4 117 résultats
1954réf. 98511954 PARIS, Dunod - 1954 - In-8 - Broché - Préface de Frédéric Scheurer - XII & 184 pages - Très propre
1937réf. R240159705Dunod. 1937. In-12. Broché. Etat d'usage, Couv. légèrement passée, Dos satisfaisant, Papier jauni. VIII + 153 pages. Page de titre très légèrement déchirée sans conséquence sur le texte.. . . . Classification Dewey : 657-Comptabilité
1931réf. ROD0119630J.-B. BAILLIERE ET FILS. 1931. In-12. Broché. Etat d'usage, Coins frottés, Dos frotté, Intérieur acceptable. 152 pages augmentées de quelques planches en noir et blanc.. . . . Classification Dewey : 657-Comptabilité
J.-B. BAILLIERE ET FILS. 1931. In-12 Carré. Broché. Etat d'usage. Couv. légèrement passée. Dos frotté. Intérieur bon état. 152 pages. Bibliothèque pratique de l'amateur.
1931réf. RO40077729J.-B. BAILLIERE ET FILS. 1931. In-12. Broché. Etat d'usage, Couv. légèrement passée, Dos frotté, Intérieur bon état. 152 pages.. . . . Classification Dewey : 657-Comptabilité
2015réf. 500293631Studyrama 2015 313 pages 13 8x2x19 8cm. 2015. Broché. 313 pages.
réf. 95066Paris, Les Editions d’Organisation 1978, 240x155mm, 558pages, broché. Bel exemplaire.
réf. 119929aafChur Simeon Benedict, 1836, gr. in-8vo, XIV + 284 S. + 1 lithogr. Falttafel ‘Musterblätter - .... Üblichste Bezeichnung verschiedener Währungen, Maasse u. dgl.’, ill. Original-Pappband. Fleckig und sehr gebraucht, (ohne Vorsatzbl.)
Dunod. 1969. In-12 Carré. Broché. Bon état. Couv. convenable. Dos satisfaisant. Intérieur frais. 118 pages. Etiquette de code sur le dos. Tampons et annotations de bibliothèque en pages de garde et de titre. 2e plat légèrement abîmé. Collection 'La vie de l'entreprise', 8.
1969réf. RO40233361Dunod. 1969. In-12. Broché. Bon état, Couv. convenable, Dos satisfaisant, Intérieur frais. 118 pages. Etiquette de code sur le dos. Tampons et annotations de bibliothèque en pages de garde et de titre. 2e plat légèrement abîmé.. . . . Classification Dewey : 657-Comptabilité
1969réf. R160199840DUNOD. 1969. In-12. Broché. Bon état, Couv. convenable, Dos frotté, Quelques rousseurs. 118 pages - Une annotation à l'encre sur le 2e contreplat. . . . Classification Dewey : 657-Comptabilité
1984Hardcover. No jacket. Ellis Horwood Series in Mathematics and Its Applications. Superficial marks on boards. Contents are sound, clean, clear, in very good condition. BW Used
MAME / GIGORD. COLLECTION D OUVRAGES CLASSIQUES. Non daté. In-12 Carré. Cartonné. Etat d'usage. Coins frottés. Dos fané. Intérieur acceptable. 327 pages.
1900réf. 14422Couverture rigide. Cartonnage de l'éditeur défraîchi. 157 pages.
MAME. COLLECTION D OUVRAGES CLASSIQUES.. 1938. In-8 Carré. Cartonné. Etat d'usage. Couv. légèrement passée. Dos abîmé. Intérieur acceptable. 176 pages. Quelques notes au crayon de couleurs dans la marge du texte.
