United States Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administrations, Defense ProgramsBiblio.com
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2002réf. 76354Washington DC: United States Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Defense Programs 2002. Presumed First Edition First printing. Wraps. Very good. iv 55 3 pages. Illustrations. Acronyms & Abbreviations. Glossary. This type of document is very ephemeral and it is believed that very few copies have survived in the more than two decades since it was issued. The United States government's Strategic Computing Initiative funded research into advanced computer hardware and artificial intelligence from 1983 to 1993. The initiative was designed to support various projects that were required to develop machine intelligence in a prescribed ten-year time frame from chip design and manufacture computer architecture to artificial intelligence software. The project was superseded in the 1990s by the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative and then by the Advanced Simulation and Computing Program. These later programs did not include artificial general intelligence as a goal but instead focused on supercomputing for large scale simulation such as atomic bomb simulations. The Advanced Simulation and Computing Program or ASC is a super-computing program run by the National Nuclear Security Administration in order to simulate test and maintain the United States nuclear stockpile. The program was created in 1995 in order to support the Stockpile Stewardship Program or SSP. The goal of the initiative is to extend the lifetime of the current aging stockpile. Among the sections in the Table of Contents are: Stockpile Stewardship Defense Applications Computer Science Integrated Computing Systems Strategic Alliances Verification and Validation Physics Modeling Weapons Simulation Modeling and Simulation Level 1 Milestones High Explosives Advanced Visualization Detonation Wave Titan IV Solid Rocket Motor Metropolis Center JCEL. United States Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Defense Programs paperback
2018réf. 75546Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Safety Infrastructure and Operations 2018. Presumed First Edition First printing. Spiral bound. Very good. 58 pages. Illustrations color. Map. Acronyms. Clear plastic sheets at front and back covers. This 2018 Master Asset Plan MAP lays out the National Nuclear Security Administration's NNSA infrastructure vision and highlights strategic investments being made to achieve it. It is an update to the first-ever 2017 MAP which described how NNSA's infrastructure supports it's unique mission requirements and the gaps and mission risks inherent in that infrastructure. Safe reliable and modern infrastructure at NNSA's national laboratories and production plants is absolutely essential to accomplish our vital national security mission and ensure the well-being of our workforce. As the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states there is no margin for further delay in improving the state of NNSA's infrastructure. Significant and sustained investments will be required during the next quarter century to recapitalize and revitalize the nuclear security enterprise. The Master Asset Plan assembles data into a single report that presents an integrated view of NNSA's infrastructure strategy. National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations unknown
2018réf. 75547Washington DC: U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration and U. K. Ministry of Defence 2018. Presumed First Edition First printing. Wraps. Very good. 3 38 3 plus covers. Timeline. Illustrations many in color. Maps. The 1958 US-UK Mutual Defense Agreement or UK-US Mutual Defence Agreement is a bilateral treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom on nuclear weapons cooperation. The treaty's full name is Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. It allows the United States and the UK to exchange nuclear materials technology and information. While the US has nuclear cooperation agreements with other countries including France and some NATO countries this agreement is by far the most comprehensive. Harold Macmillan called it "the Great Prize". The treaty was signed on 3 July 1958 after the Soviet Union shocked the American public with the Sputnik crisis on 4 October 1957 and the British hydrogen bomb programme successfully tested a hydrogen bomb in the Operation Grapple test on 8 November 1957. The Anglo-American Special Relationship proved mutually beneficial although it was never one of equals; the United States was far larger than Britain both militarily and economically. Britain soon became dependent on the United States for its nuclear weapons as it lacked the resources to produce a range of designs. The treaty allowed American nuclear weapons to be supplied to Britain through Project E for the use by the Royal Air Force and British Army of the Rhine. The treaty provided for the sale to the UK of one complete nuclear submarine propulsion plant plus ten years' supply of enriched uranium to fuel it. Other nuclear material was also acquired from the United States under the treaty. including 7.5 tonnes of highly enriched uranium although much of the highly enriched uranium was used as fuel for the growing fleet of UK nuclear submarines. The treaty paved the way for the Polaris Sales Agreement and the Royal Navy ultimately acquired entire weapons systems with the UK Polaris programme and Trident nuclear programme using American missiles with British nuclear warheads. The treaty has been amended and renewed nine times. The most recent renewal extended it to 31 December 2024. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration and U. K. Ministry of Defence paperback
