4781 risultati
1972rif. RO60029394Foucher. 1972. In-8. Broché. Bon état, Couv. convenable, Dos satisfaisant, Intérieur frais. 143 pages.. . . . Classification Dewey : 657-Comptabilité
1946Hardcover (no jacket) in very good condition. First edition of this excellent high school text. The boards and spine are lightly marked and worn, with one or two slight bumps to the edges. Minor foxing and tanning on the page block and one or two pages. Binding is sound; all content is clear. CM Used
1995rif. 275836PN. New. 1995. Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback
DUNOD.. 1967. In-8 Carré. Broché. Etat d'usage. Couv. légèrement passée. Coiffe en tête abîmée. Intérieur acceptable. 151 pages.
1967rif. R150164876DUNOD.. 1967. In-8. Broché. Etat d'usage, Couv. légèrement passée, Coiffe en tête abîmée, Intérieur acceptable. 151 pages.. . . . Classification Dewey : 657-Comptabilité
ISBN : 2040083928. Dunod. 1979. In-8 Carré. Broché. Etat d'usage. Couv. légèrement passée. Dos frotté. Intérieur bon état. 220 pages. 9e édition, nouveau tirage.
1958rif. RO80078307DUNOD. 3ème édition. 1958. In-8. Broché. Bon état, Couv. convenable, Dos satisfaisant, Intérieur frais. 212 pages.. . . . Classification Dewey : 657-Comptabilité
1958rif. RO80078308DUNOD. 3ème édition. 1958. In-8. Broché. Bon état, Couv. convenable, Dos satisfaisant, Intérieur acceptable. 175 pages.. . . . Classification Dewey : 657-Comptabilité
1964rif. RO60029020Dunod. 1964. In-8. Broché. Bon état, Couv. légèrement passée, Dos frotté, Intérieur bon état. 192 pages.. . . . Classification Dewey : 657-Comptabilité
1996Paperback. Covers are unmarked, pages are clean, and the text is clear. TH Used
2001rif. 1330986PN. New. 2001. Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback
1991rif. 244274PN. New. 1991. Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback
1989rif. 792041PN. New. 1989. Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition. . PN paperback
1992rif. 259647PN. New. 1992. Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback
1991rif. 91339Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1991. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 41 3 pages. Footnotes. Illustrations. Tabular data. This is a "Report to the Chairman Subcommittee on Science Technology and Space Committee on Commerce Science and Transportation U.S. Senate". Pursuant to a congressional request GAO reviewed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's NASA testing activities focusing on: 1 the adequacy of the NASA testing policies and practices; 2 NASA oversight of contractor testing; and 3 the adequacy of resources available for testing. In April 1990 NASA deployed its $1.5 billion Hubble Space Telescope to an orbit 380 miles above the earth. Soon after the agency discovered that the telescope's primary mirror was manufactured in the wrong shape severely degrading its scientific capabilities. The flaw was not detected before the telescope was launched because the mirror was not adequately tested. The Chairman Subcommittee on Science Technology and Space Senate Committee on Commerce Science and Transportation asked GAO to review NASA'S testing activities. Specifically GAO'S objectives were to assess the adequacy of testing policies and practices and the agency's oversight of contractor testing and to determine whether sufficient resources existed for testing. Because space missions are inherently risky systems cannot be easily repaired while in orbit and failures are widely publicized it is especially important that the systems' performance be thoroughly tested before launch. These complex systems are usually acquired in very limited quantities and test programs are specifically tailored for each project. According to a NASA team appointed to investigate the Hubble failure mirror tests were inadequately planned and poorly analyzed. The team further noted that NASA did not provide adequate oversight of the contractor's test program. Testing has varied from project to project. The success of many of NASA'S recent space projects indicates that in many cases testing was adequate. Tests were not effective however in detecting the Hubble mirror flaw. In other cases launch schedules have been adversely affected because tests did not identify problems soon enough. Testing practices vary because NASA has no uniform policies governing testing. Existing guidance is fragmented not well defined and varies from one NASA field center to another. In some cases hardware designed for the same mission may be tested to different standards. All centers have oversight controls to help ensure that contractors properly plan and conduct tests and report the results. Controls at some centers however could be further strengthened. Also according to a recent National Academy of Public Administration study NASA needs to retain more of its research and development work in-house to give civil service personnel the experience necessary to adequately oversee agency contractors. No standard exists for determining the amount of resources that should be devoted to testing but according to NASA officials resources are normally sufficient to conduct essential tests. However project managers must sometimes make cost-risk tradeoffs when defining the scope and extent of testing programs. Further some in-house test facilities and equipment need upgrading. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1991rif. 242561PN. New. 1991. Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback
1994rif. 91327Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1994. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 31 1 pages. Footnotes. Figure. Table. This is a "Report to Congressional Requesters". The space shuttle is the only U.S. launch system capable of carrying people to and from space. It has operated for over 10 years and is likely to be used well into the next century. As the shuttle ages the National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA will be faced with increased need to update and replace various components due to obsolescence or to enhance safety. At Congress; request GAO reviewed the shuttle program lo determine 1 the assumptions NASA has made regarding the length of time the current shuttle fleet will be in operation and 2 NASA'S processes and criteria for selecting needed safety and obsolescence upgrades. NASA has not made explicit assumptions about how long the current shuttle fleet will remain in operation. However based on its budget projections and approach to defining a new launch system the current fleet cannot be replaced for at least another 12 to 15 years. NASA'S projections of its likely budgets through fiscal year 1999 will not support simultaneous development of the space station and a new launch vehicle. NASA has a process for identifying and assessing needed upgrades. However NASA does not use life-cycle cost as a criterion for evaluating potential safety upgrades and it does not always consider alternatives when selecting an approach to implementing an improvement. Without life-cycle cost estimates NASA cannot determine whether an upgrade project is affordable within the context of the program and the agency's overall budget and out-year plans. Therefore it is possible that inappropriate program decisions on upgrades may be made. NASA managers do not have a precise basis for estimating life-cycle costs for decision purposes because of uncertainty about how Iong the current fleet will remain in operation. Since the shuttle fleet must operate for at least another 12 to 15 years it would seem logical that NASA officials could use that time period as a minimum basis for estimating life-cycle costs. NASA'S approach to funding the Safety and Obsolescence Upgrade program may increase programmatic risks. The program manager believes that funding is adequate to develop upgrade projects that have already been approved. However recent budgets have not included funds for early design studies of other potential upgrades or to cover unforeseen contingencies. Not conducting early design studies to establish the feasibility of a potential upgrade could mean that projects are not started when they are needed or projects are initiated before they are adequately defined. Also the lack of contingency funds means that if approved projects encounter unexpected problems the projects may have to be stretched out and costs may increase. This situation raises questions as to whether the decision to start two new projects in fiscal year 1995 adequately reflect budget constraints and inherent technical and cost risks. In commenting on a draft of this report NASA said that it agreed in principle with our recommendations. The agency stated however that some safety upgrades are made without a full life-cycle cost analysis because of the emphasis on safety. Safety is NASAS highest priority and relative cost is a lesser consideration. We agree that NASA must heavily weigh safety considerations in such decisions. We believe however that prudent management requires an estimate of total costs to ensure that NASA managers understand the full implications of their decisions and that the projects are affordable within the context of NASA'S total budget and future plans. United States General Accounting Office paperback
2000rif. 91333Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 2000. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 20 4 pages. Footnote. Figure. Table. This is a "Report to the Chairman Committee on Commerce Science and Transportation U.S. Senate". The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's NASA space shuttle program is at a critical juncture as three key factors converge: its workforce has declined significantly since 1995 its flight rate will have to double over that of recent years to support assembly of the International Space Station and costly safety upgrades are being planned to enhance the space shuttle's safe operation until at least 2012. Several internal NASA studies have shown that the shuttle program's workforce has been affected negatively by the downsizing much of which occurred after 1995. Since 1995 the shuttle workforce has decreased by more than one-third to about 1800 full-time equivalent employees. The shuttle program has identified many key areas that are not sufficiently staffed by qualified workers and the remaining workforce shows signs of overwork and fatigue. For example indicators on forfeited leave absences from training courses and stress-related employee assistance visits are all on the rise. Moreover the program's demographic shape has changed. For example throughout the Office of Space Flight which includes the shuttle program there are more than twice as many workers over 60 years old than under 30 years old. This jeopardizes the program's ability to hand off leadership roles to the next generation and achieve a higher flight rate to support assembly of the International Space Station. In addition according to NASA it poses significant shuttle program flight safety risks. NASA has recognized the need to revitalize its workforce. For example in December 1999 it terminated shuttle program downsizing plans and initiated efforts to begin hiring new staff. In addition NASA and the Office of Management and Budget have begun an overall workforce review to examine personnel needs barriers to achieving proper staffing levels and skill mixes and potential reforms to help address the agency's long-term requirements. NASA human resource officials told us that they are now using a draft checklist we recently published as a guide in ongoing workforce planning and in discussions with the Office of Management and Budget. The checklist includes a five-part framework: strategic planning organizational alignment leadership talent and performance culture. The guide should help NASA to more clearly establish a linkage between human capital programs and the agency's mission goals and strategies. In addition the Government Performance and Results Act requires a performance plan that describes how an agency's goals and objectives are to be achieved. These plans are to include a description of the 1 operational processes skills and technology and 2 human capital information and other resources required to meet goals and objectives. In reviewing NASA's fiscal year 2000 annual performance plan we found that the plan does not adequately describe how the agency's strategies and human capital resources will help it achieve performance goals. NASA's fiscal year 2001 plan however addresses at least some human capital issues in that it includes an objective