1938réf. R150158400MAME. COLLECTION D OUVRAGES CLASSIQUES.. 1938. In-8. Cartonné. Etat d'usage, Couv. légèrement passée, Dos abîmé, Intérieur acceptable. 176 pages. Quelques notes au crayon de couleurs dans la marge du texte.. . . . Classification Dewey : 657-Comptabilité
1998réf. 91268Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1998. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Good. 46 pages. Front cover corner creased. Report to the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Science Technology and Space Committee on Commerce Science and Transportation U.S. Senate. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA and the Department of Defense DOD operate several types of aerospace test facilities including wind tunnels and rocket engine test stands. The NASA and the DOD operate several types of aerospace test facilities including wind tunnels and rocket engine test stands. Congress has been appropriating less money for aerospace programs. In response to declining budgets and reductions in personnel NASA and DOD agreed in 1995 to perform essential aerospace testing on a more cooperative basis. The agencies recommended in April 1996 that they establish joint working groups to assess and make recommendations on investments and other issues. GAO is providing the results of our review of NASA's and DOD's cooperation since May 1996 to develop a national perspective on aerospace test facilities. To assess the progress GAO determined 1 the extent to which NASA/DOD working groups on major test facilities have been operating on a regular basis 2 NASA's and DOD's actions in response to a future need to test an engine for new Air Force rockets 3 whether NASA and DOD prepared a congressionally required joint plan on rocket propulsion test facilities and 4 whether NASA and DOD are implementing a DOD assessment team's recommendation in 1997 to jointly manage with NASA certain aeronautical test facilities. This report includes a matter for congressional consideration. The GAO found that the promise of closer NASA/DOD cooperation and the development of a national perspective on aerospace test facilities remains largely unfulfilled because NASA and DOD 1 have not yet convened most test facility alliances 2 compete with each other to test engines for new rockets and 3 did not prepare a congressionally required joint plan on rocket propulsion test facilities. Although NASA and DOD have agreed to go beyond cooperative alliances in aeronautics and jointly manage their aeronautical test facilities they have not yet reached agreement on key aspects of a management organization. NASA and DOD took 20 months May 1996 through Dec. 1997 to negotiate and sign agreements formally establishing the six test facility-related cooperative alliances. During that time only the space environmental simulation alliance met regularly and conducted business. The already established rocket propulsion alliance met only once during this period despite a desire by some members to meet regularly. NASA and DOD officials did not regularly convene the other four alliances in the absence of approved charters. Despite the formation of the rocket propulsion alliance NASA and DOD compete against each other to test engines for new rocket programs. A principal arena of competition is the next phase of the Air Force's Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle EELV program. In particular the Air Force has spent millions of dollars to upgrade a test stand on the assumption that it not NASA would test EELV engines. DOD did not prepare a legislatively mandated joint plan with NASA to coordinate rocket propulsion test facilities. United States General Accounting Office paperback
réf. 0365881821.Gpaperback. Good. Access codes and supplements are not guaranteed with used items. May be an ex-library book. paperback
réf. 0366318004.Ghardcover. Good. Access codes and supplements are not guaranteed with used items. May be an ex-library book. hardcover
réf. 0656999578.Ghardcover. Good. Access codes and supplements are not guaranteed with used items. May be an ex-library book. hardcover
1995réf. 91265Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1995. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 31 1 pages. Briefing Report to the Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics Committee on Science House of Representatives. In April 1994 the National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA estimated that it would cost about $475 million for a Titan IV-Centaur launch of its Cassini spacecraft. Concerned about the cost as the Chairman of the former Subcommittee on Space House Committee on Science Space and Technology you requested that we provide information about the current estimated cost for the Cassini launch and determine the extent to which cost saving opportunities exist. On April 11 1995 we briefed your staff on the results of our work. This report contains the information presented at that briefing. NASA plans to launch its Cassini spacecraft to Saturn in October 1997. Following a voyage of more than 6 years the spacecraft will orbit Saturn for 4 years. Cassini will provide intensive long-term observations of Saturn's atmosphere rings magnetic fields and moons. Cassini's probe will be used to analyze the atmosphere of Saturn's largest moon Titan. Cassini a joint U.S.-European mission was originally paired with a project to explore comets and asteroids the Comet Rendezvous Asteroid Flyby CRAF. Cassini was first funded by Congress in fiscal year 1990. Since then CRAF was canceled and Cassini's original scientific capabilities have been reduced and its launch schedule extended. NASA is responsible for the overall success of the Cassini mission including integrating the spacecraft with the launch vehicle and approving the final launch. Under an agreement with NASA the Air Force will provide a Titan IV expendable launch vehicle with a Centaur upper stage and launch service from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida. NASA's most recent estimate for the Titan IV-Centaur launch of its Cassini spacecraft is about $452 million approximately $23 million less than its $475-million estimate in April 1994. The decrease occurred principally because NASA reduced its earlier estimate of mission integration costs. The $452-million estimate includes about $253 million paid to the Air Force for a Titan IV-Centaur launch vehicle and launch services. The remaining Cassini launch costs are NASA funding to pay for potential future cost increases mission integration prior-year studies support by two NASA field centers and miscellaneous costs. The Air Force estimates that its cost for launch vehicle and services is about $98 million more than the $253 million NASA will pay. Air Force officials believe there are benefits to providing a launch vehicle for Cassini. For example the Air Force will avoid an estimated $11.5 million to $13.8 million in storage charges and will reduce mission reliability risk due to the aging of components. Reductions in the cost of the Cassini launch may be possible because NASA recently completed its negotiation of the mission integration contract for $15 million less than estimated. However cost savings in other areas of the Cassini launch are unlikely and some of NASA's costs could increase. Also NASA missed a potential cost-saving opportunity because its agreement with the Air Force does not require the Air Force to refund NASA payments in excess of cost. Consequently the Air Force is not required to refund to NASA fees that the Air Force does not pay to the Titan IV contractor. These fees include $2 million in award fees and a $9-million incentive fee. In addition NASA's mission integration contract does not fully comply with the agency's revised policy for cost-plus-award-fee contracts which was implemented to encourage contractors to deliver quality products at reasonable costs. United States General Accounting Office paperback
réf. A9780371994443Paperback / softback. New. paperback
