Marty was born February 191953 in St. Louis Park Minnesota. He was a graduate of Montgomery High School in 1971 the U.S. Naval Academy in 1975 and the George Washington University in 1981. Marty was a U.S. Naval officer for 20 years and civil servant for 20 years with 8 of those years in the Senior Executive Service of the U.S. Department of Energy. He retired for the third time in April 2018 after 4 years at Honeywell. Marty honorably served his country in a number of Uniformed Service civilian and private sector career. This event program marked his departure from the Office of Defense Programs to take on a critically important Department of Energy position at the United States Embassy in Beijing People's Republic of China where he was the Secretary's Representative and Senior DOE representative in China. Copies of such event programs rarely survive the event itself. Presiding at the departure event was Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs Robert L. Smolen and making the major presentation was Thomas P. D'Agostino Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration. The senior representative of the United States Department of Energy at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing China is responsible for leading a team to advance U.S. security and economic interests in the areas of energy science and technology and nuclear security and nonproliferation. In this role the senior representative is responsible for developing analyses and recommendations for the Secretary on key strategic initiatives with China related to the overall energy relationship. The representative is responsible for conducting in-depth analyses for comprehensive energy policy planning and strategic decision making on international energy policy and investment and trade issues. The representative provides insights briefings and other comprehensive analyses on key energy issues in China and Asia more broadly including on the issues of energy security clean energy development and deployment energy efficiency clean energy technology innovation and bilateral and multilateral cooperation initiatives among others. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
书商的参考编号 : 82252
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National Nuclear Security Administration
Engineering Campaign Technology Roadmap; Translating Vision into Reality for Defense Engineering
Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration 2009. Presumed First Edition First printing. Velobound. Very good. 34 pages including covers. Figures color. Acronyms. Plastic sheet protects front and back covers. This had been marked "Official Use Only" but due to the passage of time and commercial and technology developments it is understood that this limitation no longer applies. The Engineering Campaign Focus Areas were: Robust Surety Responsive Weapon Engineering Performance in Radiation Environments Enhanced Lifetime Assessments and Engineering Infrastructure. The Engineering Campaign provides the Nuclear Security Enterprise with modern technologies tools and capabilities to ensure the safety security reliability and performance of the current and future US nuclear weapon stockpile and provides the nuclear weapon enterprise with a sustained engineering basis for stockpile assessment and certification. The Engineering Campaign Technology Roadmap serves as the long-term program guidance from the federal program managers to the Engineering Campaign community linking the National Nuclear Security Administration mission vision and program structure to the planning and execution of the Engineering Campaign program. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
书商的参考编号 : 77514
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National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Operations Office
Enhanced Test Readiness Cost Study
Las Vegas NV: NNSA 2002. First Edition. First Printing. very good. 69 spiral bound illus. some in color. DOE/NV-828. NNSA is part of the U.S. Department of Energy. This report contains the findings and recommendations of the test readiness cost study charted by John Gordon Administrator for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration. This study addresses the costs of moving from a readiness posture of 24-36 months to an 18-month enhanced test readiness posture. NNSA unknown
书商的参考编号 : 38203
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National Nuclear Security Administration
Environmental Assessment for the Proposed Construction and Operation of a Biosafety Level 3 Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory Los Alamos New Mexico
Los Alamos New Mexico: U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Los Alamos Site Operations 2002. 1st . Paper Back. Near Fine/No Jacket. 4to - over 9¾" - 12" tall. 120pp.lg.appendix section; SC lg.blk.plastic comb-binding; white w/blk.&clear plastic coverno title on spine; slight rub w/cleantight pgs. Environmental assessment for biosafety facility to focus on counter-terrorism technologies. <br/> <br/> U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Los Alamos Site Operations unknown
书商的参考编号 : 011654
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National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, Office of Public Affairs
Fuze Testing at Yucca Lake; Nevada Test Site History DOE/NV - - 1069
Las Vegas NV: National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Office of Public Affairs 2005. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. Single sheet printed on both sides. Very good. Format is approximately 8.5 inches by 11 inches. Illustrations and text on both sides. The Nevada Test Site was the primary testing location of American nuclear devices from 1951 to 1992; 928 announced nuclear tests occurred there. Of those 828 were underground. Sixty-two of the underground tests included multiple simultaneous nuclear detonations adding 93 detonations and bringing the total number of NTS nuclear detonations to 1021 of which 921 were underground. The site is covered with subsidence craters from the testing. The NTS was the United States' primary location for tests smaller than 1 Mt 4.2 PJ. 126 tests were conducted elsewhere including most larger tests. Many of these occurred at the Pacific Proving Grounds in the Marshall Islands. The last atmospheric test detonation at the Nevada Test Site was "Little Feller I" of Operation Sunbeam on July 17 1962. Sandia staff members traveled periodically from Salton Sea to Yucca Flat to test contact fuzing. Sandia conducted ballistic tests and monitored the operation of fuzing and firing systems. As requirements evolved it was determined that to test contact fuzing a large area of nearly "tabletop flat" land was needed. A temporary test site was secured in late 1954 on the bed of Yucca Lake in Nevada. National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, Office of Public Affairs unknown
书商的参考编号 : 81057
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National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Programs
FY 2016 Mid-Year Review Production Support & Management Technology and Production MTP; Feb 23rd -25th 2016
Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Defense Programs 2016. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. Three Ring Binder. Good. Unpaginated with about 1.5 inches of material. This binder contains Tabs 1 through 7 on Management Technology and Production CNS Pantex CNS Y-12 NSC KC LANL LLNL SNL and SRS and Tabs 8 through 13 on Production Support CNS Pantex CNS Y-12 NSC KC LANL SNL and SRS Pencil notes on table of contents precedes Tab 1. Handwritten notes observed on several pages. Under MTP at Tab 4 LANL there is an additional sheet unpunched laid in entitled LANL FY 17 Budget Scenarios: Current Core & Transitional Scope. This work is a compilation of vuegraph presentations. While unmarked on the cover there is some material marked Official Use Only which it is understood not longer applies since that limitation was almost certainly due to the pre-decisional nature of then upcoming budget decisions. Such decisions were made a number of years ago such that there can be no fiscal or policy sensitivities remaining. Stockpile stewardship refers to the United States program of reliability testing and maintenance of its nuclear weapons without the use of nuclear testing. Because no new nuclear weapons have been developed by the United States since 1992 even its youngest weapons are at least 27 years old as of 2020. Aging weapons can fail or act unpredictably in a number of ways: the high explosives that condense their fissile material can chemically degrade their electronic components can suffer from decay their radioactive plutonium/uranium cores are potentially unreliable and the isotopes used by thermonuclear weapons may be chemically unstable as well. Since the United States has also not tested nuclear weapons since 1992 this leaves the task of its stockpile maintenance resting on the use of simulations using non-nuclear explosives tests and supercomputers among other methods and applications of scientific knowledge about physics and chemistry to the specific problems of weapons aging the latter method is what is meant when various agencies refer to their work as "science-based". It also involves the manufacture of additional plutonium "pits" to replace ones of unknown quality and finding other methods to increase the lifespan of existing warheads and maintain a confident nuclear deterrent. Most work for stockpile stewardship is undertaken at United States Department of Energy national laboratories mostly at Los Alamos National Laboratory Sandia National Laboratories Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory the Nevada Test Site and Department of Energy productions facilities which employ around 27500 personnel and cost billions of dollars per year to operate. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program is a United States Department of Energy program to ensure that the nuclear capabilities of the United States are not eroded as nuclear weapons age. National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Programs unknown
书商的参考编号 : 79773
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National Nuclear Security Administration Defense Programs
FY11-FY17 Effective Surveillance Program Requirements and Workload Planning
Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Defense Programs 2010. Presumed first compilation--The number of copies made is unknown. Three Ring Binder. Good. Attendance list of 12-13 2011 Jan Surveillance Summit in front pocket--more than 30 names. List of 19 filled tabs 31 tabs present for 20-31 do not appear to have ever been filled. Tabbed items include: Effective Surveillance Program Memo dated 26 April 2010 then SNL LLNL and LANL responses then Requirements Workload Planning document of 22 Oct. 2010 followed by LLNL SRS KCP LANL PX SNL. Y12 NSO responses to the 22 Oct Memo followed by Summary of responses to 22 Oct Memo then followed by FYNSP responses from LLNL LANL and SNL followed by a Consolidated FYNSP responses. The 19th tab has the slides for workload meeting. Additional material in rear pocket: Surveillance Enterprise Governance 34 hard copy vugraphs 4 to a page--with some ink notations One page on NNSA Nuclear Weapons Surveillance Program 2 copies--one with notes on back One vugraph on FY 11 Surveillance Requirements and Over Targets with substantial notes Additional information on Consolidated Six Year Surveillance Requirements 12 sheets Greenaugh e-mail on Requirements workload 2 pages staples Illinger e-mail on Baselining New Surveillance Requirements 3 pages stapled Mangum e-mail on Surveillance Numbers 3 pages stapled 1 page on requires by site and funding program E-mail from Mangum on surveillance numbers 2 pages stapled with notes e-mail from Sinkular on NA 12 update 2 pages stapled with notes. Notes on November 5 2010 Goodrum Memo Teleconference and one page hardcopy vugraph on FY 11 Surveillance comparison. The use of data from surveillance of our nuclear weapons enables us to predict how the weapons will perform over time without nuclear explosive testing. This capability has improved significantly over the past decade and provides us with the capability to ensure an effective nuclear stockpile. Surveillance information is critical for the predictive models used in the annual nuclear weapon assessment process. These tools and the detailed quantitative modeling they support serve as key elements of the capability to maintain a safe secure and effective U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without underground nuclear explosive testing. The National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA annual assessment process has evolved significantly since the end of underground nuclear explosive testing to ensure an effective nuclear weapons stockpile. The current approach aims to achieve a comprehensive science-based understanding of nuclear weapon systems. Surveillance tools and models play critical roles in providing information essential to assessing weapon safety security and performance changes that would impact military effectiveness without performing underground nuclear explosive tests. These surveillance tools aid in the understanding of two conditions of weapons systems: the "as-built" and "as-aged" conditions. The "as-built" condition reflects the frequency and severity of original design or manufacturing defects. The "as-aged" condition reflects the evolution of age-related changes in materials components and subsystems that can alter performance. Over the last few years several advances in this area have contributed to a better understanding of the condition of our existing nuclear weapons and the ways in which the current condition could affect safety reliability or performance. Through the weapons surveillance program the U.S. has in-depth knowledge of the core components housed within weapons by using technologies such as nondestructive laser gas sampling and high-resolution computed tomography. System tests also assess the functionality of all major non-nuclear components. National Nuclear Security Administration, Defense Programs unknown
书商的参考编号 : 80985
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National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, Office of Public Affairs
Gravel Gertie; Nevada Test Site History DOE/NV - - 710 - Rev 1
Las Vegas NV: National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Office of Public Affairs 2004. Presumed First printing Rev 1. Single sheet printed on both sides. Very good. Format is approximately 8.5 inches by 11 inches. Illustrations and text on both sides. The Nevada Test Site was the primary testing location of American nuclear devices from 1951 to 1992; 928 announced nuclear tests occurred there. Of those 828 were underground. Sixty-two of the underground tests included multiple simultaneous nuclear detonations adding 93 detonations and bringing the total number of NTS nuclear detonations to 1021 of which 921 were underground. The site is covered with subsidence craters from the testing. The NTS was the United States' primary location for tests smaller than 1 Mt 4.2 PJ. 126 tests were conducted elsewhere including most larger tests. Many of these occurred at the Pacific Proving Grounds in the Marshall Islands. The last atmospheric test detonation at the Nevada Test Site was "Little Feller I" of Operation Sunbeam on July 17 1962. A Gravel Gertie is a type of bunker designed to provide containment during the nuclear weapons assembly process when the plutonium or highly enriched uranium "pit" is mated with the high explosive components and wired into the electronics the "physics package" of the warhead. The Gravel Gertie was developed for the Atomic Energy Commission in 1957 by Sandia National Laboratories. It was named after the character of the same name from the Dick Tracy comics; the compressed mass of gravel forming the ceiling of the bunker reportedly reminded researchers of Gertie's grey curly hair. A modification of existing domed munitions bunkers the Gravel Gertie was designed specifically to contain nuclear materials in the event of a catastrophic "low order" detonation of a bomb being serviced. Full nuclear detonation was highly unlikely and impossible to design against but high-ton/low-kiloton level "fizzles" were a very real risk during assembly disassembly and maintenance especially when servicing older designs with fewer redundant failsafes and more room for error. A Gravel Gertie has thick reinforced concrete walls and roof but a large vent in the top to prevent the shell from rupturing in an explosion. Below the roof however is approximately 7 meters of loosely compressed porous gravel suspended from steel cables above a false ceiling over the work area. In the event of an explosion the mass of gravel is designed to compress and move upward with the initial blast sealing the hole in the roof while allowing some of the gas pressure to escape by passing through the gravel. This "filters" the escaping gases and prevents the building from rupturing. The mass of gravel then falls down into the room when the gases cool trapping large amounts of radioactive particles under and within the gravel further minimizing leakage. The design specification called for an ability to "sufficiently contain" a 1 kiloton fizzle. According to tests at Sandia the Gravel Gertie successfully reduced the expected level of external airborne contamination by a factor of 10 which was considered satisfactory to limit exposure to the immediate area. The bunkers were installed at all US and British facilities that performed warhead arming and de-arming. The distinctive shape of the Gertie also makes it impossible to conceal its purpose from outside observers. National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, Office of Public Affairs unknown
书商的参考编号 : 81058
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National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Programs
High Explosives Integrated Strategy Team Files 11/12/2002; HE Team Closeout
Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Defense Programs 2002. Copy of Team Files. CD-R. Very good. This CD contains a treasure trove of information on High Explosive operations and facilities at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory the Los Alamos National Laboratory Sandia National Laboratories the Nevada Test Site and the Pantex Plant. This CD has the files that are excel spread sheets PDF files JPG files Power Point files and Word files. The material includes the scope team membership information from the sites information on sizing etc. This information was developed to address consolidation options between nuclear weapon laboratories and plants with an aim to reduce some costs. Major high explosive operations included research and development explosive testing detonator and small quantity production and 'main charge' production for nuclear weapons. Posted on-line--Los Alamos demonstrated the first use of plastic-bonded explosives in a nuclear explosion in 1956. This development allowed the shift from precision machined cast explosives to formulations containing high concentrations of high-energy density compounds with reduced sensitivity more uniformity and better mechanical characteristics. Since the 1960s Livermore has been researching and developing safer HE for Livermore-designed weapons. The plastic coating that binds the explosive granules typically 5 to 20% of each formulation by weight is what gives each PBX its distinctive characteristics. Pressing a PBX molding powder converts it into a solid mass with the polymer binder providing both mechanical rigidity and reduced sensitivity to accidental detonation. The choice of binder affects hardness safety and stability. The TATB-based formulations of Livermore's LX-17 and Los Alamos's PBX 9502 are "insensitive" high explosives IHE; others are termed "conventional." National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Programs unknown
书商的参考编号 : 75230
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National Nuclear Security Administration
High-Energy-Density Physics Study Report; A Comprehensive Study of the Role of High-Energy-Density Physics in the Stockpile Stewardship Program