2007réf. 75574Los Alamos NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory 2007. Concurrence Draft. DVD. Very good. This disk includes the Summary Volume 1 chapters 1-11 Volume 2 Appendices A-M and Volume 3 Comment Response Document. The disk contains 2358 KB. NNSA proposes to continue operating Los Alamos National Laboratory LANL which is located in Los Alamos County in north-central New Mexico. NNSA has identified and assessed three alternatives for continued operation of LANL: 1 No Action 2 Reduced Operations and 3 Expanded Operations. The Expanded Operations Alternative includes the impacts of actions to implement the March 2005 Compliance Order on Consent Consent Order entered into by DOE the LANL management and operating contractor and the State of New Mexico to address the investigation and remediation of environmental contamination at LANL. NNSA intends to implement actions necessary to comply with the Consent Order regardless of whether it implements other actions analyzed as part of the Expanded Operations Alternative. Expanded Operations is NNSA's Preferred Alternative. Under the No Action Alternative NNSA would continue the historical mission support activities conducted at LANL at currently approved operational levels. Under the Reduced Operations Alternative NNSA would eliminate some activities and limit the operations of other activities. Under the Expanded Operations Alternative NNSA would operate LANL at the highest levels of activity currently foreseeable including full implementation of mission assignments. Under all of the alternatives the affected environment is primarily within 50 miles 80 kilometers of LANL. Analyses indicate little difference in the environmental impacts of the alternatives on many resource areas. The primary discriminators are public risk due to radiation exposure collective worker risk due to radiation exposure socioeconomic effects due to LANL employment changes electrical power and water demand waste management and transportation. Los Alamos National Laboratory unknown
2018réf. 75706Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration 2018. Presumed First Edition First minting thus. Coin/Medal. As new. Approximately 2.25 inches in diameter. Front side has a black band at the outer edge with Mutual Defense Agreement at the top 60 years of partnership and Security at the bottom and the center image has the flags of both nations large number 60 and smaller dates 1958 and 2018. The back side has the same black band and text and the center has the following text: Here we are together defending all that to free man is dear. Prime Minister Winston Churchill Addressing the U.S. Congress December 24 1941. The 1958 US-UK Mutual Defense Agreement or UK-US Mutual Defence Agreement is a bilateral treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom on nuclear weapons cooperation. The treaty's full name is Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. It allows the United States and the UK to exchange nuclear materials technology and information. While the US has nuclear cooperation agreements with other countries including France and some NATO countries this agreement is by far the most comprehensive. Harold Macmillan called it "the Great Prize" National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
2004réf. 75764Knoxville TN: U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration 2004. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. Hardcover. Very good. Title from front cover. Various paginations approximately 225 pages. Illustrations some with color. Abbreviations and Acronyms. Includes CD on URPR Program Implementation and Task Plans dated January 2007 located inside the front cover. The University Research Program in Robotics URPR Implementation Plan is an integrated group of universities performing fundamental research that addresses broad-based robotics and automation needs of the NNSA Directed Stockpile Work DSW and Campaigns. The URPR mission is to provide improved capabilities of robotics science and engineering to meet the future needs of all weapon systems and other associated NNSA/DOE activities. The participants included University of Florida University of Michigan University of New Mexico University of Tennessee at Knoxville and University of Texas at Austin. This plan describes the purpose goals planning assumptions technical approach risks integration with other programs campaigns and sites and the estimated funding requirements for each year. The URPR mission is to provide improved capabilities of robotics science and engineering to meet the future needs of all weapon systems and other associated NNSA/DOE activities. The IRIS Lab's current areas of research are in scene building scene description and data visualization. The combination of these different fields gives rise to robust usable systems and advanced developments in the underlying technologies. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration hardcover
2002réf. 75970Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration 2002. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. DVD. Very good. The National Nuclear Security Administration's NNSA nuclear weapons complex NWC has identified developed and deployed successful high-value technologies in support of national security. The production plants testing facilities and national laboratories are a reservoir of technological capabilities unmatched in depth or breadth by any other institution. Cooperation between facilities involves interdisciplinary cross-facility knowledge exchanges at all levels of design and development to build perfectibility into the product. For example the Interplant Technology Team IPTT facilitates technical integration between NWC sites. This team promotes inter-site cooperation by helping to coordinate and focus resources that provide technology solutions. Reporting directly to the IPTT the Network of Senior Scientists and Engineers NSSE comprised of five scientists and engineers from each site meet quarterly to acknowledge and reward scientific excellence and to promote technical cooperation. The NWC is the steward of the Nation's defense nuclear mission-the military application of nuclear energy and the reducing of global danger from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The ability to address the threat of nuclear biological and chemical attacks and to protect high-value assets has assumed a higher priority. To that end the NNSA focus is on products and technologies that are immediately deployable. We can provide the crucial advantage needed to meet the terrorist threat in all conceivable forms and advance our national knowledge base to maintain the technological edge. This catalog of capabilities highlights those proven field-tested applications for deterrence and for rapid-response. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