réf. A9780461990782Paperback / softback. New. paperback
2000réf. 91334Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 2000. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 47 1 pages Footnotes. Figures. Tables. A "Report to the Chairman Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Committee on Armed Services". The increasing use of military and commercial satellite systems for national security and business purposes will have significant implications for the United States in the 21st century. The Department of Defense DOD has traditionally used satellite systems in passive roles to support military operations-for example to collect intelligence data warn of ballistic missile launches transmit voice and data communications obtain meteorological data and provide navigation signals. Now plans are being developed to expand the use of military satellite systems and develop technologies such as lasers and electronic jammers that could be used to actively conduct combat operations from space. With advances in information technology the commercial use of satellites is also expanding particularly in telecommunications. In addition single satellite systems-for example navigation environmental and imagery systems-that originally served government missions are increasingly providing capabilities to both government and commercial users. The nongovernment applications are now generating large amounts of commercial revenue. National space policy treats U.S. satellite systems as national property that organizations have the right to operate without deliberate interference. To the extent that such interference were to occur the U.S. Space Command visualizes that military forces may be called upon to provide protection just as navies protected sea commerce. The U.S. Space Command's long-range plan and the Air Force Space Command's supporting strategic master plan provide for the protection of U.S. national interests and investments in space but they do not fully conform to DOD's new space policy. The plans propose space systems only and do not provide for an assessment of the cost-effectiveness of terrestrial-land sea and air-systems as alternatives to space systems which is called for in DOD's policy. An example of such a comparative assessment would be between satellite and aircraft radar systems. In addition DOD lacks the modeling and simulation tools necessary to perform such assessments a capability that is also called for in DOD's space policy. Finally it is unclear which DOD organization has the authority and capability to perform comparative assessments between space and terrestrial systems since such assessments are outside the purview of the U.S. and Air Force Space Commands. These factors prevent DOD from being assured that the most cost-effective approaches will be considered in making decisions on the expansion of space systems. The extent to which the Air Force's 18-year program projection supports planned military space programs and desired capabilities was unverifiable. Although several of the planned space systems such as a space-based radar and a space-based laser are included in the Air Force's program projection the cost estimates in the Air Force Space Command's strategic master plan were not directly traceable to the 18-year program funding projections. They were not traceable because the data were aggregated differently and program nomenclatures differed. Air Force Space Command representatives stated that they intend to institute changes to bring about consistency between the documents. A more important matter is uncertainty about the availability of several billions of dollars in funding increases that the Air Force has projected for space system expansion. During the first 6 years of the 18-year projection fiscal years 2000-05 programmed increases are uncertain because the President and the Congress have not agreed on overall funding increases to DOD. During the last 12 years of the projection fiscal years 2006-17 the Air Force relies on planned funding increases for program modernization without identifying funding sources thus creating additional uncertainty and putting the expansion of space systems in jeopardy for affordability reasons. DOD has not given sufficient attention to providing military personnel with space education to support future military space operations. DOD's new space policy requires that information about space force structure missions capabilities and applications be incorporated into professional military education. However joint military doctrine on space operations that is necessary to implement the policy has not been issued because of disagreement among the services on the doctrine's content. Leaving the disagreement unresolved hinders common understanding for the use of space systems in military operations. In addition until the doctrine is provided DOD and military service educational institutions will lack guidance for the development of space education curricula and for determining whether existing curricula need to be modified. This report contains recommendations to the Secretary of Defense that would 1 require space plans to include analyses of terrestrial systems as alternatives 2 establish the necessary modeling and simulation tools to perform such analyses 3 identify and/or establish the DOD office to perform the analyses 4 address the delay in completing joint doctrine for space operations and 5 provide the necessary instructions to DOD and military service colleges and schools for incorporating essential space information into professional military education curricula. DOD concurred with our recommendations and provided comments. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1994réf. 91341Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1994. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 61 3 pages. Illustrations. Map. Tables. Some cover wear and soiling. This is a "Report to Congressional Requesters". U.S. preeminence in aeronautics is being challenged by Europe. Over the last decade European manufacturers have with the support of their governments increased their share of the global civil aircraft market to over 30 percent. In response to a Congressional request GAO have developed information on 1 the structure of the aeronautics' industries of finance Germany and the United Kingdom; 2 the support that these countries' respective governments give to aeronautical research and development R&D; and 3 the organization of the countries' respective aeronautical R&D establishments. We also obtained information on other aeronautical R&D efforts sponsored by the European Community and its member nations. The aeronautics industry is a major contributor to national security commerce and transportation. The industry is considered a technology driver that leads to spin-offs of advanced technology products that support other sectors of the national economy. The aeronautics industry comprises three major sectors-airframe engine and equipment. This report focuses on the airframe and engine sectors. The airframe sector usually includes final assembly of the aircraft. En 1992 manufacturers in France Germany and the United Kingdom sold aeronautics products valued at about $52 billion. Civil and military aeronautics products contributed roughly equally to that amount except for Germany where civil products accounted for about 61 percent of sales. The countries exported aerospace products worth about $31 billion roughly a $lO-billion increase over 1989. Aeronautics products for France and the United Kingdom made up over 89 percent of their countries' aerospace export totals. Although 1992 data were not available for Germany 1991 statistics show the total to be in excess of 90 percent. In the three countries about 310000 people worked in aeronautics-related activities. As a point of reference the aeronautics industry in the United States had sales of about $74 billion exported about $44 billion and employed about 611000 people in 1992. United States General Accounting Office paperback