2 371 résultats
1999réf. 2080502106912494Not Available 1999. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Not Available paperback
réf. 2090502113711578Not Available N.A. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Not Available paperback
1974réf. 2080502106914071Tax Accounting Association 1974. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Tax Accounting Association paperback
réf. 2081002109000360Moriyama shoten N.A. Soft Cover. Fine. Number of pages: 373p Plate size: 22cm Moriyama shoten paperback
1986réf. 2080502106908785Moriyama shoten 1986. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Moriyama shoten paperback
1986réf. 2080502106909609Moriyama shoten 1986. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Moriyama shoten paperback
2000réf. 77137Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 2000. Version 1 Exposure Draft. Wraps. Very good. iv 163 1 pages. Footnotes. Figures. Abbreviations. Appendices including a Glossary. Document Distribution Center Customer Service Survey form laid in. Few draft copies survive. This was a precursor to a 2004 Executive Guide of the same title published as GAO-04-394G. An exposure draft was typically used to broadly solicit comments from multiple agencies and stakeholders. Otherwise audit and review drafts were typically shared with the studied agency for factual accuracy and to obtain a management response. In 1997 the GAO developed guidance based primarily on the Clinger-Cohen Act that provides a method for evaluating and assessing how well a federal agency is selecting and managing its IT resources and identifies specific areas where improvements can be made. The Information Technology Investment Management framework identifies critical processes for successful IT investment and organizing these processes into a framework of increasingly mature stages. This shift reflects both the maturation of the thinking in the area of IT investment management and the feedback we received from organizations based upon their experiences creating their IT investment mechanisms and processes. Such a maturity framework can be used to analyze an organization's IT investment management process and determine the maturity of its investment process. In doing so ITIM establishes three key benefits: 1 a rigorous standardized tool for internal and external evaluations of an agency's IT investment management process; 2 a consistent and understandable mechanism for reporting the results of these assessments to agency executives the Congress and other interested parties; and 3 a road map agencies can use for improving their IT investment management process. The achievement of more mature IT investment management stages depends on performing other good management practices and attributes such as human capital training IT architecture and software management. United States General Accounting Office paperback
2002réf. 91336Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 2002. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 50 4 pages. Footnotes. Figures. Tables. This is a "Report to the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics Committee on Science House of Representatives". In response to a Congressional request this report discusses the mechanisms that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA has in place to capture disseminate and apply past lessons learned towards future mission success. We found that NASA's processes procedures and systems do not effectively capture and share lessons learned and therefore NASA has no assurance that lessons are being applied towards future missions. We include recommendations to the NASA administrator on ways to strengthen the agency's lessons learning processes and systems. NASA's procedures and guidelines require that program and project managers review and apply lessons learned from the past throughout a program's or project's life cycle and to document and submit any significant lessons to the agency's Lessons Learned Information System LLIS in a timely manner. NASA defines a lesson learned as knowledge or understanding gained by experience. The experience may be positive such as a successful test or mission or negative such as a mishap or failure. A lesson must be significant in that it has a real or assumed impact on operations; valid in that it is factually correct; and applicable in that it identifies a specific design process or decision that reduces or eliminates the potential for failures and mishaps or reinforces a positive result. NASA recognizes the importance of learning from the past to ensure future mission success and uses several mechanisms to capture and disseminate lessons learned. The principal source NASA has established for the agency-wide collection and sharing of lessons is the LLIS a Web-based lessons database that managers are required to review on an ongoing basis. In addition NASA uses training program reviews and periodic revisions to agency policies and guidelines to communicate lessons. Several NASA centers and key programs also maintain lessons learned systems that are geared toward their own staff. Recently NASA has taken steps to improve the way it captures and shares information by developing a business strategy called knowledge management. Knowledge management can be defined as the way that organizations create capture and reuse knowledge to achieve their objectives. According to NASA officials knowledge management has the potential to link agency staff with the knowledge and resources they need to complete tasks faster better and cheaper. In pursuit of knowledge management NASA has developed a strategic plan established a management team to coordinate knowledge management activities at NASA's centers and initiated several information technology pilot projects. Despite the processes and procedures in place to capture and share lessons learned there is no assurance that lessons are being applied toward future missions success. A GAO survey of NASA program and project managers revealed weaknesses in the collection and sharing of lessons learned agency-wide. While some lessons learning does take place our survey found that lessons are not routinely identified collected or shared by programs and project managers. Respondents reported that they are unfamiliar with lessons generated by other centers and programs. In addition many respondents indicated that they are dissatisfied with NASA's lessons learned processes and