2001. Fourth Printing stated. Velobound. Very good. Various paginations approximately 180 pages. Illustrations color. Bibliography. Appendices A-K includes Glossary and Acronyms. Figures. Distribution memorandum laid in. In its fiscal year FY 2001 Energy and Water Development Appropriation Congress directed the National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA to complete a study that "includes conclusions as to whether the full-scale NIF National Ignition Facility is required in order to maintain the safety and reliability of the current nuclear weapons stockpile and whether alternatives to the NIF could achieve the objective of maintaining the safety and reliability of the current nuclear weapons stockpile." To meet this requirement the NNSA has conducted a detailed study of the role of high-energy-density physics HEDP and NIF in the Stockpile Stewardship Program SSP. The principal finding of this study is that a vital HEDP Program is an essential component of the SSP. Based on this finding the Office of Defense Programs DP recommends the continuation of the baseline HEDP Program including 192-beam NIF with the goal of achieving ignition. Section 3.4.6 addresses an aspect of nuclear weapons effects testing. Section 4.4 is entitled Weapons Effects. The SSP was established in response to the FY 1994 National Defense Authorization Act P.L. 103-160 Sect. 3138 which called on the Secretary of Energy to "establish a stewardship program to ensure the preservation of the core intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons." In the absence of nuclear testing the SSP must: 1 support a focused multifaceted program to increase the understanding of the enduring stockpile; 2 predict detect and evaluate potential problems due to the aging of the stockpile; 3 refurbish and remanufacture weapons and components as required; and 4 maintain the science and engineering institutions needed to support the nation's nuclear deterrent now and in the future. The principal outcomes of the SSP are confidence in safety security and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons and a cadre of nuclear-skilled personnel underpinning nuclear deterrence. The NNSA national laboratories agree that a strong and diverse HEDP Program is an essential component of the SSP. An excellent understanding of high-energy-density physics is required to understand the operation of nuclear weapons. The fundamental requirements for the baseline HEDP Program are driven by meeting the needs of the stockpile and by a commitment to related broader national scientific interests. Based on these requirements the HEDP Program has developed a set of strategic goals in the following areas: weapons physics ignition high yield radiation effects basic science and supporting technologies. To determine if the HEDP Program is properly optimized to meet the needs of DP's mission DP invited senior members of the defense and scientific communities to examine high-energy-density activities conducted throughout the SSP. These study panel members were asked specifically to assess the role of high-energy-density physics within the SSP and to examine the facilities and program elements within the HEDP Program to assure that the goals of the SSP are met in the near and long term. Two areas that were not included directly in this study were HEDP activities within the Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign and the cost considerations associated with developing and operating the necessary experimental computational manufacturing and production capabilities required for the SSP. unknown
书商的参考编号 : 80996
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National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, Office of Public Affairs
Huron King; Nevada Test Site History DOE/NV - - 1089
Las Vegas NV: National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Office of Public Affairs 2005. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. Single sheet printed on both sides. Very good. Format is approximately 8.5 inches by 11 inches. Illustrations and text on both sides. The Nevada Test Site was the primary testing location of American nuclear devices from 1951 to 1992; 928 announced nuclear tests occurred there. Of those 828 were underground. Sixty-two of the underground tests included multiple simultaneous nuclear detonations adding 93 detonations and bringing the total number of NTS nuclear detonations to 1021 of which 921 were underground. The site is covered with subsidence craters from the testing. The NTS was the United States' primary location for tests smaller than 1 Mt 4.2 PJ. 126 tests were conducted elsewhere including most larger tests. Many of these occurred at the Pacific Proving Grounds in the Marshall Islands. The last atmospheric test detonation at the Nevada Test Site was "Little Feller I" of Operation Sunbeam on July 17 1962. The Huron King test was intended to address concerns about how atmospheric nuclear detonation might affect military communication satellites in orbit. A nuclear explosion produces a large electromagnetic pulse or EMP in short that can be used by an enemy to inflict secondary damage upon electrical and electronic systems by generating high levels of current and voltage surges to burn out sensitive components such as semi-conductors. An electromagnetic bomb can devastate and render functionless any modern society that rely on electricity by knocking out their power grid and disrupting communication equipment. In 1962 the US conducted a high-altitude nuclear test code-named "Starfish Prime" where they detonated a 1.44 megaton bomb 400 kilometers above the mid-Pacific Ocean. 1400 kilometers away in Hawaii the EMP blast knocked off streetlights set off burglar alarms and damaged a microwave link. In the months following the Starfish Prime test at least six low earth orbit satellites failed due to radiation damage including the one that was launched prior to the test to measure the distribution of radiation produced by the blast. In the Soviet Union too similar research on EMP was being conducted. The same year Starfish Prime took place Soviet scientists detonated a 300 kiloton bomb at an altitude of 290 km above Kazakhstan. To measure the effects of the EMP arising from the blast they strung a 570 kilometer-long overhead telephone line and fitted them with fuses and gas-filled overvoltage protectors. The EMP from the test caused all the fuses to blow and all of the overvoltage protectors to fire along the entire length of the test-line. Furthermore the EMP set on fire the electrical power plant in the city of Karaganda by inducing currents in a 1000 km long shallow buried power cable. Despite the lower yield of the bomb in comparison to that of Starfish Prime the EMP damage caused by the Soviet bomb was much greater because the tests were done over a large populated land mass and the earth's greater magnetic filed at the location also assisted to concentrate the effects of the EMP. National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, Office of Public Affairs unknown
书商的参考编号 : 81055
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National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, Office of Public Affairs
Icecap; Nevada Test Site History DOE/NV - - 1212
Las Vegas NV: National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Office of Public Affairs 2007. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. Single sheet printed on both sides. Very good. Format is approximately 8.5 inches by 11 inches. Illustrations and text on both sides. The Nevada Test Site was the primary testing location of American nuclear devices from 1951 to 1992; 928 announced nuclear tests occurred there. Of those 828 were underground. Sixty-two of the underground tests included multiple simultaneous nuclear detonations adding 93 detonations and bringing the total number of NTS nuclear detonations to 1021 of which 921 were underground. The site is covered with subsidence craters from the testing. The NTS was the United States' primary location for tests smaller than 1 Mt 4.2 PJ. 126 tests were conducted elsewhere including most larger tests. Many of these occurred at the Pacific Proving Grounds in the Marshall Islands. The last atmospheric test detonation at the Nevada Test Site was "Little Feller I" of Operation Sunbeam on July 17 1962. Icecap would have been a joint United States - United Kingdom underground nuclear test planned for 1993. Icecap would have been the 929th nuclear test at the Nevada Test Site. Icecap was scheduled in the 20 to 150 kiloton range. The blast would have vaporized the diagnostic rack and melted the rock around it. There were a total of 24 joint tests at the Nevada Test Site. The Icecap emplacement tower remains in Area 1 at the Nevada Test Site. National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, Office of Public Affairs unknown
书商的参考编号 : 81054
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National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention; Annual Report Fiscal Year 2001
Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 2001. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. Wraps. Very good. 19 13 pages. Mostly printed on both sides of a sheet. Sheets/project posters on several IPP projects are included at the back of this document. This year's report covers a year that involved a number of exciting developments in the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention IPP program. The program receives a significant vote of confidence for its commercialization focus with for successful IPP projects attracting $56 million in private venture capital funds. These funds were in addition to the already substantial contribution from U.S. industry partners who more than match U.S. government funding on each new IPP project. The IPP program also resumed operation in Kazakhstan and Ukraine adding the scientific talent of these countries to the technology resource base now available to U.S. industry partners. The program's nonproliferation objectives are met with increasing success as a growing number of former Soviet weapons scientists are engaged both in the course of ongoing work as well as in the jobs that are being created by successfully completed IPP projects. Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a central part of US national security policy. A principal instrument of the Department of Energy`s DOE`s program for securing weapons of mass destruction technology and expertise and removing incentives for scientists engineers and technicians in the newly independent states NIS of the former Soviet Union to go to rogue countries or assist terrorist groups is the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention IPP. IPP was initiated pursuant to the 1994 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. IPP is a nonproliferation program with a commercialization strategy. IPP seeks to enhance US national security and to achieve nonproliferation objectives by engaging scientists engineers and technicians from former NIS weapons institutes; redirecting their activities in cooperatively-developed commercially viable non-weapons related projects. These projects lead to commercial and economic benefits for both the NIS and the US IPP projects are funded in Russian Ukraine Kazakhstan and Belarus. This booklet offers an overview of the IPP program as well as a sampling of some of the projects which are currently underway. National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation paperback
