GOULDING, R[ichard]. W, compilerBiblio.com
Financial Accounting Standards BoardBiblio.com
Current Text 2002
réf. 6505427John Wiley & Sons . Papeback. New. pp. 320 2nd Edition John Wiley & Sons unknown
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1891réf. DEMO010117ILouth: J.W. Goulding 1891. First edition. Hardcover. Very Good. engravings. 8vo 202 pages full leather in chemise and slipcase all edges gilt. Also the Free School of King Edward VI. Illustrated with engravings. J.W. Goulding hardcover
1915réf. 1741New York: Keuffel & Esser Co. VG. Flexible cloth. Minor edgewear rubbing stains to cover; Interior is bright and clean. Cover and page block have rounded corners. Text is generally b&w with some accent color added red orange yellow; B&W Illustrations; 6x9"; 566 pages . 1915. Keuffel & Esser Co. hardcover
1819réf. 91335Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office August 18 1994. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 46 pages. A "Report to the Chairman Committee on Government Operations House of Representatives". Federal procurement Contract administration Aerospace contracts Contract modifications Contract costs Contractor performance Work measurement standards Small business contractors Human resources training Contractor responsibility. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1999réf. 91247Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1999. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 38 pages. Illustration. Tabular Data. Footnotes. This is a "Report to Congressional Requesters". When completed around 2004 the goal of the International Space Station ISS is to provide the United States and its international partners with an Earth orbiting facility that supports human habitation and scientific research in a microgravity environment. Because of Russia's ongoing problems in funding its share of the space station's construction costs the National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA is concerned that Russia may also not be able to fulfill its commitments to fund ISS operations costs. NASA estimated that the annual cost to operate the completed space station will average $1.3 billion or $13 billion over a 10-year mission life. NASA anticipates sharing these costs with its international partners and it hopes to further reduce funding requirements through sharing with commercial users or through more efficient commercial operations. As requested by you and the late Representative George E. Brown Jr. we reviewed NASA's estimate for the cost to operate the space station after assembly is completed. Specifically we were asked to determine 1 if any space station-related costs are not included in NASA's estimate; 2 the level of uncertainty in the cost estimate for operations especially with regard to the potential impact of changes in Russian participation; and 3 how NASA funding requirements will be reduced by sharing costs with international partners or through commercial use and operations. NASA's $1.3 billion estimate does not include all funding requirements related to space station operations. NASA does not prepare budget estimates on a full-cost basis because it has not completed implementation of its full cost accounting system. Additional items that will have to be funded in the future within the space station budget include costs for upgrading obsolete systems and operating an alternative propulsion module. NASA has not developed detailed estimates for potential upgrades to combat component obsolescence and improve performance but space station officials believe that a robust enhancement program could cost $100 million or more per year. NASA has not estimated the cost of operating an alternative propulsion module being procured to provide reboost if Russia is unable to provide that function. Items that we determined to be space station-related that are funded in other NASA budget lines include space shuttle flights civil service personnel principal investigators and space communications; these are estimated to cost a total of $2.5 billion in fiscal year 2004. When NASA implements full cost accounting in 2001 some costs currently in other NASA budget lines will be included in the space station budget. In commenting on our draft report NASA stated that shuttle flights should be allocated to the overall cost of operating the space station using a marginal cost of $84 million per flight rather than an average cost of $435 million. We believe the average cost per flight more accurately represents NASA resources related to operating the space station. There is a high degree of uncertainty in NASA's estimate for the cost to operate the space station from 2005 to 2014. NASA's original estimate of $13 billion for operating the space station was developed to aid in evaluating life-cycle costs of redesign options rather than to accurately forecast budget needs. This estimate did not consider end-of-mission costs for either extending the life of the space station beyond 10 years or decommissioning it. The estimate was also developed for an earlier space station configuration that has since been modified. NASA does not prepare detailed budget estimates for the space station and other programs beyond fiscal year 2004 the last year of its current 5-year budget-planning period. NASA recently began an effort to review its operations cost estimate and develop a long-range funding profile that would better reflect annual requirements over the 10-year operations period. Adding to the uncertainty of future costs the full impact on operations if Russia is unable to fulfill its obligations is not known at this time. NASA would incur costs to operate an alternative propulsion module but does not yet know whether there will be a shortfall in Russian logistics flights or how such a shortfall would be spread among the shuttle and international partner resupply vehicles. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1996réf. 91328Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1996. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 38 2 pages. Footnotes. Figures. Tables. This is a "Report to the Ranking Minority Member Committee on Commerce House of Representatives". The GAO reviewed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's NASA actions to improve cost reporting for the International Space Station program and the cost and schedule status of that program. The International Space Station ISS is one of the nation's largest research and development projects. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA Japan Canada the European Space Agency and Russia are building it as a permanently orbiting laboratory to conduct materials and life sciences research under nearly weightless conditions. NASA estimates its development and operations cost at $17.4 billion from October 1993 through the completion of assembly which is currently scheduled for June 2002. Cost reporting by NASA contractors and subcontractors at the Johnson Space Center including some working on major parts of an earlier version of the current ISS was the subject of a congressional hearing in July 1994. At the hearing NASA promised to improve performance management of its development contracts. GAO was asked by Representative John D. Dingell who was then Chairman Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the former House Committee on Energy and Commerce to review the program's cost and schedule status and NASA's actions to improve cost reporting. NASA's ISS program includes a prime contract with the Boeing Company to develop the U.S. portion of ISS a large number of smaller contracts to develop the ground-based and on-orbit capability to use and operate it and other contracts to develop on-orbit research facilities and conduct research. In mid-1993 a $2.1-billion annual funding limitation was imposed on the program. Performance measurement systems establish detailed baselines to measure the extent to which tasks are on schedule and within budget. Such systems are intended to provide early warning of cost and schedule problems to enable corrective actions to negate or minimize their impacts. Over the past several years ISS flight hardware has been produced. As of April 1996 the ISS prime contract was about $89 million over cost and about $88 million behind schedule. Overall the prime contract is 45-percent complete and these variances are within planned funding levels. However many cost threats to the development program remain and financial reserves needed for unexpected contingencies remain limited over the next few years. If available reserves ultimately prove inadequate program managers would have to either exceed the annual funding limitation or defer or rephase other activities thus possibly delaying ISS's schedule and likely increasing its overall cost. NASA has made progress toward ensuring that the ISS prime development contractor and its major subcontractors implement effective performance measurement systems for managing their contracts but a complete performance measurement system is still not in place. Also NASA has made slower progress implementing effective performance measurement systems on its contracts for developing ground-based and on-orbit capabilities for using and operating ISS. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1997réf. 91261Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1997. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 40 pages. Report to Congressional Requesters. This report discusses 1 the Department of Defense's DOD and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's NASA requirements for surveillance of space objects and 2 DOD's space surveillance capabilities to support these requirements. This report contains recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense the Air Force the Navy and the Army; the Administrator of NASA; the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Central Intelligence; and other interested congressional committees. During the past 40 years the number of manmade space objects orbiting the earth-active and inactive satellites and debris generated from launch vehicle and satellite breakups-has increased dramatically. Knowing what objects are in space and their locations are important because of the 1 implications of foreign satellite threats to U.S. national security and 2 hazards that such objects create for multibillion dollar space programs especially large ones such as the International Space Station. DOD's existing space surveillance network is not capable of providing the information NASA needs to adequately predict collisions between space objects orbiting the earth and