systems. Managers also identified challenges or cultural barriers to the sharing of lessons learned such as the lack of time to capture or submit lessons and a perception of intolerance for mistakes. They further offered suggestions for areas of improvement including enhancements to LLIS and implementing mentoring and "storytelling" or after-action reviews as additional mechanisms for lessons learning. While NASA's current knowledge management efforts should lead to some improvement in the sharing of agency lessons and knowledge they lack ingredients that have been shown to be critical to the success of knowledge management at leading organizations. Cultural resistance to sharing knowledge and the lack of strong support from agency leaders often make it difficult to implement an effective lessons learning and knowledge sharing environment. We found that successful industry and government organizations have overcome barriers by making a strong management commitment to knowledge sharing developing a well defined business plan for implementing knowledge management providing incentives to encourage knowledge sharing and building technology systems to facilitate easier access to information. The application of these principles could increase opportunities for NASA to perform its basic mission of exploring space faster better and cheaper more successfully. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1997réf. 79427Washington DC: General Accounting Office National Security and International Division June 1997. Presumed First Edition First printing White cover not usual blue cover--reprint/. Wraps. Good. 235 pages. Oversized book measuring 11 inches by 8/1-2 inches. Postage sticker and part of a shipping label roughly removed on rear cover. This report is the unclassified version of a classified report that the General Accounting Office issued in July 1996 on the Operation Desert Storm air campaign. At the request of John D. Dingell the Ranking Minority Member of the Committee on Commerce House of Representatives the Department of Defense reevaluated the security classification of the original report and as a result about 85 percent of the material originally determined to be classified has subsequently been determined to be unclassified and is presented in this report. The best available data did not permit GAO to either: 1 make a comprehensive system-by-system quantitative comparison of aircraft and weapon effectiveness; or 2 validate some of the key performance claims for certain weapon systems. Pursuant to Congressional direction GAO reviewed the Operation Desert Storm air campaign focusing on the: 1 use and performance of aircraft munitions and missiles employed during the air campaign; 2 validity of Department of Defense DOD and manufacturer claims particularly those for weapon systems utilizing advanced technology; 3 relationship between cost and performance of weapon systems; and 4 extent that Desert Storm air campaign objectives were met. GAO noted that: 1 air power clearly achieved many of Desert Storm's objectives but fell short of fully achieving others; 2 the available quantitative and qualitative data indicate that air power damage to several major target sets was more limited than DOD's title V report to the Congress stated; 3 these data show clear success against the oil and electrical target categories but less success against Iraqi air defense command control and communications and lines of communication; 4 success against nuclear-related mobile Scud and Republican Guard targets was the least measurable; 5 the lessons that can be learned from Desert Storm are limited because of the unique conditions the strike tactics employed by the coalition the limited Iraqi response and limited data on weapon system effectiveness; 6 the strong likelihood of campaign success enabled U.S. commanders to favor strike tactics that maximized aircraft and pilot survivability rather than weapon system effectiveness; 7 the Iraqis employed few if any electronic countermeasures and presented almost no air-to-air opposition; 8 as a result Desert Storm did not consistently or rigorously test all the performance parameters of aircraft and weapon systems used in the air campaign; 9 many of DOD's and manufacturers' postwar claims about weapon system performance were overstated misleading inconsistent with the best available data or unverifiable; 10 aircraft and pilot losses were historically low partly owing to the use of medium- to high-altitude munition delivery tactics that nonetheless both reduced the accuracy of guided and unguided munitions and hindered target identification and acquisition; 11 air power was inhibited by the limited ability of aircraft sensors to identify and acquire targets the failure to gather intelligence on critical targets and the inability to collect and disseminate battle damage assessments BDA in a timely manner; 12 the contributions of guided weaponry incorporating advanced technologies and their delivery platforms were limited because the cooperative operating conditions they require were not consistently encountered; 13 the important contributions of stealth and laser-guided bombs were emphasized as was the need for more and better BDA and less attention was paid to the significant contributions of less-sophisticated systems and the performance of critical tasks such as the identification and acquisition of targets; and 14 there was no apparent link between the cost of aircraft and munitions and their performance in Desert Storm. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Division paperback