书商的参考编号 : 79902
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National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office/National Security Technologies, Office of Public Affairs
Joint Verification Experiment-25 Years Event Photographs
Las Vegas: National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office/National Security Technologies Office of Public Affairs 2013. Presumed First thus. DVD-RW. Very good. This contains dozens of photographs from the event in JPG format. There are multiple images in files titled: Day 1 Day 2 Day 2 Part 2 Dinner Dinner 2 Kearsarge GZ NSF Group Photo Steakhouse and U1a-Jasper. The United States part of the Joint Verification Experiment carried out in 1988 as the Kearsarge event in Operation Touchstone. Twenty-five years later before tensions increased between Russia and the United States a joint commemoration of the event was held at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site formerly the Nevada Test Site. This DVD contains photographs taken throughout the two day event. The objective of the JVE was to calibrate the seismic yield estimation capability of underground nuclear explosions conducted in both countries. It involved the unprecedented US on-site yield measurement of a Soviet nuclear explosion at its then nuclear test site in Kazakhstan and the reciprocal Soviet on-site yield measurement of a US nuclear explosion at the Nevada Test Site. JVE provided the first opportunity for scientists from US and Soviet nuclear weapons laboratories to meet and work cooperatively. At the Nevada Test Site and at the follow-on experiment at the Soviet Semipalatinsk Test Site they developed confidence-building steps that made possible the ratification of the TTBT in 1990. Both Russians and Americans agree that cooperation between US and Soviet nuclear weapons scientists began with the JVE and the follow-on discussions on the TTBT verification mechanisms during the Geneva negotiations. National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office/National Security Technologies, Office of Public Affairs unknown
书商的参考编号 : 76278
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National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office/National Security Technologies, Office of Public Affairs
Joint Verification Experiment 25th Anniversary
Las Vegas NV: National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office/National Security Technologies Office of Public Affairs 2013. Presumed First thus. DVD-RW. Very good. This has two files. One of JVE historic photographs as a powerpoint presentation with about 160 images. The second file is a WMV format and is about a 40 minute video of Ambassador Paul Robinson's remarks shown at the commemoration. The United States part of the Joint Verification Experiment carried out in 1988 as the Kearsarge event in Operation Touchstone. Twenty-five years later before tensions increased between Russia and the United States a joint commemoration of the event was held at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site formerly the Nevada Test Site. The objective of the JVE was to calibrate the seismic yield estimation capability of underground nuclear explosions conducted in both countries. It involved the unprecedented US yield measurement of a Soviet nuclear explosion at its then nuclear test site in Kazakhstan and the reciprocal Soviet yield measurement of a US nuclear explosion at the Nevada Test Site. JVE provided the first opportunity for scientists from US and Soviet nuclear weapons laboratories to meet and work cooperatively. At the Nevada Test Site and at the follow-on experiment at the Soviet Semipalatinsk Test Site they developed confidence-building steps that made possible the ratification of the TTBT in 1990. Both Russians and Americans agree that cooperation between US and Soviet nuclear weapons scientists began with the JVE and the follow-on discussions on the TTBT verification mechanisms during the Geneva negotiations. National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office/National Security Technologies, Office of Public Affairs unknown
书商的参考编号 : 76279
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National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office/National Security Technologies, Office of Public Affairs
JVE 1988-2013
Las Vegas NV: National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office/National Security Technologies Office of Public Affairs 2013. Presumed First thus. DVD-RW. Very good. Set of 6 DVDs. Volume 1 Welcome Ponomarev Paul Robinson Soloshin and Allen; Volume 2 Historic Panel: Aquilina Shubin Wilkes Hawkins; Volume 3 Historic Panel: Dunlop Turnbull Petrov Sandoval Zucca; Volume 4 Future Panel Browne Warner Wallace McDowell Kostyukov Aheleznov Loparev; Volume 5 Shubin and Future Recommendations PanelKickuck Hecker Lehman Hunter; and Volume 6 Voloshin Vic Reis Next Steps Panel: Cook Harrington Gottemoeller Kamenskikh and Document Signing and Conference Close. The United States part of the Joint Verification Experiment carried out in 1988 as the Kearsarge event in Operation Touchstone. Twenty-five years later a joint commemoration of the event was held at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site formerly the Nevada Test Site. The objective of the JVE was to calibrate the seismic yield estimation capability of underground nuclear explosions conducted in both countries. It involved the unprecedented US yield measurement of a Soviet nuclear explosion at its then nuclear test site in Kazakhstan and the reciprocal Soviet yield measurement of a US nuclear explosion at the Nevada Test Site JVE provided the first opportunity for scientists from US and Soviet nuclear weapons laboratories to meet and work cooperatively. At the Nevada Test Site and at the follow-on experiment at the Soviet Semipalatinsk Test Site they developed confidence-building steps that made possible the ratification of the TTBT in 1990. National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office/National Security Technologies, Office of Public Affairs unknown
书商的参考编号 : 76282
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National Nuclear Security Administration
JVE English 10/13 Written in ink on disk
National Nuclear Security Administration 2013. Presumed First thus. CD-RW. Very good. This has one file with 27 powerpoint items on it. These include presentations by Shubin Loparev Zheleznov McDowell Wallace Warner Lehman Hecker Voloshin Reis Zucca Sandoval Petrov Felske Hawkins and Ponomarev plus panel related material and the JVE coin. Among the topics covered include Trust but Verify Optimizing Rosatom JVE Results Seismic Hydrodynamic Monitoring Geophysics Geology Technical Elements Next Steps and Future Cooperation. The United States part of the Joint Verification Experiment carried out in 1988 as the Kearsarge event in Operation Touchstone. Twenty-five years later before tensions increased between Russia and the United States a joint commemoration of the event was held at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site formerly the Nevada Test Site. JVE provided the first opportunity for scientists from US and Soviet nuclear weapons laboratories to meet and work cooperatively. At the Nevada Test Site and at the follow-on experiment at the Soviet Semipalatinsk Test Site they developed confidence-building steps that made possible the ratification of the TTBT in 1990. Both Russians and Americans agree that cooperation between US and Soviet nuclear weapons scientists began with the JVE and the follow-on discussions on the TTBT verification mechanisms during the Geneva negotiations. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
书商的参考编号 : 76280
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National Nuclear Security Administration
JVE Russian 10/13 Written in ink on disk
National Nuclear Security Administration 2013. Presumed First thus. CD-RW. Very good. This has one file with 27 powerpoint items on it. In Russian: These appear to include presentations by Shubin Loparev Zheleznov McDowell Wallace Warner Lehman Hecker Voloshin Reis Zucca Sandoval Petrov Felske Hawkins and Ponomarev plus panel related material and the JVE coin. Among the topics covered include Trust but Verify Optimizing Rosatom JVE Results Seismic Hydrodynamic Monitoring Geophysics Geology Technical Elements Next Steps and Future Cooperation. The United States part of the Joint Verification Experiment carried out in 1988 as the Kearsarge event in Operation Touchstone. Twenty-five years later before tensions increased between Russia and the United States a joint commemoration of the event was held at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site formerly the Nevada Test Site. JVE provided the first opportunity for scientists from US and Soviet nuclear weapons laboratories to meet and work cooperatively. At the Nevada Test Site and at the follow-on experiment at the Soviet Semipalatinsk Test Site they developed confidence-building steps that made possible the ratification of the TTBT in 1990. Both Russians and Americans agree that cooperation between US and Soviet nuclear weapons scientists began with the JVE and the follow-on discussions on the TTBT verification mechanisms during the Geneva negotiations. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
书商的参考编号 : 76281
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National Nuclear Security Administration
M&O Cost Analysis FY2011; ICF and Science Campaigns
Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration 2011. Presumed First thus. Three Ring Binder. Good. Includes sections on LANL ICF LLNL ICF SNL ICF LANL ICF LLNL SC NNSS SC and SNL SC. Includes information on ICF Ignition Diagnostics Facility Operations Pulsed Power Science Campaign Primary Assessment Technologies Dynamic Materials Properties Advanced Radiography Secondary Assessment Technologies and Advanced Certification. Some of the cost breakdown is by: Chargebacks Purchases Travel Labor Equipment Training Subcontracts Other Direct Costs Material Institutional costs Service Center and Overheads. This is a rare snapshot into the range of expenditures and the monthly progression of expenditures. Cost analysis is a comparison of costs. Costs used to prepare financial statements are not the same as those used to control operations. Costs may be controllable or non-controllable and are subject to time periods and constraints. For example controllable costs are those the manager may authorize. However costs that may be able to be controlled over the long-term may not be controllable in the short-term.<br/><br/>Total cost is the relationship between production quantity and costs expressed as: Total cost = Fixed Cost Variable Cost Output<br/><br/>Costs are classified according to their behavior. A cost's behavior is how the cost responds to changes in the level of the business activity. Costs are broadly divided into variable costs and fixed costs. For example the total variable cost increases and decreases in relation to the changes in business activity levels. Conversely fixed costs are not affected by business activity level changes remaining the same throughout. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
书商的参考编号 : 80419
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National Nuclear Security Administration, Defense Programs
Management Technology & Production MTP and Production Support PS FY10 Program Review and FYNSP Planning Meeting November 17-18 2010; Enabling the Nuclear Security Enterprise to meet weapon production requirements
Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Defense Programs 2010. Presumed First Edition First printing --number of copies assembled is unknown. Three Ring Binder. Very good. The Table of Contents is: MTP 32 vugraphs 4 per page PS 59 vugraphs 4 per page KCP 20 vugraphs 1 per page PX 55 vugraphs--various paginations--1 per page SRS 41 vugraphs--various paginations--1 per page Y12 41 vugraphs--various paginations--1 per page LANL 38 vugraphs--various paginations--1 per page LLNL 48 vugraphs--various paginations--1 per page SNL 158 vugraphs--various paginations--1 per page Agenda 3 pages and Participant list 1 page. In the back pocket is a November 2010 Updated to the NDAA of FY 2010 Section 1251 Report and a stapled seven sheet compilation of Budget Requirements. Some material was marked Official Use Only but this limitation is understood to not longer apply due to the passage of time and public dissemination of comparable information. Approximately 2 inches of material in the binder. The Production Support Program is a DSW Program that funds multi-system manufacturing-based activities that provide individual site production capabilities and capacity for the LEPs LLC production weapon surveillance and weapon assembly and disassembly operations. The Production Support Program also enables the modernization of production capabilities to improve efficiency and ensure that manufacturing operations meet future requirements. This includes maintenance/calibration services for manufacturing operations to meet DoD War Reserve requirements. Collectively these activities directly support execution of systems engineering concepts and production integration. The Production Support Program provides DSW with the capability to conduct life extension work stockpile surveillance dismantlement work neutron generator production and detonator cable assembly production. The Management Technology and Production MTP Program's work scope is a multi-system production-based program that promotes nuclear security enterprise integration and enhances efficiency. MTP activities provide the products components and/or services for multi-weapon system surveillance laboratory/flight test data collection and analysis; weapons reliability reporting to DoD; DSW requirements tracking and execution; management and operation; and stockpile planning. The MTP Program funds plant and laboratory personnel to sustain the stockpile through activities related to surveillance; weapons response process improvements; engineering authorizations; safety assessments; use control technologies; containers; base spares; studies and assessments for nuclear operation safety; production of weapon components for use in multiple weapons systems; and transportation/handling gear for use in multiple weapons systems. The MTP Program also includes activities that benefit the nuclear security enterprise mission as differentiated from Production Support activities which support internal site-specific production missions. National Nuclear Security Administration, Defense Programs unknown
书商的参考编号 : 80986
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National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Safety Infrastructure and Operations
Master Asset Plan MAP 2018; Safe Operations Effective Infrastructure Enterprise Services
Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Safety Infrastructure and Operations 2018. Presumed First Edition First printing. Spiral bound. Very good. 58 pages. Illustrations color. Map. Acronyms. Clear plastic sheets at front and back covers. This 2018 Master Asset Plan MAP lays out the National Nuclear Security Administration's NNSA infrastructure vision and highlights strategic investments being made to achieve it. It is an update to the first-ever 2017 MAP which described how NNSA's infrastructure supports it's unique mission requirements and the gaps and mission risks inherent in that infrastructure. Safe reliable and modern infrastructure at NNSA's national laboratories and production plants is absolutely essential to accomplish our vital national security mission and ensure the well-being of our workforce. As the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states there is no margin for further delay in improving the state of NNSA's infrastructure. Significant and sustained investments will be required during the next quarter century to recapitalize and revitalize the nuclear security enterprise. The Master Asset Plan assembles data into a single report that presents an integrated view of NNSA's infrastructure strategy. National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations unknown
书商的参考编号 : 75546
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National Nuclear Security Administration
Milestone Tool
Albuquerque NM: National Nuclear Security Administration 2003. Presumed First Edition First printing. Brochure. Very good. Format is approximately 8.5 inches by 11 inches. Tri-folded. Print on three panels on one side and one panel on the other side. This is a brochure for the Nuclear Weapons Complex Milestone Reporting Tool MRT. It described Online MRT access. Users needed a User name and a KERBEROS Password. There is a screen shot and directons about adding a milestone editing a milestone viewing a milestone deleting a milestone and preparing Milestone reports. The Milestone Reporting Tool was a web-based tool for the assessment and reporting of Nuclear Weapon Complex National Milestones. This tool was supported by Sandia for the National Nuclear Security Administration. The U.S. nuclear weapons complex consists of a national industrial infrastructure for the physical production of nuclear weapons and their deployment systems as well as the scientific-engineering workforces that are responsible for the research and design of nuclear weapons and the federal workforce that integrates the nuclear weapons complex into U.S. military planning and operations. The industrial sites of the nuclear weapons complex include sites for the research and design of nuclear weapons the production of weapons components including plutonium pits the non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons and sites for the final assembly and storage of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are a multi-billion dollar a year enterprise in the United States. The workforce of the nuclear weapons complex at its main sites now consists of approximately 51000 persons spread across the United States working in the main labs factories and offices responsible for the bomb. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
书商的参考编号 : 76156
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National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Office of Public Affairs
Miss Atom Bomb; Nevada Test Site History DOE/NV - - 1024
Las Vegas NV: National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Office of Public Affairs 2004. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. Single sheet printed on both sides. Very good. Format is approximately 8.5 inches by 11 inches. Illustrations and text on both sides. The Nevada Test Site was the primary testing location of American nuclear devices from 1951 to 1992; 928 announced nuclear tests occurred there. Of those 828 were underground. Sixty-two of the underground tests included multiple simultaneous nuclear detonations adding 93 detonations and bringing the total number of NTS nuclear detonations to 1021 of which 921 were underground. The site is covered with subsidence craters from the testing. The NTS was the United States' primary location for tests smaller than 1 Mt 4.2 PJ. 126 tests were conducted elsewhere including most larger tests. Many of these occurred at the Pacific Proving Grounds in the Marshall Islands. The last atmospheric test detonation at the Nevada Test Site was "Little Feller I" of Operation Sunbeam on July 17 1962. Miss Atomic pageants are held in the United States generally in Nevada to celebrate the City of Las Vegas's modernity. The pageants were "inspired by the cultural phenomena Las Vegas decided to combine two of its major attractions-nuclear bombs and showgirls-into a beauty contest". There were only four "showgirl-turned-beauty-queens" and "there was no single Miss Atomic Bomb beauty pageant and most of the queens were simply showgirls chosen for their radiant . looks". "The queens came about in an only loosely related manner: atomic-themed usually of the mushroom cloud variety costumes." The first atomic pin-up girl Candyce King appeared on May 9 1952 in the Evening Telegraph Dixon Illinois and the Day Record Statesville North Carolina papers as "Miss Atomic Blast". In the spring of 1953 the city of North Las Vegas chose Paula Harris as Miss North Las Vegas of 1953 and gave her the nickname "Miss A-Bomb". In 1955 Operation Cue drew attention when it was delayed multiple times because of high winds and was nicknamed "Operation Mis-Cue." Linda Lawson was crowned "Miss Cue" on May 1 1955. The title was "to illustrate another mis-firing of the Operation Cue Bomb." Lawson's "crown" was a mushroom cloud. The last and most famous was Lee Merlin crowned as "Miss Atomic Bomb" coinciding with Operation Plumbbob while wearing a cotton mushroom cloud on the front of her swimsuit. The popular photograph by Don English was distributed nationally. She is currently "Miss Atomic". Don English of the Las Vegas Sun photographed her. National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, Office of Public Affairs unknown
