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1900Best.-Nr. 14422Couverture rigide. Cartonnage de l'éditeur défraîchi. 157 pages.
MAME. COLLECTION D OUVRAGES CLASSIQUES.. 1938. In-8 Carré. Cartonné. Etat d'usage. Couv. légèrement passée. Dos abîmé. Intérieur acceptable. 176 pages. Quelques notes au crayon de couleurs dans la marge du texte.
1938Best.-Nr. R150158400MAME. COLLECTION D OUVRAGES CLASSIQUES.. 1938. In-8. Cartonné. Etat d'usage, Couv. légèrement passée, Dos abîmé, Intérieur acceptable. 176 pages. Quelques notes au crayon de couleurs dans la marge du texte.. . . . Classification Dewey : 657-Comptabilité
1998Best.-Nr. 91268Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1998. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Good. 46 pages. Front cover corner creased. Report to the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Science Technology and Space Committee on Commerce Science and Transportation U.S. Senate. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA and the Department of Defense DOD operate several types of aerospace test facilities including wind tunnels and rocket engine test stands. The NASA and the DOD operate several types of aerospace test facilities including wind tunnels and rocket engine test stands. Congress has been appropriating less money for aerospace programs. In response to declining budgets and reductions in personnel NASA and DOD agreed in 1995 to perform essential aerospace testing on a more cooperative basis. The agencies recommended in April 1996 that they establish joint working groups to assess and make recommendations on investments and other issues. GAO is providing the results of our review of NASA's and DOD's cooperation since May 1996 to develop a national perspective on aerospace test facilities. To assess the progress GAO determined 1 the extent to which NASA/DOD working groups on major test facilities have been operating on a regular basis 2 NASA's and DOD's actions in response to a future need to test an engine for new Air Force rockets 3 whether NASA and DOD prepared a congressionally required joint plan on rocket propulsion test facilities and 4 whether NASA and DOD are implementing a DOD assessment team's recommendation in 1997 to jointly manage with NASA certain aeronautical test facilities. This report includes a matter for congressional consideration. The GAO found that the promise of closer NASA/DOD cooperation and the development of a national perspective on aerospace test facilities remains largely unfulfilled because NASA and DOD 1 have not yet convened most test facility alliances 2 compete with each other to test engines for new rockets and 3 did not prepare a congressionally required joint plan on rocket propulsion test facilities. Although NASA and DOD have agreed to go beyond cooperative alliances in aeronautics and jointly manage their aeronautical test facilities they have not yet reached agreement on key aspects of a management organization. NASA and DOD took 20 months May 1996 through Dec. 1997 to negotiate and sign agreements formally establishing the six test facility-related cooperative alliances. During that time only the space environmental simulation alliance met regularly and conducted business. The already established rocket propulsion alliance met only once during this period despite a desire by some members to meet regularly. NASA and DOD officials did not regularly convene the other four alliances in the absence of approved charters. Despite the formation of the rocket propulsion alliance NASA and DOD compete against each other to test engines for new rocket programs. A principal arena of competition is the next phase of the Air Force's Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle EELV program. In particular the Air Force has spent millions of dollars to upgrade a test stand on the assumption that it not NASA would test EELV engines. DOD did not prepare a legislatively mandated joint plan with NASA to coordinate rocket propulsion test facilities. United States General Accounting Office paperback
Best.-Nr. 0365881821.Gpaperback. Good. Access codes and supplements are not guaranteed with used items. May be an ex-library book. paperback
Best.-Nr. 0366318004.Ghardcover. Good. Access codes and supplements are not guaranteed with used items. May be an ex-library book. hardcover
Best.-Nr. 0656999578.Ghardcover. Good. Access codes and supplements are not guaranteed with used items. May be an ex-library book. hardcover
1995Best.-Nr. 91265Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1995. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 31 1 pages. Briefing Report to the Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics Committee on Science House of Representatives. In April 1994 the National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA estimated that it would cost about $475 million for a Titan IV-Centaur launch of its Cassini spacecraft. Concerned about the cost as the Chairman of the former Subcommittee on Space House Committee on Science Space and Technology you requested that we provide information about the current estimated cost for the Cassini launch and determine the extent to which cost saving opportunities exist. On April 11 1995 we briefed your staff on the results of our work. This report contains the information presented at that briefing. NASA plans to launch its Cassini spacecraft to Saturn in October 1997. Following a voyage of more than 6 years the spacecraft will orbit Saturn for 4 years. Cassini will provide intensive long-term observations of Saturn's atmosphere rings magnetic fields and moons. Cassini's probe will be used to analyze the atmosphere of Saturn's largest moon Titan. Cassini a joint U.S.