1999réf. 91264Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1999. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 34 pages. Report to Congressional Requesters. The purpose of the $1.3 billion X-33 Program cosponsored by the NASA and the Lockheed Martin Corporation is to develop and demonstrate advanced technologies and techniques needed for future reusable launch vehicles RLV including lightweight internal fuel tanks advanced rocket engines a durable heat shield and rapid-turnaround low-cost operations. The X-33 vehicle will be a half-scale model of Lockheed Martin's planned single-stage-to-orbit SSTO Venture Star RLV an operational vehicle that will be based on and developed after the X-33. Lockheed Martin and NASA will base the decision to proceed with developing the Venture Star in part on the results of the X-33 Program. NASA would potentially be one of Lockheed Martin's primary customers for the cargo-only flights and is the only anticipated customer for passenger flights. The passenger flights would carry crewmembers to and from the International Space Station. NASA and Lockheed Martin are conducting the X-33 Program under a cooperative agreement a financial instrument with which a government entity and one or more public or private organizations jointly fund and implement an activity to achieve common objectives. Such a partnership was encouraged by the National Space Transportation Policy of 1994 as a means of 1 establishing NASA as the lead agency for technology development and demonstration of reusable space transportation systems and 2 positioning the government and the private sector to make decisions on the development of an operational reusable launch system. NASA and Lockheed Martin X-33 program managers anticipate that the program will achieve technical requirements such as demonstrating the feasibility of building large liquid hydrogen fuel tanks made of graphite composite material. However the program will not meet some original cost schedule and performance objectives. Problems encountered by Lockheed Martin while working toward the X-33 Program's technical requirements have caused cost increases delay of the test vehicle's first flight and revision of some performance objectives. The technical problems occurred during development and fabrication of the X-33 vehicle's internal fuel tanks rocket engines and thermal protection system the three key advanced technologies the program seeks to demonstrate. Resolving these technical problems caused Lockheed Martin's estimated contribution to grow $75 million above the original estimate of $211.6 million to $286.6 million. However part of the increase will be borne by the government. Procurement regulations allow companies to recover allowable independent research and development costs by including them as overhead in the pricing for other government contracts. Thus Lockheed Martin's and its partners' shares may actually be lower. In addition estimated government costs for NASA civil service personnel working on the program not included in NASA's X-33 program budget also increased. Together these estimated costs increased from $216.9 million to $274.3 million as of March 1999. As a result we believe a more accurate representation of the estimated government's share of the X-33 Program is $1.23 billion while industry's estimated share is $125.4 million. Several issues will need to be evaluated before NASA decides to use Venture Star RLVs to support the International Space Station. First the results of the X-33 Program must provide sufficient information for NASA to determine that the risks have been sufficiently reduced and that continuation of activities leading to the agency's use of Venture Star as a customer is warranted. Second even though Venture Star RLVs are intended to be commercially owned and operated government financial incentives will likely be needed to initiate such a venture. Third NASA would have to pay for either two crew modules or modifications to Venture Star vehicles if the crew return vehicle being developed for the International Space Station is chosen as a means for Venture Star to carry people. Fourth because the Venture Star RLV would not carry as much cargo as the space shuttle additional flights would be needed. The more frequent docking activities may reduce the amount of stable time available for some science operations. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1998réf. 59761Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1998. Wraps. Very good. No dust jacket. Cover has slight wear and soiling. 324 p. : ill. maps; 28 cm. Includes: Illustrations Maps. GAO/HEHS-98-32. This report examings how VA and community hospitals' care evolved during the 20th century including changes in supply and demand factors contributing to declining demand the extent of excess capacity and actions taken to increase efficiency and compete for patients. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1992réf. 45007Washington DC: GAO 1992. First Edition. First Printing. very good. approx. 600 wraps 2-vol. set index Part A and B only Part A is entitled Improving National Security and International Affairs Programs GAO/OP-92-1A; Part B is entitled Improving Resources Community and Economic Development Programs GAO/OP-92-1B. GAO paperback
1968réf. 2082702114905209Japan Management Publishing Association 1968. Soft Cover. Fine. Number of pages: 261 pages Size: 23cm Japan Management Publishing Association paperback
réf. 2081002108500722Sanctuary Publishing Nozomi General Accounting Office N.A. Soft Cover. Fine. Number of pages: 235p Size: 19cm Sanctuary Publishing Nozomi General Accounting Office paperback
1994réf. 2080502106911942Not Available 1994. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Not Available paperback
1898réf. 15514AB1898. Wien Weiss 1898 - 1899. 295 : 225 cm. Original cloth. Textbook for the different ways of accounting including the corresponding letter. - From the businees-school Weiss in Vienna. hardcover
réf. B9781578860678Paperback / softback. New. paperback
réf. mon0000112535IFRS Foundation 12/01/2018 00:00:01. paperback. New. 8.7933 in x 24.7812 in x 15.3883 in. IFRS Foundation paperback
2002réf. 2080502106915980Financial Accounting Standards Foundation 2002. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Financial Accounting Standards Foundation paperback
2004réf. 2080502106915031Financial Accounting Standards Foundation 2004. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Financial Accounting Standards Foundation paperback
2003réf. 2080502106914074Financial Accounting Standards Foundation 2003. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Financial Accounting Standards Foundation paperback
2006réf. 2080502106915978Financial Accounting Standards Foundation 2006. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Financial Accounting Standards Foundation paperback
2005réf. 2080502106915979Financial Accounting Standards Foundation 2005. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Financial Accounting Standards Foundation paperback
1998réf. 2080502106915705Not Available 1998. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Not Available paperback
1998réf. 2080502106909499Not Available 1998. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Not Available paperback