2007réf. 76108Boston MA: Harvard School of Business Publishing Corporation 2007. Presumed First Edition First printing. Magazine. Very good. Quarto approximately 8.5 inches by 11 inches. 168 pages. Color illustrations. Covers has slight wear and soiling. Includes a Harvard Business School Press insert. This issue contains the famous interview with Jeff Bezos entitled The Institutional Yes. It also contains articles on the Business Climate including insights from Michael Porter and Theodore Roosevelt IV Chief Strategy Officer Personalized Medicine a conversation with Rory Stewart and designing markets. Jeffrey Preston Bezos January 12 1964 is an American technology entrepreneur. He is best known as the founder chairman and chief executive officer of Amazon. Bezos graduated from Princeton University in 1986. He founded Amazon in late 1994. The company began as an online bookstore and has expanded to a variety of products and services including video and audio streaming. Harvard Business Review HBR is a general management magazine published by Harvard Business Publishing a wholly owned subsidiary of Harvard University. HBR is published six times a year. HBR's articles cover a wide range of topics that are relevant to various industries management functions and geographic locations. These focus on areas including leadership organizational change negotiation strategy operations marketing finance and managing people. In the 1980s Theodore Levitt became the editor of Harvard Business Review and changed the magazine to make it more accessible to general audiences. Articles were shortened and the scope of the magazine was expanded to include a wider range of topics. Between 2006 and 2008 HBP went through several reorganizations but finally settled into the three market-facing groups that exist today: Higher Education; Corporate Learning; and Harvard Business Review Group which publishes Harvard Business Review magazine. Harvard School of Business Publishing Corporation unknown
2003réf. 75104U.S. Department of Energy 2003. Presumed First Edition First printing thus--August 2003 Revision to April 2003 version. Spiral bound wraps. Very good. Various paginations approximately 70 pages. Illustrations some with color. Cover has an identifer--03-GA50854. Clear plastic sheets protect front and back covers. Definitions. Acronyms References. Bibliography. Appendices. This report was prepared in response to Recommendations 3 and 3.b page 18 of the report of the Senior Managers task Group on Suspect/Counterfeit Items S/CI. "Resolution of Outstanding Issues Identified from Inspector General Report DOE/IG-0304" June 21 1996. Specifically the intent of this report is to disseminate information regarding Department of Energy DOE S/CI trends analyses and related procurement/quality assurance issues. The DOE complex is provided with general guidance about controlling S/CI and other procurement/quality security issues while DOE management is provided information on progress within the Department relative to these issues. This annual report is an update to the S/CI report issued in 2002 and includes data on the S/CI reported in the Occurrence Reporting and Processing Systems ORPS between January 1 1991 and December 31 2002. The changes to the April 2003 reports are that 1 the ORPS report counts and analyses that have been added to the database from January 1 2002 through December 31 2002 have been included; 2 New information was added regarding other significant activities related to S/CI; and 3 Section 2.3 has been updated to summarize the findings and discussions for the S/CI videoconferences. U.S. Department of Energy paperback
2005réf. 75224Albuquerque NM: National Nuclear Security Administration 2005. Presumed First Edition First issuance thus. CD. Very good. On Hold Shelf. This disk has six files on it: 1. Welcome letter 2. Course Material 3. Self Review 4. Reference Material 5. Software and 6. Read Me. In the course material area there is information of special access programs security policies threat briefing OPSEC overview a Baseline Security Manual and practical exercises. The reference material is indicated as including Executive Orders Presidential Decision Documents Public Laws Director of Central Intelligence Directives 6 DCIDs DoD Manuals DOE policies and other associated materials. In opening the disk there was a reference to SNL so it is assumed that Sandia National Laboratories assisted at least in the production of the CD if not in the development of this training. This CD is marked 'Official Use Only" but previous experience in requesting a determination as to whether the dissemination limitation has almost without exception resulted in silence which we take after a period of time as indicating consent. Special access programs SAPs in the U.S. Federal Government are security protocols that provide highly classified information with safeguards and access restrictions that exceed those for regular classified information. SAPs can range from black projects to routine but especially-sensitive operations such as COMSEC maintenance or Presidential transportation support. In addition to routine controls a SAP may impose more stringent investigative or adjudicative requirements specialized nondisclosure agreements special terminology or markings exclusion from standard contract investigations carve-outs and centralized billet systems. There was no specific organization within the NNSA indicated on the CD that a question on dissemination could be referred to. Since this information is more than a decade old and because multiple requests for status on other Official Use Only materials have been ignored it is assumed that the OUO limitation no long applies. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
2005réf. 75219Washington DC: United States Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration 2005. Presumed First Edition First issuance thus. VHS Tape. Very good. This is a standard VHS tape approximately 4 inches by 7 inches with a hand written label stating Surveillance Training - SFIs 45 min. No classification or information use limitation on label or tape sleeve. The tape has been partially played but not rewound. Significant Finding Investigations were addressed in DOE/IG-0535 Audit Report Management of the Stockpile Surveillance Program's Significant Finding Investigations December 2001. The Directors of the three nuclear weapons laboratories annually assess and report the condition of the weapon systems for which their laboratories are responsible. A critical event in this process is the identification of a defect or malfunction during surveillance testing. This is especially important when dealing with an aging weapons stockpile. Departmental procedures require preliminary tests or evaluations to establish whether a Significant Finding Investigation SFI should be initiated. Such investigations are then conducted to determine the identified problem's cause and impact and to recommend corrective actions. Weapons surveillance began in the US in the mid-1960s when weapons testing was done through underground explosions of nuclear devices. Such testing continued until the early 1990s. If tests on a weapon system show an anomaly - a possible problem with a part that could jeopardize the system operation - with a system evaluation engineer SEE is notified. It is the SEE's job to determine if the anomaly could affect the surety safe use or reliability of the weapon. If the SEE makes that determination he/she opens a "significant finding investigation SFI. The responsibility of the investigation team is to determine the cause and impact of the defect and to make recommendations for corrective actions. United States Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