-European mission was originally paired with a project to explore comets and asteroids the Comet Rendezvous Asteroid Flyby CRAF. Cassini was first funded by Congress in fiscal year 1990. Since then CRAF was canceled and Cassini's original scientific capabilities have been reduced and its launch schedule extended. NASA is responsible for the overall success of the Cassini mission including integrating the spacecraft with the launch vehicle and approving the final launch. Under an agreement with NASA the Air Force will provide a Titan IV expendable launch vehicle with a Centaur upper stage and launch service from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida. NASA's most recent estimate for the Titan IV-Centaur launch of its Cassini spacecraft is about $452 million approximately $23 million less than its $475-million estimate in April 1994. The decrease occurred principally because NASA reduced its earlier estimate of mission integration costs. The $452-million estimate includes about $253 million paid to the Air Force for a Titan IV-Centaur launch vehicle and launch services. The remaining Cassini launch costs are NASA funding to pay for potential future cost increases mission integration prior-year studies support by two NASA field centers and miscellaneous costs. The Air Force estimates that its cost for launch vehicle and services is about $98 million more than the $253 million NASA will pay. Air Force officials believe there are benefits to providing a launch vehicle for Cassini. For example the Air Force will avoid an estimated $11.5 million to $13.8 million in storage charges and will reduce mission reliability risk due to the aging of components. Reductions in the cost of the Cassini launch may be possible because NASA recently completed its negotiation of the mission integration contract for $15 million less than estimated. However cost savings in other areas of the Cassini launch are unlikely and some of NASA's costs could increase. Also NASA missed a potential cost-saving opportunity because its agreement with the Air Force does not require the Air Force to refund NASA payments in excess of cost. Consequently the Air Force is not required to refund to NASA fees that the Air Force does not pay to the Titan IV contractor. These fees include $2 million in award fees and a $9-million incentive fee. In addition NASA's mission integration contract does not fully comply with the agency's revised policy for cost-plus-award-fee contracts which was implemented to encourage contractors to deliver quality products at reasonable costs. United States General Accounting Office paperback
Best.-Nr. A9780371994443Paperback / softback. New. paperback
Best.-Nr. A9780461990782Paperback / softback. New. paperback
2000Best.-Nr. 91334Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 2000. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 47 1 pages Footnotes. Figures. Tables. A "Report to the Chairman Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Committee on Armed Services". The increasing use of military and commercial satellite systems for national security and business purposes will have significant implications for the United States in the 21st century. The Department of Defense DOD has traditionally used satellite systems in passive roles to support military operations-for example to collect intelligence data warn of ballistic missile launches transmit voice and data communications obtain meteorological data and provide navigation signals. Now plans are being developed to expand the use of military satellite systems and develop technologies such as lasers and electronic jammers that could be used to actively conduct combat operations from space. With advances in information technology the commercial use of satellites is also expanding particularly in telecommunications. In addition single satellite systems-for example navigation environmental and imagery systems-that originally served government missions are increasingly providing capabilities to both government and commercial users. The nongovernment applications are now generating large amounts of commercial revenue. National space policy treats U.S. satellite systems as national property that organizations have the right to operate without deliberate interference. To the extent that such interference were to occur the U.S. Space Command visualizes that military forces may be called upon to provide protection just as navies protected sea commerce. The U.S. Space Command's long-range plan and the Air Force Space Command's supporting strategic master plan provide for the protection of U.S. national interests and investments in space but they do not fully conform to DOD's new space policy. The plans propose space systems only and do not provide for an assessment of the cost-effectiveness of terrestrial-land sea and air-systems as alternatives to space systems which is called for in DOD's policy. An example of such a comparative assessment would be between satellite and aircraft radar systems. In addition DOD lacks the modeling and simulation tools necessary to perform such assessments a capability that is also called for in DOD's space policy. Finally it is unclear which DOD organization has the authority and capability to perform comparative assessments between space and terrestrial systems since such assessments are outside the purview of the U.S. and Air Force Space Commands. These factors prevent DOD from being assured that the most cost-effective approaches will be considered in making decisions on the expansion of space systems. The extent to which the Air Force's 18-year program projection supports planned military space programs and desired capabilities was unverifiable. Although several of the planned space systems such as a space-based radar and a space-based laser are included in the Air Force's program projection the cost estimates in the Air Force Space Command's strategic master plan were not directly traceable to the 18-year program funding projections. They were not traceable because the data were aggregated differently and program nomenclatures differed. Air Force Space Command representatives stated that they intend to institute changes to bring about consistency between the documents. A more important matter is uncertainty about the availability of several billions of dollars in funding increases that the Air Force has projected for space system expansion. During the first 6 years of the 18-year projection fiscal years 2000-05 programmed increases are uncertain because the President and the Congress have not agreed on overall funding increases to DOD. During the last 12 years of the projection fiscal years 2006-17 the Air Force relies on planned funding increases for program modernization without identifying funding sources thus creating additional uncertainty and putting the expansion of space systems in jeopardy