书商的参考编号 : 81048
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National Nuclear Security Administration
NNSA Ignition Review Panel; National Ignition Campaign Review--June 2-3 2011 Volume 3
Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration 2011. Presumed First thus. Held together with a binder clip. Very good. Volume 3 ONLY. C. Deeney's copy per cover sheet. While stated as Volume 3 this appears to be a stand-alone item documenting the Third Review Panel Meeting. It is labeled on the cover shee as NIC Preliminary Data. The agenda covers June 2 and June 3 2011. Among the topics and presentations at tabs are NIC Overview by E. Moses NIC Technical Framework by J. Lindl Ignition Tuning Experiments by N. Landen Progress on Target Layering by J. Atherton Implosion Experiments by J. Edwards and ITF/ITFX Assessment by J. Lindl and NIC FY11 Go-Forward Schedule by J. Atherton. The presentations are printed with four frames per page with substantial use of color. The National Ignition Facility NIF is a large laser-based inertial confinement fusion ICF research device located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore California. NIF uses lasers to heat and compress a small amount of hydrogen fuel with the goal of inducing nuclear fusion reactions. NIF's mission is to achieve fusion ignition with high energy gain and to support nuclear weapon maintenance and design by studying the behavior of matter under the conditions found within nuclear weapons. NIF is the largest and most energetic ICF device built to date and the largest laser in the world. The National Ignition Campaign NIC was a multi-institution effort established under the National Nuclear Security Administration of DOE in 2005 prior to the completion of the National Ignition Facility NIF in 2009. The scope of the NIC was the planning and preparation for and the execution of the first 3 yr of ignition experiments through the end of September 2012 as well as the development fielding qualification and integration of the wide range of capabilities required for ignition. Besides the operation and optimization of the use of NIF these capabilities included over 50 optical x-ray and nuclear diagnostic systems target fabrication facilities experimental platforms and a wide range of NIF facility infrastructure. The goal of ignition experiments on the NIF is to achieve for the first time ignition and thermonuclear burn in the laboratory via inertial confinement fusion and to develop a platform for ignition and high energy density applications on the NIF. The goal of the NIC was to develop and integrate all of the capabilities required for a precision ignition campaign and if possible to demonstrate ignition and gain by the end of FY12. The goal of achieving ignition can be divided into three main challenges. The first challenge is defining specifications for the target laser and diagnostics with the understanding that not all ignition physics is fully understood and not all material properties are known. The second challenge is designing experiments to systematically remove these uncertainties. The third challenge is translating these experimental results into metrics designed to determine how well the experimental implosions have performed relative to expectations and requirements and to advance those metrics toward the conditions required for ignition. At project completion in 2009 NIF lacked almost all the diagnostics and infrastructure required for ignition experiments. About half of the 3 yr period covered in this review was taken up by the effort required to install and performance qualify the equipment and experimental platforms needed for ignition experiments. Ignition on the NIF is a grand challenge undertaking and the results presented here represent a snapshot in time on the path toward that goal. The path forward presented at the end of this review summarizes plans for the Ignition Campaign on the NIF which were adopted at the end of 2012 as well as some of the key results obtained since the end of the NIC. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
书商的参考编号 : 80403
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National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, Office of Public Affairs
Plowshare Program; Nevada Test Site History DOE/NV - -761 Rev 1
Las Vegas NV: National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Office of Public Affairs 2004. Presumed First printing of Rev 1. Single sheet printed on both sides. Very good. Format is approximately 8.5 inches by 11 inches. Illustrations and text on both sides. The Nevada Test Site was the primary testing location of American nuclear devices from 1951 to 1992; 928 announced nuclear tests occurred there. Of those 828 were underground. Sixty-two of the underground tests included multiple simultaneous nuclear detonations adding 93 detonations and bringing the total number of NTS nuclear detonations to 1021 of which 921 were underground. The site is covered with subsidence craters from the testing. The NTS was the United States' primary location for tests smaller than 1 Mt 4.2 PJ. 126 tests were conducted elsewhere including most larger tests. Many of these occurred at the Pacific Proving Grounds in the Marshall Islands. The last atmospheric test detonation at the Nevada Test Site was "Little Feller I" of Operation Sunbeam on July 17 1962. Project Plowshare was the overall United States program for the development of techniques to use nuclear explosives for peaceful construction purposes. As part of the program 31 nuclear warheads were detonated in 27 separate tests. Plowshare was the US portion of what are called Peaceful Nuclear Explosions PNE; a similar Soviet program was carried out under the name Nuclear Explosions for the National Economy. Successful demonstrations of non-combat uses for nuclear explosives include rock blasting stimulation of tight gas chemical element manufacture unlocking some of the mysteries of the R-process of stellar nucleosynthesis and probing the composition of the Earth's deep crust creating reflection seismology vibroseis data which has helped geologists and follow-on mining company prospecting. The project's uncharacteristically large and atmospherically vented Sedan nuclear test also led geologists to determine that Barringer crater was formed as a result of a meteor impact and not from a volcanic eruption as had earlier been assumed. This became the first crater on Earth definitely proven to be from an impact event. Negative impacts from Project Plowshare's tests generated significant public opposition which eventually led to the program's termination in 1977. These consequences included Tritiated water projected to increase by CER Geonuclear Corporation to a level of 2% of the then-maximum level for drinking water and the deposition of fallout from radioactive material being injected into the atmosphere before underground testing was mandated by treaty. National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, Office of Public Affairs unknown
书商的参考编号 : 81043
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National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, Office of Public Affairs
Plutonium Dispersal Tests at the Nevada Test Site; Nevada Test Site History DOE/NV - -1046
Las Vegas NV: National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Office of Public Affairs 2005. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. Single sheet printed on both sides. Very good. Format is approximately 8.5 inches by 11 inches. Illustrations and text on both sides. The Nevada Test Site was the primary testing location of American nuclear devices from 1951 to 1992; 928 announced nuclear tests occurred there. Of those 828 were underground. Sixty-two of the underground tests included multiple simultaneous nuclear detonations adding 93 detonations and bringing the total number of NTS nuclear detonations to 1021 of which 921 were underground. The site is covered with subsidence craters from the testing. The NTS was the United States' primary location for tests smaller than 1 Mt 4.2 PJ. 126 tests were conducted elsewhere including most larger tests. Many of these occurred at the Pacific Proving Grounds in the Marshall Islands. The last atmospheric test detonation at the Nevada Test Site was "Little Feller I" of Operation Sunbeam on July 17 1962. Operation Roller Coaster was a series of 4 nuclear tests conducted by the United Kingdom in 1963 at the Nevada Test Site to measure plutonium dispersal risk. These experiments were safety tests the purpose of which were to determine whether a weapon or warhead damaged in an accident would detonate with a nuclear yield even if some or all of the high explosive components burned or detonated. The procedure for these tests was to fault the test bomb by removing a detonator wire or perhaps all but one for example possibly enhancing the weapon with extra initiators or an especially enriched core and then to fire the weapon normally. If there is any nuclear yield in the firing then the test is deemed a failure from a safety standpoint. A successful test will measure only the chemical explosive in the test bomb exploding which still of course blasts the bomb core and causes the core material to be spread over a wide area if the test is in open air as all the Project 56 tests were. Over 895 acres 362 ha of Area 11 at the NTS were contaminated with plutonium dust and fragments. The area has become known as Plutonium Valley and continues to be used on an intermittent basis for realistic drills in radiological monitoring and sampling operations. The Project 57 test site was added to the NTS as Area 13 an approximately 10-by-16-mile block of land abutting the northeast boundary of the Test Site. Ground Zero for the shot was only five miles northwest of Groom Lake and seven miles from the main cantonment area of the airbase. A formerly secret AEC report dated 14 March 1957 described the new test area stating that it "is not contaminated to a degree that would effect the experiment and when contaminated will not interfere with the conduct of the PLUMBBOB nuclear tests which are scheduled to begin in May 1957. The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project has obtained approval for the use of the land for the test." The XW-25 warhead was flown to the airstrip at Yucca Flat then moved to Area 13 for final placement. The Project 57 shot was originally scheduled for early April but was pushed back several times. <br /> Finally on the morning of 24 April the signal was sent to the detonator and the warhead's high explosive charge destroyed the weapon. Although there had been no obvious atomic explosion a three-man team in protective clothing was dispatched to determine whether or not any beta or gamma radiation hazard existed from a partial nuclear yield. There was none but all personnel entering the area were required to wear full protective suits and respirators to shield themselves from alpha radiation emitted by plutonium. National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, Office of Public Affairs unknown
