Comptabilité

1997 · réf. 91261 — Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1997. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 40 pages. Report to Congressional Requesters. This report discusses 1 the Department of Defense's DOD and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's NASA requirements for surveillance of space objects and 2 DOD's space surveillance capabilities to support these requirements. This report contains recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense the Air Force the Navy and the Army; the Administrator of NASA; the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Central Intelligence; and other interested congressional committees. During the past 40 years the number of manmade space objects orbiting the earth-active and inactive satellites and debris generated from launch vehicle and satellite breakups-has increased dramatically. Knowing what objects are in space and their locations are important because of the 1 implications of foreign satellite threats to U.S. national security and 2 hazards that such objects create for multibillion dollar space programs especially large ones such as the International Space Station. DOD's existing space surveillance network is not capable of providing the information NASA needs to adequately predict collisions between space objects orbiting the earth and multibillion dollar space programs such as the space station. Moreover the existing network cannot satisfy DOD's emerging space surveillance requirements which are currently under review. DOD's plans to 1 modernize an existing surveillance network radar system and 2 develop three new ballistic missile warning systems which could contribute to performing the surveillance function do not adequately consider DOD's or NASA's surveillance requirements. These four systems are separately managed by the Navy the Air Force and the Army. An opportunity exists to consider these systems' potential capabilities to enhance the surveillance network to better satisfy requirements and achieve greater benefits from planned investment in space sensor technology. Despite NASA's dependency on DOD to provide space object information the 1996 National Space Policy makes no provision for an interagency mechanism-either organizational or funding-to ensure that DOD's surveillance capabilities satisfy NASA's requirements. Overall there is no authoritative direction formal agreement or clear plan on how DOD and NASA could consolidate their space surveillance requirements for a common capability. A coordinated interagency plan that considers all existing and planned space surveillance capabilities could be beneficial in making cost-effective decisions to satisfy a consolidated set of national security and civil space surveillance requirements. Unless DOD and NASA can agree on such a plan an opportunity may be missed to simultaneously 1 achieve efficiencies; 2 better ensure the safety of the planned multibillion dollar space station; and 3 help satisfy national security needs including the U.S. forces' future needs for space asset information. United States General Accounting Office paperback