for affordability reasons. DOD has not given sufficient attention to providing military personnel with space education to support future military space operations. DOD's new space policy requires that information about space force structure missions capabilities and applications be incorporated into professional military education. However joint military doctrine on space operations that is necessary to implement the policy has not been issued because of disagreement among the services on the doctrine's content. Leaving the disagreement unresolved hinders common understanding for the use of space systems in military operations. In addition until the doctrine is provided DOD and military service educational institutions will lack guidance for the development of space education curricula and for determining whether existing curricula need to be modified. This report contains recommendations to the Secretary of Defense that would 1 require space plans to include analyses of terrestrial systems as alternatives 2 establish the necessary modeling and simulation tools to perform such analyses 3 identify and/or establish the DOD office to perform the analyses 4 address the delay in completing joint doctrine for space operations and 5 provide the necessary instructions to DOD and military service colleges and schools for incorporating essential space information into professional military education curricula. DOD concurred with our recommendations and provided comments. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1994Best.-Nr. 91341Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1994. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 61 3 pages. Illustrations. Map. Tables. Some cover wear and soiling. This is a "Report to Congressional Requesters". U.S. preeminence in aeronautics is being challenged by Europe. Over the last decade European manufacturers have with the support of their governments increased their share of the global civil aircraft market to over 30 percent. In response to a Congressional request GAO have developed information on 1 the structure of the aeronautics' industries of finance Germany and the United Kingdom; 2 the support that these countries' respective governments give to aeronautical research and development R&D; and 3 the organization of the countries' respective aeronautical R&D establishments. We also obtained information on other aeronautical R&D efforts sponsored by the European Community and its member nations. The aeronautics industry is a major contributor to national security commerce and transportation. The industry is considered a technology driver that leads to spin-offs of advanced technology products that support other sectors of the national economy. The aeronautics industry comprises three major sectors-airframe engine and equipment. This report focuses on the airframe and engine sectors. The airframe sector usually includes final assembly of the aircraft. En 1992 manufacturers in France Germany and the United Kingdom sold aeronautics products valued at about $52 billion. Civil and military aeronautics products contributed roughly equally to that amount except for Germany where civil products accounted for about 61 percent of sales. The countries exported aerospace products worth about $31 billion roughly a $lO-billion increase over 1989. Aeronautics products for France and the United Kingdom made up over 89 percent of their countries' aerospace export totals. Although 1992 data were not available for Germany 1991 statistics show the total to be in excess of 90 percent. In the three countries about 310000 people worked in aeronautics-related activities. As a point of reference the aeronautics industry in the United States had sales of about $74 billion exported about $44 billion and employed about 611000 people in 1992. United States General Accounting Office paperback
Best.-Nr. a917731973. first edition. US Genral Accounting Offic.e Federal Election Campaign act of 1971. Thick oblong 4to. wraps. 987p. VG binding secure; no ownership marks; light cover wear . Somewhat scarce. Volume 1 only. . paperback
2000Best.-Nr. 77137Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 2000. Version 1 Exposure Draft. Wraps. Very good. iv 163 1 pages. Footnotes. Figures. Abbreviations. Appendices including a Glossary. Document Distribution Center Customer Service Survey form laid in. Few draft copies survive. This was a precursor to a 2004 Executive Guide of the same title published as GAO-04-394G. An exposure draft was typically used to broadly solicit comments from multiple agencies and stakeholders. Otherwise audit and review drafts were typically shared with the studied agency for factual accuracy and to obtain a management response. In 1997 the GAO developed guidance based primarily on the Clinger-Cohen Act that provides a method for evaluating and assessing how well a federal agency is selecting and managing its IT resources and identifies specific areas where improvements can be made. The Information Technology Investment Management framework identifies critical processes for successful IT investment and organizing these processes into a framework of increasingly mature stages. This shift reflects both the maturation of the thinking in the area of IT investment management and the feedback we received from organizations based upon their experiences creating their IT investment mechanisms and processes. Such a maturity framework can be used to analyze an organization's IT investment management process and determine the maturity of its investment process. In doing so ITIM establishes three key benefits: 1 a rigorous standardized tool for internal and external evaluations of an agency's IT investment management process; 2 a consistent and understandable mechanism for reporting the results of these assessments to agency executives the Congress and other interested parties; and 3 a road map agencies can use for improving their IT investment management process. The achievement of more mature IT investment management stages depends on performing other good management practices and attributes such as human capital training IT architecture and software management. United States General Accounting Office paperback