书商的参考编号 : 81042
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National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Programs
Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties; QMU Workshop August 9-10 2006 Washington DC
Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Defense Programs 2006. Presumed First thus. Three Ring Binder. Good. This binder has seven tabs five with information. After a table of contents the tabs are: Agenda Attendee Listing NA-11 Opening Comments Draft QMU Business Operating Procedure missing Definition of Terms QMU Site Differences missing and White Paper on "National Certification Methodology for the Nuclear Weapon Stockpile" . The White Paper is 8 pages with color illustrations. The Table of Contents has the name Deeny sic Deeney written in the upper right corner. This is believe to have been the copy of a Dr. Christopher Deeny then a senior executive in the office of Assistant Deputy Administrator for Research Development and Simulation NA-11. He later rose to the Assistant Deputy Administrator position. The agenda included assessments of QMU Methodologies at each lab a W76 Nuclear example a W80 example QMU differences between sites QMU Inconsistencies and a Path Forward discussion. There are 30 attendees listed from Sandia Los Alamos Livermore Argonne DOE Office of Science and NNSA. The NA-11 Opening Comments is a nine vugraph presentation that addressed workshop purpose goals description history external interest and desired outcome. The White Paper was authored by Bruce T. Goodwin then of Livermore and Raymond Juzaitis then of Los Alamos later head of the LLC that operated the Nevada National Security Site. This is a rare surviving snapshot of the U.S. Weapons Program development and assessment of Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties in the context of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Program absent underground testing. Derived from Wikipeida: Quantification of Margins and Uncertainty QMU is a decision-support methodology for complex technical decisions. QMU focuses on the identification characterization and analysis of performance thresholds and their associated margins for engineering systems that are evaluated under conditions of uncertainty particularly when portions of those results are generated using computational modeling and simulation. QMU has traditionally been applied to complex systems where comprehensive experimental test data is not readily available and cannot be easily generated for either end-to-end system execution or for specific subsystems of interest. Examples of systems where QMU has been applied include nuclear weapons performance qualification and stockpile assessment. QMU focuses on characterizing in detail the various sources of uncertainty that exist in a model thus allowing the uncertainty in the system response output variables to be well quantified. These sources are frequently described in terms of probability distributions to account for the stochastic nature of complex engineering systems. The characterization of uncertainty supports comparisons of design margins for key system performance metrics to the uncertainty associated with their calculation by the model. QMU supports risk-informed decision-making processes where computational simulation results provide one of several inputs to the decision-making authority. There is currently no standardized methodology across the simulation community for conducting QMU; the term is applied to a variety of different modeling and simulation techniques that focus on rigorously quantifying model uncertainty in order to support comparison to design margins. The fundamental concepts of QMU were originally developed concurrently at several national laboratories supporting nuclear weapons programs in the late 1990s including Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratory. The original focus of the methodology was to support nuclear stockpile decision-making an area where full experimental test data could no longer be generated for validation due to bans on nuclear weapons testing. The methodology has since been applied in other applications where safety or mission critical decisions for complex projects must be made using results based on modeling and simulation. Examples outside of the nuclear weapons field include applications at NASA for interplanetary spacecraft and rover development missile six-degree-of-freedom simulation results and characterization of material properties in terminal ballistic encounters. QMU focuses on quantification of the ratio of design margin to model output uncertainty. The process begins with the identification of the key performance thresholds for the system which can frequently be found in the systems requirements documents. These thresholds also referred to as performance gates can specify an upper bound of performance a lower bound of performance or both in the case where the metric must remain within the specified range. For each of these performance thresholds the associated performance margin must be identified. The margin represents the targeted range the system is being designed to operate in to safely avoid the upper and lower performance bounds. These margins account for aspects such as the design safety factor the system is being developed to as well as the confidence level in that safety factor. QMU focuses on determining the quantified uncertainty of the simulation results as they relate to the performance threshold margins. This total uncertainty includes all forms of uncertainty related to the computational model as well as the uncertainty in the threshold and margin values. The identification and characterization of these values allows the ratios of margin-to-uncertainty to be calculated for the system. These M/U values can serve as quantified inputs that can help authorities make risk-informed decisions regarding how to interpret and act upon results based on simulations. Verification and validation V & V of a model is closely interrelated with QMU. Verification is broadly acknowledged as the process of determining if a model was built correctly; validation activities focus on determining if the correct model was built. V&V against available experimental test data is an important aspect of accurately characterizing the overall uncertainty of the system response variables. V&V seeks to make maximum use of component and subsystem-level experimental test data to accurately characterize model input parameters and the physics-based models associated with particular sub-elements of the system. The use of QMU in the simulation process helps to ensure that the stochastic nature of the input variables as well as the underlying uncertainty in the model are properly accounted for when determining the simulation runs required to establish model credibility prior to accreditation. National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Programs unknown
书商的参考编号 : 80402
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National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development NA 22
Remote Sensing Program--Goals Objectives and Requirements; NA22-PDP-07-2008
Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development NA-22 2008. Presumed First Edition First printing. Spiral bound. Very good. 27 1 pages including covers. Marked Official Use Only. This limitation is understood to no longer apply due to the passage of time and the public disclosure of comparable information in Congressional Budget Requests Congressional testimony and other information releases. The Atomic Energy Commission originally established the "Aerial Measurements Operations" at Nellis Air Force Base in Las Vegas Nevada in the 1950s. It was created to serve the worldwide emergency system by providing rapid response to radiological emergencies. In 1976 the DOE established an Aerial Measurements Operations at Andrews Air Force Base - now called Joint Base Andrews - in Maryland to provide scientific and technical support to counterterrorism efforts during U.S. Bicentennial events in Washington D.C. With a location on each coast the RSL has served for over 50 years as a valuable national asset for nuclear emergency response and remote sensing capabilities. The Remote Sensing Laboratory RSL is a center for creating and using advanced technologies that provide a broad range of scientific technological and operational disciplines with core competencies in emergency response operations and support remote sensing and applied science and technologies in support of counterterrorism and radiological incident response. The National Nuclear Security Administration's NNSA Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development NA-22 has undertaken a multi-year planning effort to focus its research and development R&D efforts on enabling technologies to improve U.S. capabilities to detect and monitor nuclear weapons production proliferation and testing worldwide. NA-22 has developed an expert Remote Sensing Program working group to assist in this planning. This document is the initial result of the planning effort and its purpose was to established the program's goals objectives and requirements. The primary intent of this document is to 1 provide guidance to the investigators at national laboratories other NA-22 program managers and the user community to better focus future Remote Sensing Program proposals 2 provide a vehicle for user community input and 3 serve as a starting point for the subsequent technology roadmapping process. National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development (NA-22) unknown