2008réf. 75228Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Defense Programs Program Integration Office Office of Program Management & Evaluation 2008. Presumed First Edition First issuance of disc content included draft material. CD-R. Good. The NNSA proposed a new Weapon Surveillance Facility WSF for non-destructive weapon and pit surveillance to supplement the existing Weapons Evaluation Test Laboratory. By relocating some testing now done at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory the NNSA says the new WSF would help consolidate non-destructive testing facilities and reduce the number of sites in the nuclear weapons complex with Category I/II SNM. Since all significant quantities of Cat I/II SNM have now been removed from Livermore the NNSA must either find another location for the environmental testing carried out there or seek special authorization to allow Livermore to continue working with SNM for limited periods. The WSF could also free up some Pantex bays now used for evaluation to return to use for assembly/disassembly operations. This CD includes a draft final report of the Weapon surveillance Facility Integrated Project Team unfilled out Official Use Only stamp which as such has no force or effect. In addition to the 23 page draft report there are six word Expert Choice files Minimize investment Impact Minimize Cost Impact Workforce Impact Reduced Length of Transition Reduce square footage Storage Consolidation Decision Criteria and WSF Design Criteria. Some of the functions were being performed at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory building 332 but the major emphasis was on options for new construction at Pantex. This type of material rarely survives in either hardcopy or electronic form. This offers a rare snapshot into facility planning and mission assignments within the United States Nuclear Weapons Complex. National Nuclear Security Administration, Defense Programs, Program Integration Office, Office of Program Management & Evalu unknown
2002réf. 75230Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Defense Programs 2002. Copy of Team Files. CD-R. Very good. This CD contains a treasure trove of information on High Explosive operations and facilities at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory the Los Alamos National Laboratory Sandia National Laboratories the Nevada Test Site and the Pantex Plant. This CD has the files that are excel spread sheets PDF files JPG files Power Point files and Word files. The material includes the scope team membership information from the sites information on sizing etc. This information was developed to address consolidation options between nuclear weapon laboratories and plants with an aim to reduce some costs. Major high explosive operations included research and development explosive testing detonator and small quantity production and 'main charge' production for nuclear weapons. Posted on-line--Los Alamos demonstrated the first use of plastic-bonded explosives in a nuclear explosion in 1956. This development allowed the shift from precision machined cast explosives to formulations containing high concentrations of high-energy density compounds with reduced sensitivity more uniformity and better mechanical characteristics. Since the 1960s Livermore has been researching and developing safer HE for Livermore-designed weapons. The plastic coating that binds the explosive granules typically 5 to 20% of each formulation by weight is what gives each PBX its distinctive characteristics. Pressing a PBX molding powder converts it into a solid mass with the polymer binder providing both mechanical rigidity and reduced sensitivity to accidental detonation. The choice of binder affects hardness safety and stability. The TATB-based formulations of Livermore's LX-17 and Los Alamos's PBX 9502 are "insensitive" high explosives IHE; others are termed "conventional." National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Programs unknown
réf. 75434CD. As new. This item is still in its original plastic wrap. The rear of the sleeve lists the contents: Overview Defense Applications and Modeling; Simulation and Computer Science Integrated Computing Systems University Partnerships Special Projects ASCI's future ASCI's Multidisciplinary Applications. Among the subsections are: Visualization Technilogies at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Visualization Technologies at Sandia National Laboratories ASCI White at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Science at the Level 1 Alliances and Technology Prospectus. The U.S. Department of Energy DOE established the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative ASCI in 1996. The goal of ASCI is to simulate the results of new weapons designs as well as the effects of aging on existing and new designs all in the absence of underground nuclear tests. The ASCI is an applications-driven effort with a goal to develop reliable computational models of the processes involved in the design manufacture and degradation of nuclear weapons. Based on discussions with scientists and engineers with expertise in weapons design manufacturing and in computational physics a goal of simulating full-system three-dimensional nuclear burn and safety simulation processes by the year 2004 was established. A number of applications-based milestones were identified to mark the progress from current simulation capabilities to full-system simulation capabilities. Codes development to simulate casting material aging safety forging welding of microstructures and so on. unknown