to improve workforce health monitoring. In addition in June 2000 the President directed the heads of all executive branch federal agencies to integrate human resource management into planning budgeting and mission evaluation processes. The directive requires each agency to include specific human resource management goals and objectives in its strategic and annual performance plans beginning October 1 2000. The President's June 2000 directive provides further emphasis on the need to integrate human capital requirements with the strategic planning process continued management emphasis will be critical to the success of NASA's human capital planning. In addition NASA will need to take steps to ensure it has the right people to manage the shuttle program Because the President has now directed NASA and all other executive branch agencies to include human capital goals and objectives in their strategic and annual performance plans GAO is not making recommendations in this report. We will monitor NASA's progress in establishing and achieving its human capital goals as part of our annual performance plan assessments. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1992rif. 257026PN. New. 1992. Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback
1997rif. 297934PN. New. 1997. . Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback
1991rif. 243146PN. New. 1991. Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback
1993rif. 264458PN. New. 1993. Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback
1992rif. 257010PN. New. 1992. Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback
1994rif. 273558PN. New. 1994. Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback
1999rif. 91247Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1999. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 38 pages. Illustration. Tabular Data. Footnotes. This is a "Report to Congressional Requesters". When completed around 2004 the goal of the International Space Station ISS is to provide the United States and its international partners with an Earth orbiting facility that supports human habitation and scientific research in a microgravity environment. Because of Russia's ongoing problems in funding its share of the space station's construction costs the National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA is concerned that Russia may also not be able to fulfill its commitments to fund ISS operations costs. NASA estimated that the annual cost to operate the completed space station will average $1.3 billion or $13 billion over a 10-year mission life. NASA anticipates sharing these costs with its international partners and it hopes to further reduce funding requirements through sharing with commercial users or through more efficient commercial operations. As requested by you and the late Representative George E. Brown Jr. we reviewed NASA's estimate for the cost to operate the space station after assembly is completed. Specifically we were asked to determine 1 if any space station-related costs are not included in NASA's estimate; 2 the level of uncertainty in the cost estimate for operations especially with regard to the potential impact of changes in Russian participation; and 3 how NASA funding requirements will be reduced by sharing costs with international partners or through commercial use and operations. NASA's $1.3 billion estimate does not include all funding requirements related to space station operations. NASA does not prepare budget estimates on a full-cost basis because it has not completed implementation of its full cost accounting system. Additional items that will have to be funded in the future within the space station budget include costs for upgrading obsolete systems and operating an alternative propulsion module. NASA has not developed detailed estimates for potential upgrades to combat component obsolescence and improve performance but space station officials believe that a robust enhancement program could cost $100 million or more per year. NASA has not estimated the cost of operating an alternative propulsion module being procured to provide reboost if Russia is unable to provide that function. Items that we determined to be space station-related that are funded in other NASA budget lines include space shuttle flights civil service personnel principal investigators and space communications; these are estimated to cost a total of $2.5 billion in fiscal year 2004. When NASA implements full cost accounting in 2001 some costs currently in other NASA budget lines will be included in the space station budget. In commenting on our draft report NASA stated that shuttle flights should be allocated to the overall cost of operating the space station using a marginal cost of $84 million per flight rather than an average cost of $435 million. We believe the average cost per flight more accurately represents NASA resources related to operating the space station. There is a high degree of uncertainty in NASA's estimate for the cost to operate the space station from 2005 to 2014. NASA's original estimate of $13 billion for operating the space station was developed to aid in evaluating life-cycle costs of redesign options rather than to accurately forecast budget needs. This estimate did not consider end-of-mission costs for either extending the life of the space station beyond 10 years or decommissioning it. The estimate was also developed for an earlier space station configuration that has since been modified. NASA does not prepare detailed budget estimates for the space station and other programs beyond fiscal year 2004 the last year of its current 5-year budget-planning period. NASA recently began an effort to review its operations cost estimate and develop a long-range funding profile that would better reflect annual requirements over the 10-year operations period. Adding to the uncertainty of future costs the full impact on operations if Russia is unable to fulfill its obligations is not known at this time. NASA would incur costs to operate an alternative propulsion module but does not yet know whether there will be a shortfall in Russian logistics flights or how such a shortfall would be spread among the shuttle and international partner resupply vehicles. United States General Accounting Office paperback
