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1992Best.-Nr. 257024PN. New. 1992. Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback
1969Hardcover without dust jacket. Board corners lightly bumped and rear board lightly scored. Tape residue to endpapers; name of previous owner penned to front pastedown and a bookshop sticker to the same. Spine is cocked and there is a mark to page block foot. Main contents remain clean and unmarked. AD Used
1981Proceedings of the Seminar held at the Gmd, Bonn, 1979. Usual library labels and stamps. Light shelfwear, coffee ring on front cover. All contents clean, tight and bright. Ex-Library
1990Best.-Nr. 238636PN. New. 1990. Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback
1997Best.-Nr. 297358PN. New. 1997. . Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback
1997Best.-Nr. 297114PN. New. 1997. Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback
1990Best.-Nr. 233535PN. New. 1990. Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback
1999Best.-Nr. 91264Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1999. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 34 pages. Report to Congressional Requesters. The purpose of the $1.3 billion X-33 Program cosponsored by the NASA and the Lockheed Martin Corporation is to develop and demonstrate advanced technologies and techniques needed for future reusable launch vehicles RLV including lightweight internal fuel tanks advanced rocket engines a durable heat shield and rapid-turnaround low-cost operations. The X-33 vehicle will be a half-scale model of Lockheed Martin's planned single-stage-to-orbit SSTO Venture Star RLV an operational vehicle that will be based on and developed after the X-33. Lockheed Martin and NASA will base the decision to proceed with developing the Venture Star in part on the results of the X-33 Program. NASA would potentially be one of Lockheed Martin's primary customers for the cargo-only flights and is the only anticipated customer for passenger flights. The passenger flights would carry crewmembers to and from the International Space Station. NASA and Lockheed Martin are conducting the X-33 Program under a cooperative agreement a financial instrument with which a government entity and one or more public or private organizations jointly fund and implement an activity to achieve common objectives. Such a partnership was encouraged by the National Space Transportation Policy of 1994 as a means of 1 establishing NASA as the lead agency for technology development and demonstration of reusable space transportation systems and 2 positioning the government and the private sector to make decisions on the development of an operational reusable launch system. NASA and Lockheed Martin X-33 program managers anticipate that the program will achieve technical requirements such as demonstrating the feasibility of building large liquid hydrogen fuel tanks made of graphite composite material. However the program will not meet some original cost schedule and performance objectives. Problems encountered by Lockheed Martin while working toward the X-33 Program's technical requirements have caused cost increases delay of the test vehicle's first flight and revision of some performance objectives. The technical problems occurred during development and fabrication of the X-33 vehicle's internal fuel tanks rocket engines and thermal protection system the three key advanced technologies the program seeks to demonstrate. Resolving these technical problems caused Lockheed Martin's estimated contribution to grow $75 million above the original estimate of $211.6 million to $286.6 million. However part of the increase will be borne by the government. Procurement regulations allow companies to recover allowable independent research and development costs by including them as overhead in the pricing for other government contracts. Thus Lockheed Martin's and its partners' shares may actually be lower. In addition estimated government costs for NASA civil service personnel working on the program not included in NASA's X-33 program budget also increased. Together these estimated costs increased from $216.9 million to $274.3 million as of March 1999. As a result we believe a more accurate representation of the estimated government's share of the X-33 Program is $1.23 billion while industry's estimated share is $125.4 million. Several issues will need to be evaluated before NASA decides to use Venture Star RLVs to support the International Space Station. First the results of the X-33 Program must provide sufficient information for NASA to determine that the risks have been sufficiently reduced and that continuation of activities leading to the agency's use of Venture Star as a customer is warranted. Second even though Venture Star RLVs are intended to be commercially owned and operated government financial incentives will likely be needed to initiate such a venture. Third NASA would have to pay for either two crew modules or modifications to Venture Star vehicles if the crew return vehicle being developed for the International Space Station is chosen as a means for Venture Star to carry people. Fourth because the Venture Star RLV would not carry as much cargo as the space shuttle additional flights would be needed. The more frequent docking activities may reduce the amount of stable time available for some science operations. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1997Best.-Nr. 91261Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1997. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 40 pages. Report to Congressional Requesters. This report discusses 1 the Department of Defense's DOD and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's NASA requirements for surveillance of space objects and 2 DOD's space surveillance capabilities to support these requirements. This report contains recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense the Air Force the Navy and the Army; the Administrator of NASA; the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Central Intelligence; and other interested congressional committees. During the past 40 years the number of manmade space objects orbiting the earth-active and inactive satellites and debris generated from launch vehicle and satellite breakups-has increased dramatically. Knowing what objects are in space and their locations are important because of the 1 implications of foreign satellite threats to U.S. national security and 2 hazards that such objects create for multibillion dollar space programs especially large ones such as the International Space Station. DOD's existing space surveillance network is not capable of providing the information NASA needs to adequately predict collisions between space objects orbiting the earth and multibillion dollar space programs such as the space station. Moreover the existing network cannot satisfy DOD's emerging space surveillance requirements which are currently under review. DOD's plans to 1 modernize an existing surveillance network radar system and 2 develop three new ballistic missile warning systems which could contribute to performing the surveillance function do not adequately consider DOD's or NASA's surveillance requirements. These four systems are separately managed by the Navy the Air Force and the Army. An opportunity exists to consider these systems' potential capabilities to enhance the surveillance network to better satisfy requirements and achieve greater benefits from planned investment in space sensor technology. Despite NASA's dependency on DOD to provide space object information the 1996 National Space Policy makes no provision for an interagency mechanism-either organizational or funding-to ensure that DOD's surveillance capabilities satisfy NASA's requirements. Overall there is no authoritative direction formal agreement or clear plan on how DOD and NASA could consolidate their space surveillance requirements for a common capability. A coordinated interagency plan that considers all existing and planned space surveillance capabilities could be beneficial in making cost-effective decisions to satisfy a consolidated set of national security and civil space surveillance requirements. Unless DOD and NASA can agree on such a plan an opportunity may be missed to simultaneously 1 achieve efficiencies; 2 better ensure the safety of the planned multibillion dollar space station; and 3 help satisfy national security needs including the U.S. forces' future needs for space asset information. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1992Best.-Nr. 257026PN. New. 1992. Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback
1997Best.-Nr. 297934PN. New. 1997. . Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback
1991Best.-Nr. 243146PN. New. 1991. Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback
1993Best.-Nr. 264458PN. New. 1993. Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback
1992Best.-Nr. 257010PN. New. 1992. Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback
1994Best.-Nr. 273558PN. New. 1994. Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback
1999Best.-Nr. 91247Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1999. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 38 pages. Illustration. Tabular Data. Footnotes. This is a "Report to Congressional Requesters". When completed around 2004 the goal of the International Space Station ISS is to provide the United States and its international partners with an Earth orbiting facility that supports human habitation and scientific research in a microgravity environment. Because of Russia's ongoing problems in funding its share of the space station's construction costs the National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA is concerned that Russia may also not be able to fulfill its commitments to fund ISS operations costs. NASA estimated that the annual cost to operate the completed space station will average $1.3 billion or $13 billion over a 10-year mission life. NASA anticipates sharing these costs with its international partners and it hopes to further reduce funding requirements through sharing with commercial users or through more efficient commercial operations. As requested by you and the late Representative George E. Brown Jr. we reviewed NASA's estimate for the cost to operate the space station after assembly is completed. Specifically we were asked to determine 1 if any space station-related costs are not included in NASA's estimate; 2 the level of uncertainty in the cost estimate for operations especially with regard to the potential impact of changes in Russian participation; and 3 how NASA funding requirements will be reduced by sharing costs with international partners or through commercial use and operations. NASA's $1.3 billion estimate does not include all funding requirements related to space station operations. NASA does not prepare budget estimates on a full-cost basis because it has not completed implementation of its full cost accounting system. Additional