Administration

2010 · réf. 80985 — Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Defense Programs 2010. Presumed first compilation--The number of copies made is unknown. Three Ring Binder. Good. Attendance list of 12-13 2011 Jan Surveillance Summit in front pocket--more than 30 names. List of 19 filled tabs 31 tabs present for 20-31 do not appear to have ever been filled. Tabbed items include: Effective Surveillance Program Memo dated 26 April 2010 then SNL LLNL and LANL responses then Requirements Workload Planning document of 22 Oct. 2010 followed by LLNL SRS KCP LANL PX SNL. Y12 NSO responses to the 22 Oct Memo followed by Summary of responses to 22 Oct Memo then followed by FYNSP responses from LLNL LANL and SNL followed by a Consolidated FYNSP responses. The 19th tab has the slides for workload meeting. Additional material in rear pocket: Surveillance Enterprise Governance 34 hard copy vugraphs 4 to a page--with some ink notations One page on NNSA Nuclear Weapons Surveillance Program 2 copies--one with notes on back One vugraph on FY 11 Surveillance Requirements and Over Targets with substantial notes Additional information on Consolidated Six Year Surveillance Requirements 12 sheets Greenaugh e-mail on Requirements workload 2 pages staples Illinger e-mail on Baselining New Surveillance Requirements 3 pages stapled Mangum e-mail on Surveillance Numbers 3 pages stapled 1 page on requires by site and funding program E-mail from Mangum on surveillance numbers 2 pages stapled with notes e-mail from Sinkular on NA 12 update 2 pages stapled with notes. Notes on November 5 2010 Goodrum Memo Teleconference and one page hardcopy vugraph on FY 11 Surveillance comparison. The use of data from surveillance of our nuclear weapons enables us to predict how the weapons will perform over time without nuclear explosive testing. This capability has improved significantly over the past decade and provides us with the capability to ensure an effective nuclear stockpile. Surveillance information is critical for the predictive models used in the annual nuclear weapon assessment process. These tools and the detailed quantitative modeling they support serve as key elements of the capability to maintain a safe secure and effective U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without underground nuclear explosive testing. The National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA annual assessment process has evolved significantly since the end of underground nuclear explosive testing to ensure an effective nuclear weapons stockpile. The current approach aims to achieve a comprehensive science-based understanding of nuclear weapon systems. Surveillance tools and models play critical roles in providing information essential to assessing weapon safety security and performance changes that would impact military effectiveness without performing underground nuclear explosive tests. These surveillance tools aid in the understanding of two conditions of weapons systems: the "as-built" and "as-aged" conditions. The "as-built" condition reflects the frequency and severity of original design or manufacturing defects. The "as-aged" condition reflects the evolution of age-related changes in materials components and subsystems that can alter performance. Over the last few years several advances in this area have contributed to a better understanding of the condition of our existing nuclear weapons and the ways in which the current condition could affect safety reliability or performance. Through the weapons surveillance program the U.S. has in-depth knowledge of the core components housed within weapons by using technologies such as nondestructive laser gas sampling and high-resolution computed tomography. System tests also assess the functionality of all major non-nuclear components. National Nuclear Security Administration, Defense Programs unknown