multibillion dollar space programs such as the space station. Moreover the existing network cannot satisfy DOD's emerging space surveillance requirements which are currently under review. DOD's plans to 1 modernize an existing surveillance network radar system and 2 develop three new ballistic missile warning systems which could contribute to performing the surveillance function do not adequately consider DOD's or NASA's surveillance requirements. These four systems are separately managed by the Navy the Air Force and the Army. An opportunity exists to consider these systems' potential capabilities to enhance the surveillance network to better satisfy requirements and achieve greater benefits from planned investment in space sensor technology. Despite NASA's dependency on DOD to provide space object information the 1996 National Space Policy makes no provision for an interagency mechanism-either organizational or funding-to ensure that DOD's surveillance capabilities satisfy NASA's requirements. Overall there is no authoritative direction formal agreement or clear plan on how DOD and NASA could consolidate their space surveillance requirements for a common capability. A coordinated interagency plan that considers all existing and planned space surveillance capabilities could be beneficial in making cost-effective decisions to satisfy a consolidated set of national security and civil space surveillance requirements. Unless DOD and NASA can agree on such a plan an opportunity may be missed to simultaneously 1 achieve efficiencies; 2 better ensure the safety of the planned multibillion dollar space station; and 3 help satisfy national security needs including the U.S. forces' future needs for space asset information. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1955réf. 2725Sydney: W.C. Penfold & Co. Pty. Ltd. VG. Spiral bound. Edgewear to cardboard cover; Illustrated catalog printed in black and brown type with B&W illustrations; but includes of paint color charts either printed in color or with pasted in color bars. Cumberland Pencil Company 4.75x7" booklet bound in printed in color featuring their "Derwent" pencils. Order form in back pocket and a form to open a credit account laid in; B&W and color illustrations; 7x10.75"; 104 pages . 1955. W.C. Penfold & Co. Pty. Ltd. unknown
réf. 6505427John Wiley & Sons . Papeback. New. pp. 320 2nd Edition John Wiley & Sons unknown
réf. 0666092893.Ghardcover. Good. Access codes and supplements are not guaranteed with used items. May be an ex-library book. hardcover
réf. 8496998096.Gpaperback. Good. Access codes and supplements are not guaranteed with used items. May be an ex-library book. paperback
1996réf. 0101531996. Soft Cover. Good. Publisher: John Wiley & Sons Inc. 1996 Good OVERSIZED Soft Cover ISBN: 0-471-16026-1 paperback
réf. 0428659039.Ghardcover. Good. Access codes and supplements are not guaranteed with used items. May be an ex-library book. hardcover
réf. 10626-125992128XPaperback. New. Book Condition is in New Paperback Eastern Economy Edition/Indian Edition textbook with identical content as the US version. May have been Printed in India with cover stating Not for sale in US. Fast shipping through the DHL FedEx Aramex And Delivered In 8-12 Days to all worldwide. paperback
réf. 1907026614.Gunknown_binding. Good. Access codes and supplements are not guaranteed with used items. May be an ex-library book. unknown
1998réf. 91268Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1998. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Good. 46 pages. Front cover corner creased. Report to the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Science Technology and Space Committee on Commerce Science and Transportation U.S. Senate. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA and the Department of Defense DOD operate several types of aerospace test facilities including wind tunnels and rocket engine test stands. The NASA and the DOD operate several types of aerospace test facilities including wind tunnels and rocket engine test stands. Congress has been appropriating less money for aerospace programs. In response to declining budgets and reductions in personnel NASA and DOD agreed in 1995 to perform essential aerospace testing on a more cooperative basis. The agencies recommended in April 1996 that they establish joint working groups to assess and make recommendations on investments and other issues. GAO is providing the results of our review of NASA's and DOD's cooperation since May 1996 to develop a national perspective on aerospace test facilities. To assess the progress GAO determined 1 the extent to which NASA/DOD working groups on major test facilities have been operating on a regular basis 2 NASA's and DOD's actions in response to a future need to test an engine for new Air Force rockets 3 whether NASA and DOD prepared a congressionally required joint plan on rocket propulsion test facilities and 4 whether NASA and DOD are implementing a DOD assessment team's recommendation in 1997 to jointly manage with NASA certain aeronautical test facilities. This report includes a matter for congressional consideration. The GAO found that the promise of closer NASA/DOD cooperation and the development of a national perspective on aerospace test facilities remains largely unfulfilled because NASA and DOD 1 have not yet