2004réf. 75433United States Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Defense Programs 2004. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. DVD. Very good. DVD has 40 files and many of them are folders. On July 13-14 2004 the Caltech ASC Level 1 Center hosted an ASC TriLab V&V Workshop in La Jolla CA to discuss and compare what the NNSA laboratories and the ASC Level 1 University Centers are learning with respect to code verification and validation. About 50 people participated in the workshop. Presentations were organized into four sessions and moderated by key V&V personnel from the NNSA labs and ASC Centers: 1 V&V Program Overviews Jamileh Soudah ASC HQ - Chair 2 Code and Solution Verification Tomek Plewa University of Chicago Flash Center - Chair 3 Validation Experiments Dan Meiron Caltech ASC Center - Chair 4 Validation and Uncertainty Quantification Tony Giunta Sandia - Chair The workshop began with V&V overviews presented by speakers from Los Alamos Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories and the ASC Level 1 Alliance Centers at Caltech the University of Chicago the University of Illinois Stanford University and the University of Utah. These baseline presentations were followed by talks addressing approaches and lessons learned in code and solution verification designing and implementing validation experiments and what has been accomplished and remains to be done in uncertainty qualification. At the end of the workshop Dan Meiron Caltech hosted a discussion to summarize commonalities across the lab and university programs and identify collaborative efforts that might follow this workshop. The workshop began with V&V overviews presented by speakers from Los Alamos Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories and the ASC Level 1 Alliance Centers at Caltech the University of Chicago the University of Illinois Stanford University and the University of Utah. These baseline presentations were followed by talks addressing approaches and lessons learned in code and solution verification designing and implementing validation experiments and what has been accomplished and remains to be done in uncertainty qualification. At the end of the workshop Dan Meiron Caltech hosted a discussion to summarize commonalities across the lab and university programs and identify collaborative efforts that might follow this workshop. The purpose of this document is to provide a synopsis of the key issues discussed during the workshop. The intent is not to review the substance of the technical presentations which are available from the Caltech V&V Workshop web site and CD but to provide a record of the important issues raised during the workshop discussion and interaction. Input for this synopsis comes primarily from the summary session moderated by Dan Meiron and notes taken during the course of the workshop sessions. United States Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Programs unknown
2006réf. 74915Las Vegas NV: United States Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration 2006. Presumed First Edition in CD form of this report. DVD. Very good. This DVD is approximately 4.5 inches in diameter. The Nevada Test Site-Directed Research Development and Demonstration SDRD program completed a very successful year of research and development activities in FY 2005. Fifty new projects were selected for funding this year and five FY 2004 projects were brought to conclusion. The total funds expended by the SDRD program were $5.4 million for an average per project cost of just under $100000. Two external audits of SDRD accounting practices were conducted in FY 2005. Both audits found the program's accounting practices consistent with the requirements of DOE Order 413.2A. Highlights for the year included: the filing of 18 invention disclosures for intellectual property generated by FY 2005 projects; programmatic adoption of 17 FY 2004 SDRD-developed technologies; participation in the tri-lab Laboratory Directed Research and Development LDRD and SDRD program review that was broadly attended; peer reviews of all FY 2005 projects; and the successful completion of 55 R&D projects as presented in this report. United States Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
2013réf. 74122Washington DC: United States Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration 2013. Presumed First thus. Coin. Very good. The Joint Verification Experiments occurred in 1988. One occurred in the U.S. and one in Russia. A 25th anniversary commemoration was held at the National Nuclear Security Site formerly the Nevada Test Site in 2013. This coin was given out to a select few participants officials and organizers. Coin has a 1.5 inch diameter. On one side the center image is the Department of Energy logo with two outer rings with text. The outermost ring text is "Building Trust and Confidence National Nuclear Security Admiistration" The other side has a center image with the dates 1988-2013 Russian and U.S. flags and the atomic symbol and an outer ring with the following text "25th Aniversary U.S.-Russia Joint Verification Experiment". Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Conduct of a Joint Verification Experiment May 31 1988. Reaffirming the statement of the Secretary of State of the United States and the Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of December 9 1987 Proceeding from the agreement to conduct a joint Verification Experiment hereinafter referred to as JVE for the purpose of the elaboration of effective verification measures for the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests hereinafter referred to as the 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests the parties have agreed in part as follows: 1. For purposes of the JVE there shall be two nuclear explosions one at the U.S. Nevada Test Site and one at the USSR Semipalatinsk Test Site each hereinafter being referred to as a JVE explosion. 2. The planned yield of the JVE explosion at each test site shall be not less than 100 kilotons and shall approach 150 kilotons. 3. Each Party shall have the opportunity to measure on the basis of reciprocity the yield of the JVE explosion conducted at the other Party's test site using teleseismic methods and at the other's test site using hydrodynamic yield measurement methods. 4. Each Party shall also perform teleseismic measurements with its national seismic station network for both JVE explosions. To assist in teleseismic measurement the Parties shall exchange data on five nuclear explosions conducted after January 1 1978 but before January 1 1988 to include yield date and time geographic coordinates depth of burial and associated geological and geophysical data. For each of these historical explosions the Parties shall exchange teleseismic recordings taken at five designated stations on each side including station corrections and the best network seismic magnitude. 5. Each Party shall perform hydrodynamic yield measurements within the satellite hole provided for that purpose of the JVE explosions at both Parties' test sites using the methods it has identified in this Agreement. DONE at Moscow on May 31 1988 in two copies each in the English and Russian languages both texts being equally authentic. FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA George P. Shultz FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS E. Shevardnadze. United States, Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