书商的参考编号 : 80995
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National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development
RS2010--Remote Sensing Program Review Agenda; DOE Nevada Support Facility Las Vegas Nevada May 18-19 2010
Las Vegas NV: National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development 2010. Presumed First printing thus. Ephemera. Very good. 2 sheets printed on both sides stapled in upper left corner. Minor ink notation at bottom of last page. The Program Review had the following focus areas: Spectral Sensing of Solids Poster Session Passive Spectral Sensing Development Active Spectral Sensing Development Millimeter-Wave and RF Sensing Optical Remote Sensing Enabling Technologies and a limited attendance SCI Session. One of the enduring programs within the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development is to develop remote sensing technology that supports detection and characterization of signatures or activities related to nuclear proliferation The Remote Sensing Program has been a cornerstone in the national capability for the detection of facilities and activities related to the proliferation of foreign nuclear programs. Remote Sensing research encompass a wide variety of capabilities to detect signatures associated with the development of nuclear weapons. The research areas in the Remote Sensing program include sensor development image processing and digital signal processing techniques for analysis and characterization of observed phenomena. The list of presenters representers the key researcher and program performers from Argonne Los Alamos Livermore Oak Ridge Sandia Savannah River and Pacific Northwest National Laboratories the Remote Sensing Laboratory the Special Technologies Laboratory and the Nevada National Security Site management and operating contractor along with Federal program officials. The Remote Sensing Laboratory RSL is a center for creating and using advanced technologies that provide a broad range of scientific technological and operational disciplines with core competencies in emergency response operations and support remote sensing and applied science and technologies in support of counterterrorism and radiological incident response. The Atomic Energy Commission originally established the "Aerial Measurements Operations" at Nellis Air Force Base in Las Vegas Nevada in the 1950s. It was created to serve the worldwide emergency system by providing rapid response to radiological emergencies. In 1976 the DOE established an Aerial Measurements Operations at Andrews Air Force Base - now called Joint Base Andrews - in Maryland to provide scientific and technical support to counterterrorism efforts during U.S. Bicentennial events in Washington D.C. With a location on each coast the RSL has served for over 50 years as a valuable national asset for nuclear emergency response and remote sensing capabilities. National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development unknown
书商的参考编号 : 80981
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National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, Office of Public Affairs
Runaway Train at the Nevada Test Site; Nevada Test Site History DOE/NV - - 1049
Las Vegas NV: National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Office of Public Affairs 2005. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. Single sheet printed on both sides. Very good. Format is approximately 8.5 inches by 11 inches. Illustrations and text on both sides. The Nevada Test Site was the primary testing location of American nuclear devices from 1951 to 1992; 928 announced nuclear tests occurred there. Of those 828 were underground. Sixty-two of the underground tests included multiple simultaneous nuclear detonations adding 93 detonations and bringing the total number of NTS nuclear detonations to 1021 of which 921 were underground. The site is covered with subsidence craters from the testing. The NTS was the United States' primary location for tests smaller than 1 Mt 4.2 PJ. 126 tests were conducted elsewhere including most larger tests. Many of these occurred at the Pacific Proving Grounds in the Marshall Islands. The last atmospheric test detonation at the Nevada Test Site was "Little Feller I" of Operation Sunbeam on July 17 1962. The Nevada Railway Museum at Boulder City has a diesel locomotive with an interesting history. It was built by General Electric in March 1953 makers number 31827. It's described as a 'B-B-160/160'. The customer was the United States Navy and it carries its 'Navy Plates' - 'LOCOMOTIVE DE 80 TON 56-1/2 IN GA 0-4-4-0 CLASS'. '56-1/2 IN GA' just meant standard gauge. The locomotive was transferred to the Atomic Weapons Testing Site in Nevada which had its own internal railway. The lighthearted title of 'The Jackass and Western Railroad' stuck and the name appears in black on each side of the yellow-liveried locomotive. In the Atomic Testing Museum in Las Vegas there is a model of the railway on the test site which seems to have been used as a training aid. I also found the 'Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity' authorizing the operation of the railway on the test site. This was issued on 7th April 1975 by the Public Service Commission of Nevada and allows the Jackass and Western Railroad to operate a freight and passenger service within the confines of the Nevada Test Site. A copy of this certificate is held at the Railway Museum at Boulder City. On the morning of March 8 1968 during routine operations the brakes failed and the train gained speed becoming a runaway. There was an attempt to derail the runaway train which was successful. The train was determined to be carrying too much weight. The heavy shipping containers were essentially undamaged the same could not be said of the train or the track. National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, Office of Public Affairs unknown
书商的参考编号 : 81059
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National Nuclear Security Administration
Security for Special Programs
Albuquerque NM: National Nuclear Security Administration 2005. Presumed First Edition First issuance thus. CD. Very good. On Hold Shelf. This disk has six files on it: 1. Welcome letter 2. Course Material 3. Self Review 4. Reference Material 5. Software and 6. Read Me. In the course material area there is information of special access programs security policies threat briefing OPSEC overview a Baseline Security Manual and practical exercises. The reference material is indicated as including Executive Orders Presidential Decision Documents Public Laws Director of Central Intelligence Directives 6 DCIDs DoD Manuals DOE policies and other associated materials. In opening the disk there was a reference to SNL so it is assumed that Sandia National Laboratories assisted at least in the production of the CD if not in the development of this training. This CD is marked 'Official Use Only" but previous experience in requesting a determination as to whether the dissemination limitation has almost without exception resulted in silence which we take after a period of time as indicating consent. Special access programs SAPs in the U.S. Federal Government are security protocols that provide highly classified information with safeguards and access restrictions that exceed those for regular classified information. SAPs can range from black projects to routine but especially-sensitive operations such as COMSEC maintenance or Presidential transportation support. In addition to routine controls a SAP may impose more stringent investigative or adjudicative requirements specialized nondisclosure agreements special terminology or markings exclusion from standard contract investigations carve-outs and centralized billet systems. There was no specific organization within the NNSA indicated on the CD that a question on dissemination could be referred to. Since this information is more than a decade old and because multiple requests for status on other Official Use Only materials have been ignored it is assumed that the OUO limitation no long applies. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
书商的参考编号 : 75224
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National Nuclear Security Administration
Synopsis of the Applied Technology Roadmap; Providing Defense Readiness for Tomorrow
Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration c2002. Presumed First Edition First printing. Spiral bound. Very good. Format is approximately 11 inches by 8.5 inches. 30 pages plus covers. Maps. Footnotes. Illustrations many in color. Cover has slight wear and soiling. This document is a high-level synopsis of the full National Nuclear Security Administration's Applied Technology Roadmap. The larger document is the product of a collaborative effort by the NNSA and contractor representatives to the Applied Technology team. Representatives from all of the eight sites comprising the NWC as well as other NNSA staff from headquarters and several field offices participated in several workshops. The authors acknowledged a debt to the group that compiled the NNSA Applied Engineering Testing & Manufacturing Capabilities book. There were four pillars in the roadmap: Flexible Agile Manufacturing; Model-Based Design and Development; Responsive Integrated Enterprise; and Adaptable Knowledge-Enabled Workforce. The Nuclear Weapons Complex relies on the unique synergy created among the design laboratories and the production plants. The laboratories provide a strong science base while the production plants are capable of unmatched precision in producing a wide variety of materials components and assemblies. Together the laboratories and plants can transform a concept into specialized hardware to meet very demanding requirements. The complex thus created in a security environment for synthesizing and processing a wide variety of materials including hazardous and radioactive components. The Applied Technology Roadmap shows how the synergy of the NWC science and technologies base will be used to provide national defense for tomorrow. The most efficient way to support the nation is to build the 'pillars' formed from enabling technologies that rest upon the foundation of NWC capabilities capitalizing on existing and future investment in the NWC. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
书商的参考编号 : 77513
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