items that will have to be funded in the future within the space station budget include costs for upgrading obsolete systems and operating an alternative propulsion module. NASA has not developed detailed estimates for potential upgrades to combat component obsolescence and improve performance but space station officials believe that a robust enhancement program could cost $100 million or more per year. NASA has not estimated the cost of operating an alternative propulsion module being procured to provide reboost if Russia is unable to provide that function. Items that we determined to be space station-related that are funded in other NASA budget lines include space shuttle flights civil service personnel principal investigators and space communications; these are estimated to cost a total of $2.5 billion in fiscal year 2004. When NASA implements full cost accounting in 2001 some costs currently in other NASA budget lines will be included in the space station budget. In commenting on our draft report NASA stated that shuttle flights should be allocated to the overall cost of operating the space station using a marginal cost of $84 million per flight rather than an average cost of $435 million. We believe the average cost per flight more accurately represents NASA resources related to operating the space station. There is a high degree of uncertainty in NASA's estimate for the cost to operate the space station from 2005 to 2014. NASA's original estimate of $13 billion for operating the space station was developed to aid in evaluating life-cycle costs of redesign options rather than to accurately forecast budget needs. This estimate did not consider end-of-mission costs for either extending the life of the space station beyond 10 years or decommissioning it. The estimate was also developed for an earlier space station configuration that has since been modified. NASA does not prepare detailed budget estimates for the space station and other programs beyond fiscal year 2004 the last year of its current 5-year budget-planning period. NASA recently began an effort to review its operations cost estimate and develop a long-range funding profile that would better reflect annual requirements over the 10-year operations period. Adding to the uncertainty of future costs the full impact on operations if Russia is unable to fulfill its obligations is not known at this time. NASA would incur costs to operate an alternative propulsion module but does not yet know whether there will be a shortfall in Russian logistics flights or how such a shortfall would be spread among the shuttle and international partner resupply vehicles. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1996Best.-Nr. 91328Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1996. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 38 2 pages. Footnotes. Figures. Tables. This is a "Report to the Ranking Minority Member Committee on Commerce House of Representatives". The GAO reviewed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's NASA actions to improve cost reporting for the International Space Station program and the cost and schedule status of that program. The International Space Station ISS is one of the nation's largest research and development projects. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA Japan Canada the European Space Agency and Russia are building it as a permanently orbiting laboratory to conduct materials and life sciences research under nearly weightless conditions. NASA estimates its development and operations cost at $17.4 billion from October 1993 through the completion of assembly which is currently scheduled for June 2002. Cost reporting by NASA contractors and subcontractors at the Johnson Space Center including some working on major parts of an earlier version of the current ISS was the subject of a congressional hearing in July 1994. At the hearing NASA promised to improve performance management of its development contracts. GAO was asked by Representative John D. Dingell who was then Chairman Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the former House Committee on Energy and Commerce to review the program's cost and schedule status and NASA's actions to improve cost reporting. NASA's ISS program includes a prime contract with the Boeing Company to develop the U.S. portion of ISS a large number of smaller contracts to develop the ground-based and on-orbit capability to use and operate it and other contracts to develop on-orbit research facilities and conduct research. In mid-1993 a $2.1-billion annual funding limitation was imposed on the program. Performance measurement systems establish detailed baselines to measure the extent to which tasks are on schedule and within budget. Such systems are intended to provide early warning of cost and schedule problems to enable corrective actions to negate or minimize their impacts. Over the past several years ISS flight hardware has been produced. As of April 1996 the ISS prime contract was about $89 million over cost and about $88 million behind schedule. Overall the prime contract is 45-percent complete and these variances are within planned funding levels. However many cost threats to the development program remain and financial reserves needed for unexpected contingencies remain limited over the next few years. If available reserves ultimately prove inadequate program managers would have to either exceed the annual funding limitation or defer or rephase other activities thus possibly delaying ISS's schedule and likely increasing its overall cost. NASA has made progress toward ensuring that the ISS prime development contractor and its major subcontractors implement effective performance measurement systems for managing their contracts but a complete performance measurement system is still not in place. Also NASA has made slower progress implementing effective performance measurement systems on its contracts for developing ground-based and on-orbit capabilities for using and operating ISS. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1994Best.-Nr. 91338Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1994. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 27 1 pages. Footnotes. Figures. Tables. This is a "Report to the Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management Committee on Governmental Affairs U.S. Senate". The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's NASA goal is to launch assemble and operate an earth-orbiting microgravity and life sciences research laboratory-International Space Station Alpha-starting in 1997. Congress requested that we review NASA's efforts to develop a robust life and microgravity sciences research community for the space station. Specifically we reviewed 1 what NASA is doing to assess the required size of the research community needed for the space station and to ensure that such a community will be available 2 how NASA will ensure that the research selected for the space station will be the best possible and 3 whether a recently canceled Shuttle research flight adversely affected NASA's efforts to develop a research community for the space station. In June 1994 we reported to you on the impact of the expanded Russian role on space station funding and research. We stated that Russian participation in the space station would substantially increase overall station research resources. However the degree to which the U.S. research community will benefit from these increased resources has yet to be determined. NASA has taken an initial step to assess the size of the space station's research community but it is not intending to develop this community by directly soliciting proposals to do research on the space station. Instead NASA is focusing on developing a comprehensive research program that emphasizes more ground-based research and uses space flight only for research efforts that require a microgravity environment in space. To accomplish this program NASA wants to greatly increase the number of ground-based investigators. This science-oriented approach is reasonable but funding levels could jeopardize it unless NASA adjusts its funding priorities. To achieve its goal NASA would need increased funding for its life and microgravity sciences research and analysis over fiscal years 1995 to 1999-the formative years for the initial development of space station-related research. However NASA expects such funding to remain constant. The result could be a smaller than desired number of investigators in the ground-based research program from which station-based research will be selected. The existing process of using peer review panels to judge the scientific merit and microgravity-related relevance of experiments for the space station will continue. The peer review scores for 285 life and microgravity sciences research proposals show that NASA's funding decisions were generally consistent with the findings of the peer review panels: most top-rated proposals and none of the lowest rated ones were funded. But peer review panels and NASA sometimes disagreed on the scientific merit and relevance of these proposals. For example 4 of the 15 U.S. experiments selected by NASA for a July 1994 Space Shuttle research flight-the International Microgravity Laboratory-were not among those rated highest in the peer review process. NASA's efforts to increase the size of its life and microgravity sciences research community are not likely to be adversely affected by the February 1994 cancellation of the third Spacelab Life Sciences flight SLS-3. The U.S. principal investigators on that flight stated that although they were concerned about NASA's lack of communication about the flight cancellation most of them have been accommodated on other space flights and they generally will be able to meet their experiment objectives. All of the investigators with whom we spoke also plan to continue submitting proposals for future NASA research opportunities. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1991Best.-Nr. 242561PN. New. 1991. Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback
1994Best.-Nr. 91327Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1994. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 31 1 pages. Footnotes. Figure. Table. This is a "Report to Congressional Requesters". The space shuttle is the only U.S. launch system capable of carrying people to and from space. It has operated for over 10 years and is likely to be used well into the next century. As the shuttle ages the National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA will be faced with increased need to update and replace various components due to obsolescence or to enhance safety. At Congress; request GAO reviewed the shuttle program lo determine 1 the assumptions NASA has made regarding the length of time the current shuttle fleet will be in operation and 2 NASA'S processes and criteria for selecting needed safety and obsolescence upgrades. NASA has not made explicit assumptions about how long the current shuttle