2011réf. 74121Amarillo TX: Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Pantex 2011. Presumed First thus. Coin. Very good. Challenge coin/medal has a two-inch diameter. One side has a center image of the American Bald Eagle with the words Pantex NNSA. Around the central image is the following text "Department of Energy LANL LLNL SNL Y12 OST". On the other side has a center image of the B53 bomb and around the central image is the following text "SS-21 Dismantlement Final Unit Sept 2011". From Wikipedia: The Mk/B53 was a high-yield bunker buster thermonuclear weapon developed by the United States during the Cold War. Deployed on Strategic Air Command bombers the B53 with a yield of 9 megatons was the most powerful weapon in the U.S. nuclear arsenal after the last B41 nuclear bombs were retired in 1976. The B53 was the basis of the W-53 warhead carried by the Titan II Missile which was decommissioned in 1987. Fifty B53s were retained during that time as part of the "hedge" portion of the Enduring Stockpile. The last B53 was disassembled on 25 October 2011 a year ahead of schedule. Development of the weapon began in 1955 by Los Alamos National Laboratory based on the earlier Mk 21 and Mk 46 weapons. In March 1958 the Strategic Air Command issued a request for a new Class C bomb to replace the earlier Mk 41. A revised version of the Mk 46 became the TX-53 in 1959. The Mk 53 entered production in 1962 and was built through June 1965. It entered service aboard B-47 Stratojet B-52G Stratofortress and B-58 Hustler bomber aircraft in the mid-1960s. From 1968 it was redesignated B53. Some early versions of the bomb were dismantled beginning in 1967. The B53 was also intended to be retired in the 1980s but 50 units remained in the active stockpile until the deployment of the B61-11 in 1997. At that point the obsolete B53s were slated for immediate disassembly; however the process of disassembling the units was greatly hampered by safety concerns as well as a lack of resources. In 2010 authorization was given to disassemble the 50 bombs at the Pantex plant in Texas. The process of dismantling the last remaining B53 bomb in the stockpile was completed in 2011. It was intended as a bunker buster weapon using a surface blast after laydown deployment to transmit a shock wave through the earth to collapse its target. Attacks against the Soviet deep underground leadership shelters in the Chekhov/Sharapovo area south of Moscow envisaged multiple B53/W53 exploding at ground level. It has since been supplanted in such roles by the earth-penetrating B61 Mod 11 a bomb that penetrates the surface to deliver much more of its explosive energy into the ground and therefore needs a much smaller yield to produce the same effects. The B53 was intended to be retired in the 1980s but 50 units remained in the active stockpile until the deployment of the B61-11 in 1997. At that point the obsolete B53s were slated for immediate disassembly; however the process of disassembling the units was greatly hampered by safety concerns and a lack of resources. The last remaining B53 bomb began the disassembly processes on Tuesday 25 October 2011 at the Energy Department's Pantex Plant. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Pantex unknown
2011réf. 74113Amarillo TX: National Nuclear Security Administration Pantex Plant c2011. Presumed First thus. Patches. Very good. The patch is about 3.5 inches by 3.5 inches but the top is rounded so it is more like an arched window than a full square. It has a black border. The center has the image of the bomb a big dog and the text "B53" and "Last of the Big Dogs. On an orange border in black letters is "NNSA SS-21 Dismantlement DOE Pantex LANL LLNL SNL Y12 OST" From Wikipedia: The Mk/B53 was a high-yield bunker buster thermonuclear weapon developed by the United States during the Cold War. Deployed on Strategic Air Command bombers the B53 with a yield of 9 megatons was the most powerful weapon in the U.S. nuclear arsenal after the last B41 nuclear bombs were retired in 1976. The B53 was the basis of the W-53 warhead carried by the Titan II Missile which was decommissioned in 1987. Fifty B53s were retained during that time as part of the "hedge" portion of the Enduring Stockpile. The last B53 was disassembled on 25 October 2011 a year ahead of schedule. Development of the weapon began in 1955 by Los Alamos National Laboratory based on the earlier Mk 21 and Mk 46 weapons. In March 1958 the Strategic Air Command issued a request for a new Class C bomb to replace the earlier Mk 41. A revised version of the Mk 46 became the TX-53 in 1959. The Mk 53 entered production in 1962 and was built through June 1965. It entered service aboard B-47 Stratojet B-52G Stratofortress and B-58 Hustler bomber aircraft in the mid-1960s. From 1968 it was redesignated B53. Some early versions of the bomb were dismantled beginning in 1967. The B53 was also intended to be retired in the 1980s but 50 units remained in the active stockpile until the deployment of the B61-11 in 1997. At that point the obsolete B53s were slated for immediate disassembly; however the process of disassembling the units was greatly hampered by safety concerns as well as a lack of resources. In 2010 authorization was given to disassemble the 50 bombs at the Pantex plant in Texas. The process of dismantling the last remaining B53 bomb in the stockpile was completed in 2011. It was intended as a bunker buster weapon using a surface blast after laydown deployment to transmit a shock wave through the earth to collapse its target. Attacks against the Soviet deep underground leadership shelters in the Chekhov/Sharapovo area south of Moscow envisaged multiple B53/W53 exploding at ground level. It has since been supplanted in such roles by the earth-penetrating B61 Mod 11 a bomb that penetrates the surface to deliver much more of its explosive energy into the ground and therefore needs a much smaller yield to produce the same effects. The B53 was intended to be retired in the 1980s but 50 units remained in the active stockpile until the deployment of the B61-11 in 1997. At that point the obsolete B53s were slated for immediate disassembly; however the process of disassembling the units was greatly hampered by safety concerns and a lack of resources. The last remaining B53 bomb began the disassembly processes on Tuesday 25 October 2011 at the Energy Department's Pantex Plant. National Nuclear Security Administration, Pantex Plant unknown