2000Best.-Nr. 91331Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 2000. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 30 2 pages. Footnotes. Figures. Tabular Data. Appendices. This is a "Report to Congressional Requesters". The Navy Theater Wide system is being developed to defend military and civilian assets including U.S. and allied military forces in the field against attacks by medium- and long-range ballistic missiles while they are still outside the atmosphere. The Navy is developing the system in two segments. The first segment or Block I is intended to provide an initial capability by 2010 involving the deployment of 80 interceptor missiles aboard 4 ships. For fiscal years 1997 through 1999 the Congress increased funding for the program by 150 percent--about $663 million--over the $444 million requested in the President's budgets for those years. The purpose of the increase was to enable the Navy to reduce technical risks and develop system technologies earlier than planned. The Congress expressed concern that despite the funding increases the program was viewed in 1998 by a high ranking Department of Defense official and an independent panel of experts as "high risk" because of technical challenges such as improving the system's capability to track and destroy enemy ballistic missiles. As a result Congress asked GAO to determine 1 how the additional funding provided by the Congress for the program in fiscal years 1997 through 1999 was used and 2 whether significant risks to the program remain. Within the next month we also plan to issue reports on the status of two other missile defense systems under development--the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 and National Missile Defense. GAO noted that: 1 the Navy used the $663 million in increased funding as intended to reduce technical risks and develop system technologies earlier than originally planned; 2 about 41 percent was used for system design and analysis efforts such as reducing the technical risks associated with improving the system's ability to differentiate intended targets from other objects; 3 about 20 percent of the funding was used for procuring hardware items such as rocket motors and test interceptor missiles; 4 according to program officials the additional funding also allowed the program to shift from a demonstration effort to an acquisition program in which a weapon system will be fully developed and produced; 5 although the Navy used this additional funding to reduce technical risk and develop the system sooner significant technical and schedule risks still exist; 6 technological advancement is required to differentiate the target from other objects; 7 such discrimination requires that the system's computer network can process an enormous amount of data in real time; 8 this network has not been built and its software must be integrated with the computer code that is already installed on each ship's computer system; 9 current activities include writing software examining several computer architectures for the network and building the capability to test the network; 10 technological advancement is also required in developing the capability of the interceptor missile to seek and destroy the target; 11 GAO is concerned that the program office has proposed a schedule calling for initial operational testing of the missile in 2010 even though 50 percent of the required 80 missiles would be produced and delivered by 2008 and 100 percent by 2010; 12 operational testing is designed to provide an independent evaluation of whether a system meets required performance levels prior to beginning production; 13 GAO has found that cost overruns and the deployment of substandard systems occur when the Department of Defense proceeds into production before systems are tested under operational conditions; 14 the Navy has scheduled up to 7 flight tests between July 2000 and September 2001; 15 according to testing officials test programs typically separate flight tests by about 6 months; 16 a longer interval between tests gives officials better opportunities to evaluate test results understand problems and incorporate solutions into the next test; and 17 the approved level of funding does not match the Navy program office's estimate of how much it needs to implement the program on schedule. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1996Best.-Nr. 91266Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1996. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 33 3 pages. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA is facing the difficult task of fulfilling its mission with significantly fewer dollars. NASA's present strategy for absorbing its most recent funding reductions through fiscal year 2000 focuses on cutting infrastructure. If NASA fails to find and implement sufficient infrastructure cost-reduction opportunities meeting its budget targets through fiscal year 2000 will require program adjustments-stretching out reducing the scope or terminating efforts and/or postponing new initiatives. GAO reviewed the status of NASA's efforts to achieve reductions and efficiencies in its infrastructure principally facilities and the challenges it faces. In the early 1990s NASA was planning an infrastructure to support a projected annual budget of more than $20 billion and a civil service workforce of about 25000 by the turn of the century. However NASA has been directed by the Administration to reduce its future years' budget levels. In FY 1994 budget request NASA's total funding for fiscal years 1994 through 2000 was reduced by 18 percent or $22 billion. In the FY 1995 budget request total funding was reduced again by an additional 13 percent. To absorb these reductions NASA focused on adjusting programs. The Space Station program was restructured and given an annual budget ceiling of $2.1 billion. The scope of the Earth Observing System program was reduced. Funding was terminated for the Space Exploration Initiative the National Launch System and the National Aerospace Plane. The Comet Rendezvous and Asteroid Flyby project was canceled. NASA's current facility closure and consolidation plans will not fully achieve the agency's goal of decreasing the current replacement value of its facilities by about 25 percent about $4 billion in 1994 dollars by the end of fiscal year 2000. More importantly these plans