Diamant

2003 · réf. 114099 — Cambridge: The MIT Press 2003. First edition of these lectures by the Nobel Prize-winning economist. Octavo original cloth. Signed by Peter Diamond on the half-title page. Fine in a fine dust jacket. In this book Peter Diamond analyzes social security as a particular example of optimal taxation theory. Assuming a world of incomplete markets and asymmetric information he uses a variety of simple models to illuminate the economic forces that bear on specific social security policy issues. The focus is on the degree of progressivity desirable in social security and the design of incentives to delay retirement beyond the earliest age of eligibility for benefits. Before analyzing these models Diamond presents introductions to optimal income tax theory and the theory of incomplete markets. He incorporates recent theoretical developments such as time-inconsistent preferences into his analyses and shows that distorting taxes and a measure of progressivity in benefits are desirable. Diamond also discusses social security reform with a focus on Germany. The MIT Press hardcover