2017réf. 74294Washington DC: United States. Department of Energy. National Nuclear Security Administration 2017. Presumed First Edition First printing. Wraps. Very good. vi 203 1 pages. Illustrations. Acronyms. References. Format us approximately 8.5 inches by 11 inches. Cover has slight wear and soiling. This is the final report on the NNSA's Security Roadmap Key Strategy 4 Develop and Sustain a Highly Capable Security Workforce. The report is the culmination of a year's work by a team of Industrial Organizational Leadership Development professionals from the National Training Center NNSA's Office of Human Capital Management and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. The report is a comprehensive states of how the NNSA can significantly improve the recruitment development maturation and retention of the security professional. The report was designed to address the whole-person in that the report uses a competency-modeling concept as a key predictor in human performance. The next steps will include teaming to actively work the approved recommendations as well as establishing working groups to develop action plans for achieving success of each recommendation. The National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA is the U.S. agency responsible for enhancing national security through the military application of nuclear science. NNSA maintains and enhances the safety security and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear explosive testing; works to reduce the global danger from weapons of mass destruction; provides the U.S. Navy with safe and effective nuclear propulsion; and responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the U.S. and abroad. Established by the United States Congress in 2000 NNSA is a semi-autonomous agency within the United States Department of Energy. The National Nuclear Security Administration was created by Congressional action in 1999 in the wake of the Wen Ho Lee spy scandal and other allegations that lax administration by the Department of Energy had resulted in the loss of U.S. nuclear secrets to China. Originally proposed to be an independent agency NNSA gained the reluctant support of the Clinton administration only after it was instead chartered as a sub-agency within the Department of Energy to be headed by an administrator reporting to the Secretary of Energy. The first NNSA administrator appointed was Air Force General and CIA Deputy Director John A. Gordon. NNSA has four missions with regard to national security: · To manage the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile. · To reduce global danger from weapons of mass destruction and to promote international nuclear safety and nonproliferation. · To provide the United States Navy with safe militarily effective nuclear propulsion plants and to ensure the safe and reliable operation of those plants. · To support United States leadership in science and technology. United States. Department of Energy. National Nuclear Security Administration paperback
2014réf. 74295Washington DC: United States. Department of Energy. National Nuclear Security Administration. Office of Safety and Health 2014. Review draft. Binder clip at upper left corner. Very good. Approximately 200 sheets printed on one side only. Acronyms and Organizational Designations. Format is approximately 8.5 inches by 11 inches. The final version of this supplemental directive was issued/dated 11-17-14. The evaluations described in this Supplemental Directive comprise a formalized approach to ensuring the nuclear explosive safety NES of all nuclear explosive operations NEOs performed by the National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA and its contractors. This approach requires that all new approved current and proposed changes to NEOs and associated supporting infrastructure receive a commensurate level of review and analysis. The Nuclear Explosive Safety Evaluation Process is a key mission responsibility of the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Office of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs. Among the topics and activities covered are: Nuclear Explosive Safety Studies NESS Operations Safety Reviews Contractor Nuclear Explosive Safety Change Evaluations Secure Transportation Security Operations Study Group Technical Advisors Post-Evaluation Process Change Control Process Deliberation Topics Findings Information Evaluation Finding Disposition Qualification Requirements Nuclear Explosive Operations. United States. Department of Energy. National Nuclear Security Administration. Office of Safety and Health unknown
1989réf. 74608Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center Houston TX: National Aeronautics and Space Administration 1989. Presumed First Edition First printing. Wraps. Good. vii 1 44 pages plus covers. Illustrations most in color. Cover has some wear and soiling with edge tear at back. Format is approximately 8.5 inches by 11 inches. The Spacelab Life Sciences 1 SLS-1 mission originated with a call to the scientific community for experiments in 1978. Accepted experiments involved humans primates rodents amphibians and plants. The original payload configuration was reduced to include human passive rodent and basic biology experiments and engineering evaluations. Human experiments will address effects of micro-gravity on various physiological parameters during and postflight. Investigations with nonhuman subjects will study microgravity effects on the cardiopulmonary cardiovascular and musculoskeletal systems on the regulation of blood volume and erythropoiesis and on calcium metabolism and gravity receptors. SLS-1 was to serve as a stepping stone in establishing capabilities for flying nonhuman subjects and performing in-flight manipulations on these subjects without jeopardizing the crew environment. Fundamental technology incorporated in the animal holding facilities and laboratory work bench will be used in subsequent missions and in the future Space Station. Space Life Science-1 SLS-1 launched aboard Space Shuttle Orbiter Columbia STS-40 on June 5 1991 was the first Spacelab mission dedicated solely to life sciences research. The laboratory for the research took place in a module shown here carried in the cargo bay of the Columbia. The purpose of the mission was to study the mechanisms magnitudes and time courses of certain physiological changes that occur during space flight to investigate the consequences of the body's adaptation to microgravity and readjustment to Earth's gravity and to bring the benefits back home to Earth. The mission was designed to explore the responses of the heart lungs blood vessels kidneys and hormone-secreting glands to examine the causes of space motion sickness and study changes in the muscles bones and cells. Many studies started during SLS-1 provided data that served as the foundation for investigations on the International Space Station. National Aeronautics and Space Administration paperback