convened most test facility alliances 2 compete with each other to test engines for new rockets and 3 did not prepare a congressionally required joint plan on rocket propulsion test facilities. Although NASA and DOD have agreed to go beyond cooperative alliances in aeronautics and jointly manage their aeronautical test facilities they have not yet reached agreement on key aspects of a management organization. NASA and DOD took 20 months May 1996 through Dec. 1997 to negotiate and sign agreements formally establishing the six test facility-related cooperative alliances. During that time only the space environmental simulation alliance met regularly and conducted business. The already established rocket propulsion alliance met only once during this period despite a desire by some members to meet regularly. NASA and DOD officials did not regularly convene the other four alliances in the absence of approved charters. Despite the formation of the rocket propulsion alliance NASA and DOD compete against each other to test engines for new rocket programs. A principal arena of competition is the next phase of the Air Force's Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle EELV program. In particular the Air Force has spent millions of dollars to upgrade a test stand on the assumption that it not NASA would test EELV engines. DOD did not prepare a legislatively mandated joint plan with NASA to coordinate rocket propulsion test facilities. United States General Accounting Office paperback
réf. 9780471218609New. unknown
2003réf. Q-0618176519Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2003-09-08. Paperback. New. New. In shrink wrap. Looks like an interesting title! Houghton Mifflin Harcourt paperback
réf. 1265051569New. Never used book
1875réf. 10604Guatemala: Direccion General de Contabilidad Central de Hacienda 1875. Broadside. Very Good binding. Broadside. 19" x 13." Old folds; foxing and toning but generally well-preserved given it is fairly fragile. Dated 1 October 1875 the accounting office of the Guatemalan national treasury here prints the reckoning of income and expenses for the month of July and shows the one equals the other. [Direccion General de Contabilidad Central de Hacienda] unknown
1995réf. 91265Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1995. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 31 1 pages. Briefing Report to the Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics Committee on Science House of Representatives. In April 1994 the National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA estimated that it would cost about $475 million for a Titan IV-Centaur launch of its Cassini spacecraft. Concerned about the cost as the Chairman of the former Subcommittee on Space House Committee on Science Space and Technology you requested that we provide information about the current estimated cost for the Cassini launch and determine the extent to which cost saving opportunities exist. On April 11 1995 we briefed your staff on the results of our work. This report contains the information presented at that briefing. NASA plans to launch its Cassini spacecraft to Saturn in October 1997. Following a voyage of more than 6 years the spacecraft will orbit Saturn for 4 years. Cassini will provide intensive long-term observations of Saturn's atmosphere rings magnetic fields and moons. Cassini's probe will be used to analyze the atmosphere of Saturn's largest moon Titan. Cassini a joint U.S.-European mission was originally paired with a project to explore comets and asteroids the Comet Rendezvous Asteroid Flyby CRAF. Cassini was first funded by Congress in fiscal year 1990. Since then CRAF was canceled and Cassini's original scientific capabilities have been reduced and its launch schedule extended. NASA is responsible for the overall success of the Cassini mission including integrating the spacecraft with the launch vehicle and approving the final launch. Under an agreement with NASA the Air Force will provide a Titan IV expendable launch vehicle with a Centaur upper stage and launch service from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida. NASA's most recent estimate for the Titan IV-Centaur launch of its Cassini spacecraft is about $452 million approximately $23 million less than its $475-million estimate in April 1994. The decrease occurred principally because NASA reduced its earlier estimate of mission integration costs. The $452-million estimate includes about $253 million paid to the Air Force for a Titan IV-Centaur launch vehicle and launch services. The remaining Cassini launch costs are NASA funding to pay for potential future cost increases mission integration prior-year studies support by two NASA field centers and miscellaneous costs. The Air Force estimates that its cost for launch vehicle and services is about $98 million more than the $253 million NASA will pay. Air Force officials believe there are benefits to providing a launch vehicle for Cassini. For example the Air Force will avoid an estimated $11.5 million to $13.8 million in storage charges and will reduce mission reliability risk due to the aging of components. Reductions in the cost of the Cassini launch may be possible because NASA recently completed its negotiation of the mission integration contract for $15 million less than estimated. However cost savings in other areas of the Cassini launch are unlikely and some of NASA's costs could increase. Also NASA missed a potential cost-saving opportunity because its agreement with the Air Force does not require the Air Force to refund NASA payments in excess of cost. Consequently the Air Force is not required to refund to NASA fees that the Air Force does not pay to the Titan IV contractor. These fees include $2 million in award fees and a $9-million incentive fee. In addition NASA's mission integration contract does not fully comply with the agency's revised policy for cost-plus-award-fee contracts which was implemented to encourage contractors to deliver quality products at reasonable costs. United States General Accounting Office paperback
