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United States General Accounting OfficeBiblio.com

Operation Desert Storm. Evaluation of the Air Campaign; GAO Report to the Ranking Minority Member Committee on Commerce House of Representatives GAO/NSIAD-97-134

1997rif. 79427Washington DC: General Accounting Office National Security and International Division June 1997. Presumed First Edition First printing White cover not usual blue cover--reprint/. Wraps. Good. 235 pages. Oversized book measuring 11 inches by 8/1-2 inches. Postage sticker and part of a shipping label roughly removed on rear cover. This report is the unclassified version of a classified report that the General Accounting Office issued in July 1996 on the Operation Desert Storm air campaign. At the request of John D. Dingell the Ranking Minority Member of the Committee on Commerce House of Representatives the Department of Defense reevaluated the security classification of the original report and as a result about 85 percent of the material originally determined to be classified has subsequently been determined to be unclassified and is presented in this report. The best available data did not permit GAO to either: 1 make a comprehensive system-by-system quantitative comparison of aircraft and weapon effectiveness; or 2 validate some of the key performance claims for certain weapon systems. Pursuant to Congressional direction GAO reviewed the Operation Desert Storm air campaign focusing on the: 1 use and performance of aircraft munitions and missiles employed during the air campaign; 2 validity of Department of Defense DOD and manufacturer claims particularly those for weapon systems utilizing advanced technology; 3 relationship between cost and performance of weapon systems; and 4 extent that Desert Storm air campaign objectives were met. GAO noted that: 1 air power clearly achieved many of Desert Storm's objectives but fell short of fully achieving others; 2 the available quantitative and qualitative data indicate that air power damage to several major target sets was more limited than DOD's title V report to the Congress stated; 3 these data show clear success against the oil and electrical target categories but less success against Iraqi air defense command control and communications and lines of communication; 4 success against nuclear-related mobile Scud and Republican Guard targets was the least measurable; 5 the lessons that can be learned from Desert Storm are limited because of the unique conditions the strike tactics employed by the coalition the limited Iraqi response and limited data on weapon system effectiveness; 6 the strong likelihood of campaign success enabled U.S. commanders to favor strike tactics that maximized aircraft and pilot survivability rather than weapon system effectiveness; 7 the Iraqis employed few if any electronic countermeasures and presented almost no air-to-air opposition; 8 as a result Desert Storm did not consistently or rigorously test all the performance parameters of aircraft and weapon systems used in the air campaign; 9 many of DOD's and manufacturers' postwar claims about weapon system performance were overstated misleading inconsistent with the best available data or unverifiable; 10 aircraft and pilot losses were historically low partly owing to the use of medium- to high-altitude munition delivery tactics that nonetheless both reduced the accuracy of guided and unguided munitions and hindered target identification and acquisition; 11 air power was inhibited by the limited ability of aircraft sensors to identify and acquire targets the failure to gather intelligence on critical targets and the inability to collect and disseminate battle damage assessments BDA in a timely manner; 12 the contributions of guided weaponry incorporating advanced technologies and their delivery platforms were limited because the cooperative operating conditions they require were not consistently encountered; 13 the important contributions of stealth and laser-guided bombs were emphasized as was the need for more and better BDA and less attention was paid to the significant contributions of less-sophisticated systems and the performance of critical tasks such as the identification and acquisition of targets; and 14 there was no apparent link between the cost of aircraft and munitions and their performance in Desert Storm. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Division paperback

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United States Congress General Accounting OfficeBiblio.com

Operation Desert Storm: Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident: Report to the Honorable Fred Thompson U.S. Senate: GAO/OSI-95-10

1995rif. 67164Washington DC: United States Congress General Accounting Office 1995. Presumed First Edition/first printing. Wraps. Very good. Pencil ersasure residue on first page. 109 p. Includes illustrations. In the early morning of February 27 1991 during the Persian Gulf War Army Corporal Douglas Lance Fielder was unintentionally killed by U. S. soldiers who had mistaken him and his fellow engineers as the enemy. GAo was requested to determine the events that had led to the fratricide assess the adequacy of U.S. Army investigations following that fratricide and investigate allegations that Army officials hindered invistigations of the fratricide incident or influenced their outcome. From Wikipedia: "Fratricide from the Latin words frater "brother" and cida "killer " or cidum "a killing " both from caedere "to kill to cut down" is the act of a person killing his or her brother.Fratricide may also be used to refer to friendly fire incidents. It also refers to the possible destruction of one MIRV warhead by another. Targets may be arranged deliberately to increase the likelihood in a strategy called dense pack." Also from Wikipedia: "The Gulf War 2 August 1990 28 February 1991 codenamed Operation Desert Storm 17 January 1991 28 February 1991 was a war waged by a U.N. -authorized Coalition force from 34 nations led by the United States against Iraq in response to Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait. The war is also known under other names such as the Persian Gulf War First Gulf War Gulf War I or the First Iraq War before the term "Iraq War" became identified instead with the 2003 Iraq War also referred to in the U.S. as "Operation Iraqi Freedom". Kuwait's invasion by Iraqi troops that began 2 August 1990 was met with international condemnation and brought immediate economic sanctions against Iraq by members of the U.N. Security Council. U.S. President George H. W. Bush deployed U.S. forces into Saudi Arabia and urged other countries to send their own forces to the scene. An array of nations joined the Coalition. The great majority of the Coalition's military forces were from the U.S. with Saudi Arabia the United Kingdom and Egypt as leading contributors in that order. Saudi Arabia paid around US$36 billion of the US$60 billion cost. The war was marked by the beginning of live news on the front lines of the fight with the primacy of the U.S. network CNN. The war has also earned the nickname Video Game War after the daily broadcast images on board the U.S. bombers during Operation Desert Storm. The initial conflict to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait began with an aerial bombardment on 17 January 1991. This was followed by a ground assault on 24 February. This was a decisive victory for the Coalition forces who liberated Kuwait and advanced into Iraqi territory. The Coalition ceased their advance and declared a cease-fire 100 hours after the ground campaign started. Aerial and ground combat was confined to Iraq Kuwait and areas on Saudi Arabia's border. Iraq launched Scud missiles against Coalition military targets in Saudi Arabia and against Israel." United States, Congress, General Accounting Office paperback

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