1967réf. 73534Washington DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration Office of Technology Utilization Scientific and Technical Information Division 1967. Presumed First Edition First printing. Wraps. Fair. vi 345 1 pages. Map. Illustrations some in color. Upper corner has gotten wet and some pages were stuck at the top fore-edge but are now separate with minimal impact on page content. Corporate library stamp on front cover. Name in ink on title page. Cover has other wear and soiling. Some page soiling. The Gemini Summary Conference emphasized the highlights of the Gemini Program and especially the flight results of the last five missions. This report contains the 21 technical papers presented at the conference as well as the introduction by George E. Mueller and concluding remarks by George M. Low. This copy once belonged to R. E. McGaughy who is listed as an author on some NASA technical reports. The Conference had sections on Space Orbital Maneuvering Man's Activities in Space Operational ExperienceGemini Onboard Experiments and Gemini summarization. Among the listed authors are: Edwin Aldrin Eugene Cernan Edward White Michael Collins Neil Armstrong Thomas Stafford and Charles Conrad. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of Technology Utilization, Scientific and Technical Information Division paperback
2001réf. 73569Washington DC: U. S. Department of Energy 2001. Presumed First Edition First printing. Trade paperback. Very good. 217 3 pages. Illustrations. Cover has some wear and soiling. The mission of the Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control NPAC is to prevent proliferation ensure peaceful nuclear uses and enable verifiable nuclear reductions. NPAC provides a comprehensive approach to strengthen nonproliferation and arms control regimes achieving its mission through four subprograms: International Nuclear Safeguards; Nuclear Controls; Nuclear Verification; Nonproliferation Policy. One of the gravest threats the United States and the international community face is the possibility that terrorists or rogue nations will acquire nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction WMD. NNSA through its Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation DNN works closely with a wide range of international partners key U.S. federal agencies the U.S. national laboratories and the private sector to secure safeguard and/or dispose of dangerous nuclear and radiological material and detect and control the proliferation of related WMD technology and expertise. The Office of Nonproliferation Research and Engineering part of the National Nuclear Security Administration within the Department of Energy conducts wide-ranging research for diverse end users at the federal and local level. As such the Office faces a number of unusual challenges in determining how to best serve its users' needs within its budget. The Chemical & Biological National Security Program was initiated in FY97 in response to the growing awareness of both the chemical and biological weapon capabilities available to potential attackers and the vulnerabilities of the U.S> population to these weapons. From the outset the program has drawn from the deep scientific and engineering talents in the national laboratories as well as from specialized expertise in academia and industry. A basic philosophy of the CBNP is that any near-term impact of research and development requires a mission focus. The program's goal was not just to develop technology but to apply it to solve real problems and to develop demonstrate and deliver technologies and systems to improved domestic defense capabilities and ultimately to save lives in the event of a chemical or biological attack. U. S. Department of Energy paperback
2017réf. 73761Albuquerque NM: United States Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Defense Programs 2017. Presumed First Edition First printing if Issue B. Spiral bound. Very good. Various paginations approximately 150 pages. Illustrations. Some pages laminated. This Compilation includes Level 2 Federal Requirements Level 3 Contractor Agreements and Tools for Product Realization. The Defense Programs Business Process System DPBPS Portal as the mechanism for implementing DOE Order O 452.3 Management of the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex. The Portal delivers business requirements and processes specific to the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs DP for directing managing operating and executing programs at the nuclear weapons production facilities and laboratories within the Nuclear Security Enterprise NSE. The DPBPS shall be the official web-based repository housing the business requirements processes and tools to perform DP activities within the Enterprise. M&O Contractors develop Level 4 content to specify and further details needed for site compliance. b. Content posted in the DPBPS shall become contractually binding on the effective date informed through the Site Impact Analysis T014 process and authorized by the PADAMA. NNSA publishes the content after PADAMA authorization and before the effective date to allow contractors time to bring site-specific processes into compliance. The DPBPS' content apply to all federal organizations responsible for maintaining and enhancing the safety reliability and performance of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile including the ability to design produce and test in order to meet national security requirements. Field Office Contracting Officers are responsible for including this policy in the Managing & Operating M&O Contractor contracts for the National Security Enterprise sites. The Contractor Requirements Document CRD sets forth requirements of this directive that apply to contracts. The CRD must be included in contracts of National Security Enterprise M&O Contractor sites performing work under the Defense Programs. United States, Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Programs unknown