2000réf. 91334Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 2000. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 47 1 pages Footnotes. Figures. Tables. A "Report to the Chairman Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Committee on Armed Services". The increasing use of military and commercial satellite systems for national security and business purposes will have significant implications for the United States in the 21st century. The Department of Defense DOD has traditionally used satellite systems in passive roles to support military operations-for example to collect intelligence data warn of ballistic missile launches transmit voice and data communications obtain meteorological data and provide navigation signals. Now plans are being developed to expand the use of military satellite systems and develop technologies such as lasers and electronic jammers that could be used to actively conduct combat operations from space. With advances in information technology the commercial use of satellites is also expanding particularly in telecommunications. In addition single satellite systems-for example navigation environmental and imagery systems-that originally served government missions are increasingly providing capabilities to both government and commercial users. The nongovernment applications are now generating large amounts of commercial revenue. National space policy treats U.S. satellite systems as national property that organizations have the right to operate without deliberate interference. To the extent that such interference were to occur the U.S. Space Command visualizes that military forces may be called upon to provide protection just as navies protected sea commerce. The U.S. Space Command's long-range plan and the Air Force Space Command's supporting strategic master plan provide for the protection of U.S. national interests and investments in space but they do not fully conform to DOD's new space policy. The plans propose space systems only and do not provide for an assessment of the cost-effectiveness of terrestrial-land sea and air-systems as alternatives to space systems which is called for in DOD's policy. An example of such a comparative assessment would be between satellite and aircraft radar systems. In addition DOD lacks the modeling and simulation tools necessary to perform such assessments a capability that is also called for in DOD's space policy. Finally it is unclear which DOD organization has the authority and capability to perform comparative assessments between space and terrestrial systems since such assessments are outside the purview of the U.S. and Air Force Space Commands. These factors prevent DOD from being assured that the most cost-effective approaches will be considered in making decisions on the expansion of space systems. The extent to which the Air Force's 18-year program projection supports planned military space programs and desired capabilities was unverifiable. Although several of the planned space systems such as a space-based radar and a space-based laser are included in the Air Force's program projection the cost estimates in the Air Force Space Command's strategic master plan were not directly traceable to the 18-year program funding projections. They were not traceable because the data were aggregated differently and program nomenclatures differed. Air Force Space Command representatives stated that they intend to institute changes to bring about consistency between the documents. A more important matter is uncertainty about the availability of several billions of dollars in funding increases that the Air Force has projected for space system expansion. During the first 6 years of the 18-year projection fiscal years 2000-05 programmed increases are uncertain because the President and the Congress have not agreed on overall funding increases to DOD. During the last 12 years of the projection fiscal years 2006-17 the Air Force relies on planned funding increases for program modernization without identifying funding sources thus creating additional uncertainty and putting the expansion of space systems in jeopardy for affordability reasons. DOD has not given sufficient attention to providing military personnel with space education to support future military space operations. DOD's new space policy requires that information about space force structure missions capabilities and applications be incorporated into professional military education. However joint military doctrine on space operations that is necessary to implement the policy has not been issued because of