fleet will remain in operation. However based on its budget projections and approach to defining a new launch system the current fleet cannot be replaced for at least another 12 to 15 years. NASA'S projections of its likely budgets through fiscal year 1999 will not support simultaneous development of the space station and a new launch vehicle. NASA has a process for identifying and assessing needed upgrades. However NASA does not use life-cycle cost as a criterion for evaluating potential safety upgrades and it does not always consider alternatives when selecting an approach to implementing an improvement. Without life-cycle cost estimates NASA cannot determine whether an upgrade project is affordable within the context of the program and the agency's overall budget and out-year plans. Therefore it is possible that inappropriate program decisions on upgrades may be made. NASA managers do not have a precise basis for estimating life-cycle costs for decision purposes because of uncertainty about how Iong the current fleet will remain in operation. Since the shuttle fleet must operate for at least another 12 to 15 years it would seem logical that NASA officials could use that time period as a minimum basis for estimating life-cycle costs. NASA'S approach to funding the Safety and Obsolescence Upgrade program may increase programmatic risks. The program manager believes that funding is adequate to develop upgrade projects that have already been approved. However recent budgets have not included funds for early design studies of other potential upgrades or to cover unforeseen contingencies. Not conducting early design studies to establish the feasibility of a potential upgrade could mean that projects are not started when they are needed or projects are initiated before they are adequately defined. Also the lack of contingency funds means that if approved projects encounter unexpected problems the projects may have to be stretched out and costs may increase. This situation raises questions as to whether the decision to start two new projects in fiscal year 1995 adequately reflect budget constraints and inherent technical and cost risks. In commenting on a draft of this report NASA said that it agreed in principle with our recommendations. The agency stated however that some safety upgrades are made without a full life-cycle cost analysis because of the emphasis on safety. Safety is NASAS highest priority and relative cost is a lesser consideration. We agree that NASA must heavily weigh safety considerations in such decisions. We believe however that prudent management requires an estimate of total costs to ensure that NASA managers understand the full implications of their decisions and that the projects are affordable within the context of NASA'S total budget and future plans. United States General Accounting Office paperback
2000Best.-Nr. 91333Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 2000. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 20 4 pages. Footnote. Figure. Table. This is a "Report to the Chairman Committee on Commerce Science and Transportation U.S. Senate". The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's NASA space shuttle program is at a critical juncture as three key factors converge: its workforce has declined significantly since 1995 its flight rate will have to double over that of recent years to support assembly of the International Space Station and costly safety upgrades are being planned to enhance the space shuttle's safe operation until at least 2012. Several internal NASA studies have shown that the shuttle program's workforce has been affected negatively by the downsizing much of which occurred after 1995. Since 1995 the shuttle workforce has decreased by more than one-third to about 1800 full-time equivalent employees. The shuttle program has identified many key areas that are not sufficiently staffed by qualified workers and the remaining workforce shows signs of overwork and fatigue. For example indicators on forfeited leave absences from training courses and stress-related employee assistance visits are all on the rise. Moreover the program's demographic shape has changed. For example throughout the Office of Space Flight which includes the shuttle program there are more than twice as many workers over 60 years old than under 30 years old. This jeopardizes the program's ability to hand off leadership roles to the next generation and achieve a higher flight rate to support assembly of the International Space Station. In addition according to NASA it poses significant shuttle program flight safety risks. NASA has recognized the need to revitalize its workforce. For example in December 1999 it terminated shuttle program downsizing plans and initiated efforts to begin hiring new staff. In addition NASA and the Office of Management and Budget have begun an overall workforce review to examine personnel needs barriers to achieving proper staffing levels and skill mixes and potential reforms to help address the agency's long-term requirements. NASA human resource officials told us that they are now using a draft checklist we recently published as a guide in ongoing workforce planning and in discussions with the Office of Management and Budget. The checklist includes a five-part framework: strategic planning organizational alignment leadership talent and performance culture. The guide should help NASA to more clearly establish a linkage between human capital programs and the agency's mission goals and