Bloomsbury; 608 pages It was a war begun for no wise purpose and one that need never have taken place. It would stand as the worst British military disaster until the fall of Singapore exactly a century later. William Dalrymple, a British historian, recounts Britains early misadventures in Afghanistan in Return of a King, a masterful history. This is a story that hangs heavy with imperial overconfidence, political incompetence and wilful bureaucratic misjudgment. And as the latest occupying force in Afghanistan negotiates its exit, this chronicle seems all too relevant now. Afghanistan in the early 19th century was insignificant. Though home to the largest market in Central Asia, it was wretchedly poor, and its rulers barely clung to power. But the country was also a vital gateway for invasions into India. Fearing a Russian attack on its most treasured possession, Britain looked to secure Kabul. It would have been easy simply to make a pact with Afghanistans ruler, Dost Mohammad. Instead Britain backed Shah Shuja, the deposed king, who had been living in exile in India for three decades. Thus began the Great Game, an entirely unnecessary competition for Afghanistan between Russia and Britain, conjured up by armchair polemicists in London. The war began promisingly. The grandly named Army of the Indus lumbered off to Afghanistan with 58,000 people, 30,000 camels (300 for the wine alone) and a pack of foxhounds for hunting. The force took Kabul with relative ease and restored Shuja to the throne; he was accepted with little turmoil. But the infidel occupation soon proved unpopular. Shuja was swiftly seen as a puppet of the invading army. A local chieftain inquired of the British, You have brought an army into the country. But how do you propose to take it out again? It remains a tough question to answer. The occupation grew entrenched. Families joined officers and tried to make themselves comfortable. In one case this meant bringing a grand piano; in another a cat, a parakeet and five maidservants. And the soldiers did little to endear themselves, but rather meddled in religious affairs, created a thriving market for prostitutes and helped generate inflation. Afghans grew restless, and within a year rebellions started breaking out. A series of tactical mistakes followed. Assuming the conquest was complete, Britain withdrew large portions of the army in preparation for the brewing opium war in China. Reports of growing discontent were disregarded, and no money went towards new defences in Kabul. The final straw came when the British cut payments to the tribes who guarded vital supply routes, guaranteeing widespread revolts. Much of the carnage that followed was conducted in the religious name of jihad a relative innovation in Afghanistan as previous wars had been largely between Muslims. Ultimately the struggle ended as it began, with Dost Mohammad in power at Kabul. The war cost £15m about £50 billion ($80 billion) in todays money and the lives of 40,000 people, 50,000 camels and at least one cat. That is still a bargain compared with the current conflict, which costs America more than $100 billion every year. return of a King confirms Mr Dalrymples reputation as a gifted historian and an engaging writer. But the signal achievement of this work is that it makes a nearly two-century-old war seem disturbingly fresh. It makes for grim reading. Like the current adventure in Afghanistan, this first one was undone by the unsustainable cost of occupation, waning political and public interest, and the need to divert resources. In the race to secure the country, the British ambassador in Tehran believed "that he who is not with us is against us. Operation Infinite Justice, the abandoned name for the 21st-century war, carries echoes of the Army of Retribution sent in after the disastrous British retreat. Yet there is one parallel that Mr Dalrymple leaves his readers to draw, which is the futility of treating a diffuse enemy like a tra