will not result in substantial cost reductions by that date. Also although NASA is about half way to its goal of lowering the number of its full-time equivalent employees to 17500 by fiscal year 2000 it faces major uncertainties in achieving additional workforce reductions. NASA has also had problems in evaluating some cost-reduction opportunities; environmental cleanup costs could affect future facility disposition efforts; and its efforts to share facilities with DOD have progressed slowly. NASA faces barriers to accomplishing additional consolidations and closures that to date it has not been able to overcome on its own. Closing facilities relocating activities and consolidating operations in fewer locations with fewer employees have been slowed by parochial concerns about the effects of such actions on missions personnel and local communities. These concerns have been exacerbated by perceptions of the lack of fairness and impartiality in the decision-making process. In the face of these concerns NASA must still reduce its infrastructure further. Ultimately if further progress in identifying and implementing infrastructure reductions is limited a process that uses an external independent group similar to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission may be needed. To help determine the need for an independent group to facilitate closures and consolidations of NASA facilities Congress may wish to consider requiring NASA to submit a plan outlining how it intends to met its reduction goals. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1819Best.-Nr. 91335Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office August 18 1994. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 46 pages. A "Report to the Chairman Committee on Government Operations House of Representatives". Federal procurement Contract administration Aerospace contracts Contract modifications Contract costs Contractor performance Work measurement standards Small business contractors Human resources training Contractor responsibility. United States General Accounting Office paperback
2002Best.-Nr. 91336Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 2002. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 50 4 pages. Footnotes. Figures. Tables. This is a "Report to the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics Committee on Science House of Representatives". In response to a Congressional request this report discusses the mechanisms that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA has in place to capture disseminate and apply past lessons learned towards future mission success. We found that NASA's processes procedures and systems do not effectively capture and share lessons learned and therefore NASA has no assurance that lessons are being applied towards future missions. We include recommendations to the NASA administrator on ways to strengthen the agency's lessons learning processes and systems. NASA's procedures and guidelines require that program and project managers review and apply lessons learned from the past throughout a program's or project's life cycle and to document and submit any significant lessons to the agency's Lessons Learned Information System LLIS in a timely manner. NASA defines a lesson learned as knowledge or understanding gained by experience. The experience may be positive such as a successful test or mission or negative such as a mishap or failure. A lesson must be significant in that it has a real or assumed impact on operations; valid in that it is factually correct; and applicable in that it identifies a specific design process or decision that reduces or eliminates the potential for failures and mishaps or reinforces a positive result. NASA recognizes the importance of learning from the past to ensure future mission success and uses several mechanisms to capture and disseminate lessons learned. The principal source NASA has established for the agency-wide collection and sharing of lessons is the LLIS a Web-based lessons database that managers are required to review on an ongoing basis. In addition NASA uses training program reviews and periodic revisions to agency policies and guidelines to communicate lessons. Several NASA centers and key programs also maintain lessons learned systems that are geared toward their own staff. Recently NASA has taken steps to improve the way it captures and shares information by developing a business strategy called knowledge management. Knowledge management can be defined as the way that organizations create capture and reuse knowledge to achieve their objectives. According to NASA officials knowledge management has the potential to link agency staff with the knowledge and resources they need to complete tasks faster better and cheaper. In pursuit of knowledge management NASA has developed a strategic plan established a management team to coordinate knowledge management activities at NASA's centers and initiated several information technology pilot projects. Despite the processes and procedures in place to capture and share lessons learned there is no assurance that lessons are being applied toward future missions success. A GAO survey of NASA program and project managers revealed weaknesses in the collection and sharing of lessons learned agency-wide. While some lessons learning does take place our survey found that lessons are not routinely identified collected or shared by programs and project managers. Respondents reported that they are unfamiliar with lessons generated by other centers and programs. In addition many respondents indicated that they are dissatisfied with NASA's lessons learned processes and systems. Managers also identified challenges or cultural barriers to the sharing of lessons learned such as the lack of time to capture or submit lessons and a perception of intolerance for mistakes. They further offered suggestions for areas of improvement including enhancements to LLIS and implementing mentoring and "storytelling" or after-action reviews as additional mechanisms for lessons learning. While NASA's current knowledge management efforts should lead to some improvement in the sharing of agency lessons and knowledge they lack ingredients that have been shown to be critical to the success of knowledge management at leading organizations. Cultural resistance to sharing knowledge and the lack of strong support from agency leaders often make it difficult to implement an effective lessons learning and knowledge sharing environment. We found that successful industry and government organizations have overcome barriers by making a strong management commitment to knowledge sharing developing a well defined business plan for implementing knowledge management providing incentives to encourage knowledge sharing and building technology systems to facilitate easier access to information. The application of these principles could increase opportunities for NASA to perform its basic mission of exploring space faster better and cheaper more successfully. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1998Best.-Nr. 91246Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1998. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 23 1 pages. Footnotes. Illustrations. Tabular data. This is a "Report to Congressional Requesters". This report responds to a Congressional request that the GAO review the National Missile Defense NMD program funding requirements and schedule and technical risks. Specifically you asked us to determine 1 why the Department of Defense DOD significantly increased the program's near-term funding in its May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review 2 how funding increases authorized and appropriated by Congress for the program in fiscal years 1996 through 1998 have been used or are planned to be used and 3 DOD's planned level of future funding for the NMD program and planned uses for those funds. You also asked for an assessment of the program's current schedule and technical risks. We provided an initial assessment of the schedule and technical risks in our December 12 1997 report to you. This report updates that assessment. The primary mission of NMD is to defend the United States against an intercontinental ballistic missile attack consisting of several missiles launched from a rogue nation. It would also have some capability against an accidental launch from nuclear powers such as Russia or China. The United States has been developing technologies for use in an NMD system for a number of years. In April 1996 DOD changed the purpose of the NMD program from a technology readiness program to a deployment readiness program and designated NMD as a major defense acquisition program. Under the technology readiness program the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization BMDO developed and matured technologies for possible use in an NMD system. Under the current deployment readiness program BMDO plans to integrate the technologies into a system that can be made operational. The deployment readiness program is commonly known as the "33" program. The goal of the NMD 33 program is to develop and demonstrate by fiscal year 2000 an initial limited capability that could be deployed by fiscal year 2003. The deployment decision is to be based on ongoing assessments of the threat and will not be made until fiscal year 2000 at the earliest. If DOD concludes at that time that the threat does not warrant deployment by fiscal year 2003 development will continue. While BMDO is still determining the specific design of the initial NMD system its features will include 1 space- and ground-based sensors to provide early warning of attacking missiles; 2 ground-based radars to identify and track the threatening warheads; 3 ground-based interceptors to collide with and destroy incoming warheads; and 4 a battle management command control and communications system. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1988Best.-Nr. 35690Washington DC:: U.S. General Accounting Office 1988. Paperback. NEAR FINE. 8.5"x11" pale blue paperback staplebound 42 pages. Small sticker and "received" stamp on cover otherwise like new. We provide professional service and individual attention to your order daily shipments and sturdy packaging. FREE TRACKING ON ALL SHIPMENTS WITHIN USA. U.S. General Accounting Office, paperback
1992Best.-Nr. 80751Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1992. Contemporary Xerox copies. Six individually stapled items held together by a binder clip. Good. 1 31 pages. Together with copies of the testimonies of John Deutch 10 pages Lewis Branscomb 11 pages William Brinkman 5 pages and Eric Bloch 14 pages. Also included at the Opening Remarks of Chairman George E. Brown Jr. 5 pages. Dr. Deutch testified in his capacity as an Institute Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and referred to his holding several positions at the Department of Energy during the period 1978 to 1980. Professor Branscomb testified in his capacity as the Director Science Technology and Public Policy Program as the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Professor Branscomb had served as the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Executive Office of the President and was thus the President's Science Advisor. William F. Brinkman testified as the Executive Director Research Physics Division of AT&T Bell Laboratories. William Frank Brinkman was an American physicist who served as president of the American Physical Society 2002 and was the head of the Office of Science at the United States Department of Energy 2009-2013. He was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in 1984 and won the George E. Pake Prize in 1994. Erich Bloch was a Distinguished Fellow Council on Competitiveness. Erich Bloch 1925 - 2016 was an electrical engineer and administrator. He was involved with developing IBM's first transistorized supercomputer 7030 Stretch and mainframe computer System/360. He served as director of the National Science Foundation from 1984 to 1990. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: We are pleased to be here today to testify on the Department of Energy's DOE nuclear weapons laboratories. As you requested our testimony focuses on three areas: 1 the research development and testing RD&T capabilities of the Los Alamos and Livermore National Laboratories; 2 the recent trends in staffing and funding at DOE's weapons laboratories; and 3 options identified by the laboratories and DOE for consolidating the Los Alamos and Livermore RD&T programs. This testimony provides a baseline for future congressional deliberations on these issue. Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories maintain a deliberately redundant nuclear warhead research development and testing RD&T infrastructure. The redundancy between Los Alamos and Livermore was intended to stimulate competition in the nation's efforts to design nuclear warheads. With the end of the Cold War however the nature of the nuclear warhead RD&T effort at the laboratories has been changing rapidly. Changes in the world coupled with the possibility of substantial budget cuts in the nuclear weapons area brings into question whether the nation still needs or can financially sustain the laboratories' current level of redundancy. In summary although Los Alamos and Livermore have duplicative RD&T capabilities in general over the years their independent approaches have led to each developing specialized knowledge and capabilities. Over the past several years both RD&T funding and staffing have declined significantly at the laboratories. With this recent and anticipated continued decline in resources devoted to nuclear weapons RD&T some consolidation of the laboratories' functions has already occurred and more is in process. The laboratories believe the potential savings are small relative to the funds needed to maintain the entire nuclear weapons complex. The laboratories believe however that savings are possible by avoiding additional duplicative facilities in the future. Both laboratories strongly prefer the current two-laboratory structure for weapons design. However Los Alamos officials believe that if the nation is to maintain its nuclear competence in the event of further significant cuts in nuclear weapons RD&T the current structure may need to be radically altered. In addition they believe that any new configuration must maintain the current benefits of competition and peer review. United States General Accounting Office unknown
1986Best.-Nr. 83634Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1986. Presumed First Edition First printing. Wraps. Good. 55 1 pages. Footnotes. Appendix I is Selected Literature Reviewed. This report examines scientific and policy implications of nuclear winter. It is based on extensive review of relevant literature and detailed discussions with a wide range of scientists researchers and policy analysts within and outside of government. It provides an overview of what is known about nuclear winter and of ongoing research addressing areas of scientific uncertainty. It also outlines potential implications for defense strategy arms control and foreign policy-making and points out the absence of a consensus on the need for policy changes at this time. The Office of Science and Technology Policy after reviewing the report in draft suggested that GAO by discussing potential policy implications was giving more validity to the nuclear winter theory that was warranted and suggested the tenor of the report be changed. GAO did not agree. Nuclear winter is a severe and prolonged global climatic cooling effect that is hypothesized to occur after widespread firestorms following a large-scale nuclear war. The hypothesis is based on the fact that such fires can inject soot into the stratosphere where it can block some direct sunlight from reaching the surface of the Earth. It is speculated that the resulting cooling would lead to widespread crop failure and famine. When developing computer models of nuclear-winter scenarios researchers use the conventional bombing of Hamburg and the Hiroshima firestorm in World War II as example cases where soot might have been injected into the stratosphere alongside modern observations of natural large-area wildfire-firestorms. "Nuclear winter" or as it was initially termed "nuclear twilight" began to be considered as a scientific concept in the 1980s after it became clear that an earlier hypothesis that fireball generated NOx emissions would devastate the ozone layer was losing credibility. It was within this context that the climatic effects of soot from fires became the new focus of the climatic effects of nuclear war. In these model scenarios various soot clouds containing uncertain quantities of soot were assumed to form over cities oil refineries and more rural missile silos. Once the quantity of soot is decided upon by the researchers the climate effects of these soot clouds are then modeled. The term "nuclear winter" was a neologism coined in 1983 by Richard P. Turco in reference to a one-dimensional computer model created to examine the "nuclear twilight" idea. This model projected that massive quantities of soot and smoke would remain aloft in the air for on the order of years causing a severe planet-wide drop in temperature. Turco would later distance himself from these extreme conclusions. After the failure of the predictions on the effects of the 1991 Kuwait oil fires that were made by the primary team of climatologists that advocate the hypothesis over a decade passed without any new published papers on the topic. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1997Best.-Nr. 72-1488General Accounting Office GAO. 1997. 1997. 235p. Oversize. White wraps. Fine Copy. Paperback. Fine. General Accounting Office (GAO). 1997. Paperback
1997Best.-Nr. 79427Washington DC: General Accounting Office National Security and International Division June 1997. Presumed First Edition First printing White cover not usual blue cover--reprint/. Wraps. Good. 235 pages. Oversized book measuring 11 inches by 8/1-2 inches. Postage sticker and part of a shipping label roughly removed on rear cover. This report is the unclassified version of a classified report that the General Accounting Office issued in July 1996 on the Operation Desert Storm air campaign. At the request of John D. Dingell the Ranking Minority Member of the Committee on Commerce House of Representatives the Department of Defense reevaluated the security classification of the original report and as a result about 85 percent of the material originally determined to be classified has subsequently been determined to be unclassified and is presented in this report. The best available data did not permit GAO to either: 1 make a comprehensive system-by-system quantitative comparison of aircraft and weapon effectiveness; or 2 validate some of the key