strategies. In addition the Government Performance and Results Act requires a performance plan that describes how an agency's goals and objectives are to be achieved. These plans are to include a description of the 1 operational processes skills and technology and 2 human capital information and other resources required to meet goals and objectives. In reviewing NASA's fiscal year 2000 annual performance plan we found that the plan does not adequately describe how the agency's strategies and human capital resources will help it achieve performance goals. NASA's fiscal year 2001 plan however addresses at least some human capital issues in that it includes an objective to improve workforce health monitoring. In addition in June 2000 the President directed the heads of all executive branch federal agencies to integrate human resource management into planning budgeting and mission evaluation processes. The directive requires each agency to include specific human resource management goals and objectives in its strategic and annual performance plans beginning October 1 2000. The President's June 2000 directive provides further emphasis on the need to integrate human capital requirements with the strategic planning process continued management emphasis will be critical to the success of NASA's human capital planning. In addition NASA will need to take steps to ensure it has the right people to manage the shuttle program Because the President has now directed NASA and all other executive branch agencies to include human capital goals and objectives in their strategic and annual performance plans GAO is not making recommendations in this report. We will monitor NASA's progress in establishing and achieving its human capital goals as part of our annual performance plan assessments. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1991Best.-Nr. 91339Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1991. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 41 3 pages. Footnotes. Illustrations. Tabular data. This is a "Report to the Chairman Subcommittee on Science Technology and Space Committee on Commerce Science and Transportation U.S. Senate". Pursuant to a congressional request GAO reviewed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's NASA testing activities focusing on: 1 the adequacy of the NASA testing policies and practices; 2 NASA oversight of contractor testing; and 3 the adequacy of resources available for testing. In April 1990 NASA deployed its $1.5 billion Hubble Space Telescope to an orbit 380 miles above the earth. Soon after the agency discovered that the telescope's primary mirror was manufactured in the wrong shape severely degrading its scientific capabilities. The flaw was not detected before the telescope was launched because the mirror was not adequately tested. The Chairman Subcommittee on Science Technology and Space Senate Committee on Commerce Science and Transportation asked GAO to review NASA'S testing activities. Specifically GAO'S objectives were to assess the adequacy of testing policies and practices and the agency's oversight of contractor testing and to determine whether sufficient resources existed for testing. Because space missions are inherently risky systems cannot be easily repaired while in orbit and failures are widely publicized it is especially important that the systems' performance be thoroughly tested before launch. These complex systems are usually acquired in very limited quantities and test programs are specifically tailored for each project. According to a NASA team appointed to investigate the Hubble failure mirror tests were inadequately planned and poorly analyzed. The team further noted that NASA did not provide adequate oversight of the contractor's test program. Testing has varied from project to project. The success of many of NASA'S recent space projects indicates that in many cases testing was adequate. Tests were not effective however in detecting the Hubble mirror flaw. In other cases launch schedules have been adversely affected because tests did not identify problems soon enough. Testing practices vary because NASA has no uniform policies governing testing. Existing guidance is fragmented not well defined and varies from one NASA field center to another. In some cases hardware designed for the same mission may be tested to different standards. All centers have oversight controls to help ensure that contractors properly plan and conduct tests and report the results. Controls at some centers however could be further strengthened. Also according to a recent National Academy of Public Administration study NASA needs to retain more of its research and development work in-house to give civil service personnel the experience necessary to adequately oversee agency contractors. No standard exists for determining the amount of resources that should be devoted to testing but according to NASA officials resources are normally sufficient to conduct essential tests. However project managers must sometimes make cost-risk tradeoffs when defining the scope and extent of testing programs. Further some in-house test facilities and equipment need upgrading. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1992Best.-Nr. 259647PN. New. 1992. Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback
1989Best.-Nr. 792041PN. New. 1989. Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition. . PN paperback
1991Best.-Nr. 244274PN. New. 1991. Soft Cover. Date is original print. This is a reprint edition . PN paperback