disagreement among the services on the doctrine's content. Leaving the disagreement unresolved hinders common understanding for the use of space systems in military operations. In addition until the doctrine is provided DOD and military service educational institutions will lack guidance for the development of space education curricula and for determining whether existing curricula need to be modified. This report contains recommendations to the Secretary of Defense that would 1 require space plans to include analyses of terrestrial systems as alternatives 2 establish the necessary modeling and simulation tools to perform such analyses 3 identify and/or establish the DOD office to perform the analyses 4 address the delay in completing joint doctrine for space operations and 5 provide the necessary instructions to DOD and military service colleges and schools for incorporating essential space information into professional military education curricula. DOD concurred with our recommendations and provided comments. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1986réf. 83634Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1986. Presumed First Edition First printing. Wraps. Good. 55 1 pages. Footnotes. Appendix I is Selected Literature Reviewed. This report examines scientific and policy implications of nuclear winter. It is based on extensive review of relevant literature and detailed discussions with a wide range of scientists researchers and policy analysts within and outside of government. It provides an overview of what is known about nuclear winter and of ongoing research addressing areas of scientific uncertainty. It also outlines potential implications for defense strategy arms control and foreign policy-making and points out the absence of a consensus on the need for policy changes at this time. The Office of Science and Technology Policy after reviewing the report in draft suggested that GAO by discussing potential policy implications was giving more validity to the nuclear winter theory that was warranted and suggested the tenor of the report be changed. GAO did not agree. Nuclear winter is a severe and prolonged global climatic cooling effect that is hypothesized to occur after widespread firestorms following a large-scale nuclear war. The hypothesis is based on the fact that such fires can inject soot into the stratosphere where it can block some direct sunlight from reaching the surface of the Earth. It is speculated that the resulting cooling would lead to widespread crop failure and famine. When developing computer models of nuclear-winter scenarios researchers use the conventional bombing of Hamburg and the Hiroshima firestorm in World War II as example cases where soot might have been injected into the stratosphere alongside modern observations of natural large-area wildfire-firestorms. "Nuclear winter" or as it was initially termed "nuclear twilight" began to be considered as a scientific concept in the 1980s after it became clear that an earlier hypothesis that fireball generated NOx emissions would devastate the ozone layer was losing credibility. It was within this context that the climatic effects of soot from fires became the new focus of the climatic effects of nuclear war. In these model scenarios various soot clouds containing uncertain quantities of soot were assumed to form over cities oil refineries and more rural missile silos. Once the quantity of soot is decided upon by the researchers the climate effects of these soot clouds are then modeled. The term "nuclear winter" was a neologism coined in 1983 by Richard P. Turco in reference to a one-dimensional computer model created to examine the "nuclear twilight" idea. This model projected that massive quantities of soot and smoke would remain aloft in the air for on the order of years causing a severe planet-wide drop in temperature. Turco would later distance himself from these extreme conclusions. After the failure of the predictions on the effects of the 1991 Kuwait oil fires that were made by the primary team of climatologists that advocate the hypothesis over a decade passed without any new published papers on the topic. United States General Accounting Office paperback
2022réf. __1265051569McGraw Hill 2022. Paperback. New. 13 edition. 720 pages. 10.00x7.91x0.87 inches. McGraw Hill paperback
réf. Z1-C-021-00605Accounting Standards Board. Used - Good. Ships from UK in 48 hours or less usually same day. Your purchase helps support Sri Lankan Children's Charity 'The Rainbow Centre'. Ex-library so some stamps and wear but in good overall condition. 100% money back guarantee. We are a world class secondhand bookstore based in Hertfordshire United Kingdom and specialize in high quality textbooks across an enormous variety of subjects. We aim to provide a vast range of textbooks rare and collectible books at a great price. Our donations to The Rainbow Centre have helped provide an education and a safe haven to hundreds of children who live in appalling conditions. We provide a 100% money back guarantee and are dedicated to providing our customers with the highest standards of service in the bookselling industry. Accounting Standards Board unknown
2017réf. 2-1973368099Independently published 2017. Paperback. New. 147 pages. French language. 9.21x6.14x0.37 inches. Independently published paperback