performance claims for certain weapon systems. Pursuant to Congressional direction GAO reviewed the Operation Desert Storm air campaign focusing on the: 1 use and performance of aircraft munitions and missiles employed during the air campaign; 2 validity of Department of Defense DOD and manufacturer claims particularly those for weapon systems utilizing advanced technology; 3 relationship between cost and performance of weapon systems; and 4 extent that Desert Storm air campaign objectives were met. GAO noted that: 1 air power clearly achieved many of Desert Storm's objectives but fell short of fully achieving others; 2 the available quantitative and qualitative data indicate that air power damage to several major target sets was more limited than DOD's title V report to the Congress stated; 3 these data show clear success against the oil and electrical target categories but less success against Iraqi air defense command control and communications and lines of communication; 4 success against nuclear-related mobile Scud and Republican Guard targets was the least measurable; 5 the lessons that can be learned from Desert Storm are limited because of the unique conditions the strike tactics employed by the coalition the limited Iraqi response and limited data on weapon system effectiveness; 6 the strong likelihood of campaign success enabled U.S. commanders to favor strike tactics that maximized aircraft and pilot survivability rather than weapon system effectiveness; 7 the Iraqis employed few if any electronic countermeasures and presented almost no air-to-air opposition; 8 as a result Desert Storm did not consistently or rigorously test all the performance parameters of aircraft and weapon systems used in the air campaign; 9 many of DOD's and manufacturers' postwar claims about weapon system performance were overstated misleading inconsistent with the best available data or unverifiable; 10 aircraft and pilot losses were historically low partly owing to the use of medium- to high-altitude munition delivery tactics that nonetheless both reduced the accuracy of guided and unguided munitions and hindered target identification and acquisition; 11 air power was inhibited by the limited ability of aircraft sensors to identify and acquire targets the failure to gather intelligence on critical targets and the inability to collect and disseminate battle damage assessments BDA in a timely manner; 12 the contributions of guided weaponry incorporating advanced technologies and their delivery platforms were limited because the cooperative operating conditions they require were not consistently encountered; 13 the important contributions of stealth and laser-guided bombs were emphasized as was the need for more and better BDA and less attention was paid to the significant contributions of less-sophisticated systems and the performance of critical tasks such as the identification and acquisition of targets; and 14 there was no apparent link between the cost of aircraft and munitions and their performance in Desert Storm. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Division paperback
1995Best.-Nr. 67164Washington DC: United States Congress General Accounting Office 1995. Presumed First Edition/first printing. Wraps. Very good. Pencil ersasure residue on first page. 109 p. Includes illustrations. In the early morning of February 27 1991 during the Persian Gulf War Army Corporal Douglas Lance Fielder was unintentionally killed by U. S. soldiers who had mistaken him and his fellow engineers as the enemy. GAo was requested to determine the events that had led to the fratricide assess the adequacy of U.S. Army investigations following that fratricide and investigate allegations that Army officials hindered invistigations of the fratricide incident or influenced their outcome. From Wikipedia: "Fratricide from the Latin words frater "brother" and cida "killer " or cidum "a killing " both from caedere "to kill to cut down" is the act of a person killing his or her brother.Fratricide may also be used to refer to friendly fire incidents. It also refers to the possible destruction of one MIRV warhead by another. Targets may be arranged deliberately to increase the likelihood in a strategy called dense pack." Also from Wikipedia: "The Gulf War 2 August 1990 28 February 1991 codenamed Operation Desert Storm 17 January 1991 28 February 1991 was a war waged by a U.N. -authorized Coalition force from 34 nations led by the United States against Iraq in response to Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait. The war is also known under other names such as the Persian Gulf War First Gulf War Gulf War I or the First Iraq War before the term "Iraq War" became identified instead with the 2003 Iraq War also referred to in the U.S. as "Operation Iraqi Freedom". Kuwait's invasion by Iraqi troops that began 2 August 1990 was met with international condemnation and brought immediate economic sanctions against Iraq by members of the U.N. Security Council. U.S. President George H. W. Bush deployed U.S. forces into Saudi Arabia and urged other countries to send their own forces to the scene. An array of nations joined the Coalition. The great majority of the Coalition's military forces were from the U.S. with Saudi Arabia the United Kingdom and Egypt as leading contributors in that order. Saudi Arabia paid around US$36 billion of the US$60 billion cost. The war was marked by the beginning of live news on the front lines of the fight with the primacy of the U.S. network CNN. The war has also earned the nickname Video Game War after the daily broadcast images on board the U.S. bombers during Operation Desert Storm. The initial conflict to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait began with an aerial bombardment on 17 January 1991. This was followed by a ground assault on 24 February. This was a decisive victory for the Coalition forces who liberated Kuwait and advanced into Iraqi territory. The Coalition ceased their advance and declared a cease-fire 100 hours after the ground campaign started. Aerial and ground combat was confined to Iraq Kuwait and areas on Saudi Arabia's border. Iraq launched Scud missiles against Coalition military targets in Saudi Arabia and against Israel." United States, Congress, General Accounting Office paperback
