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1994réf. 91341Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1994. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 61 3 pages. Illustrations. Map. Tables. Some cover wear and soiling. This is a "Report to Congressional Requesters". U.S. preeminence in aeronautics is being challenged by Europe. Over the last decade European manufacturers have with the support of their governments increased their share of the global civil aircraft market to over 30 percent. In response to a Congressional request GAO have developed information on 1 the structure of the aeronautics' industries of finance Germany and the United Kingdom; 2 the support that these countries' respective governments give to aeronautical research and development R&D; and 3 the organization of the countries' respective aeronautical R&D establishments. We also obtained information on other aeronautical R&D efforts sponsored by the European Community and its member nations. The aeronautics industry is a major contributor to national security commerce and transportation. The industry is considered a technology driver that leads to spin-offs of advanced technology products that support other sectors of the national economy. The aeronautics industry comprises three major sectors-airframe engine and equipment. This report focuses on the airframe and engine sectors. The airframe sector usually includes final assembly of the aircraft. En 1992 manufacturers in France Germany and the United Kingdom sold aeronautics products valued at about $52 billion. Civil and military aeronautics products contributed roughly equally to that amount except for Germany where civil products accounted for about 61 percent of sales. The countries exported aerospace products worth about $31 billion roughly a $lO-billion increase over 1989. Aeronautics products for France and the United Kingdom made up over 89 percent of their countries' aerospace export totals. Although 1992 data were not available for Germany 1991 statistics show the total to be in excess of 90 percent. In the three countries about 310000 people worked in aeronautics-related activities. As a point of reference the aeronautics industry in the United States had sales of about $74 billion exported about $44 billion and employed about 611000 people in 1992. United States General Accounting Office paperback
réf. a917731973. first edition. US Genral Accounting Offic.e Federal Election Campaign act of 1971. Thick oblong 4to. wraps. 987p. VG binding secure; no ownership marks; light cover wear . Somewhat scarce. Volume 1 only. . paperback
2000réf. 77137Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 2000. Version 1 Exposure Draft. Wraps. Very good. iv 163 1 pages. Footnotes. Figures. Abbreviations. Appendices including a Glossary. Document Distribution Center Customer Service Survey form laid in. Few draft copies survive. This was a precursor to a 2004 Executive Guide of the same title published as GAO-04-394G. An exposure draft was typically used to broadly solicit comments from multiple agencies and stakeholders. Otherwise audit and review drafts were typically shared with the studied agency for factual accuracy and to obtain a management response. In 1997 the GAO developed guidance based primarily on the Clinger-Cohen Act that provides a method for evaluating and assessing how well a federal agency is selecting and managing its IT resources and identifies specific areas where improvements can be made. The Information Technology Investment Management framework identifies critical processes for successful IT investment and organizing these processes into a framework of increasingly mature stages. This shift reflects both the maturation of the thinking in the area of IT investment management and the feedback we received from organizations based upon their experiences creating their IT investment mechanisms and processes. Such a maturity framework can be used to analyze an organization's IT investment management process and determine the maturity of its investment process. In doing so ITIM establishes three key benefits: 1 a rigorous standardized tool for internal and external evaluations of an agency's IT investment management process; 2 a consistent and understandable mechanism for reporting the results of these assessments to agency executives the Congress and other interested parties; and 3 a road map agencies can use for improving their IT investment management process. The achievement of more mature IT investment management stages depends on performing other good management practices and attributes such as human capital training IT architecture and software management. United States General Accounting Office paperback
2000réf. 91331Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 2000. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 30 2 pages. Footnotes. Figures. Tabular Data. Appendices. This is a "Report to Congressional Requesters". The Navy Theater Wide system is being developed to defend military and civilian assets including U.S. and allied military forces in the field against attacks by medium- and long-range ballistic missiles while they are still outside the atmosphere. The Navy is developing the system in two segments. The first segment or Block I is intended to provide an initial capability by 2010 involving the deployment of 80 interceptor missiles aboard 4 ships. For fiscal years 1997 through 1999 the Congress increased funding for the program by 150 percent--about $663 million--over the $444 million requested in the President's budgets for those years. The purpose of the increase was to enable the Navy to reduce technical risks and develop system technologies earlier than planned. The Congress expressed concern that despite the funding increases the program was viewed in 1998 by a high ranking Department of Defense official and an independent panel of experts as "high risk" because of technical challenges such as improving the system's capability to track and destroy enemy ballistic missiles. As a result Congress asked GAO to determine 1 how the additional funding provided by the Congress for the program in fiscal years 1997 through 1999 was used and 2 whether significant risks to the program remain. Within the next month we also plan to issue reports on the status of two other missile defense systems under development--the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 and National Missile Defense. GAO noted that: 1 the Navy used the $663 million in increased funding as intended to reduce technical risks and develop system technologies earlier than originally planned; 2 about 41 percent was used for system design and analysis efforts such as reducing the technical risks associated with improving the system's ability to differentiate intended targets from other objects; 3 about 20 percent of the funding was used for procuring hardware items such as rocket motors and test interceptor missiles; 4 according to program officials the additional funding also allowed the program to shift from a demonstration effort to an acquisition program in which a weapon system will be fully developed and produced; 5 although the Navy used this additional funding to reduce technical risk and develop the system sooner significant technical and schedule risks still exist; 6 technological advancement is required to differentiate the target from other objects; 7 such discrimination requires that the system's computer network can process an enormous amount of data in real time; 8 this network has not been built and its software must be integrated with the computer code that is already installed on each ship's computer system; 9 current activities include writing software examining several computer architectures for the network and building the capability to test the network; 10 technological advancement is also required in developing the capability of the interceptor missile to seek and destroy the target; 11 GAO is concerned that the program office has proposed a schedule calling for initial operational testing of the missile in 2010 even though 50 percent of the required 80 missiles would be produced and delivered by 2008 and 100 percent by 2010; 12 operational testing is designed to provide an independent evaluation of whether a system meets required performance levels prior to beginning production; 13 GAO has found that cost overruns and the deployment of substandard systems occur when the Department of Defense proceeds into production before systems are tested under operational conditions; 14 the Navy has scheduled up to 7 flight tests between July 2000 and September 2001; 15 according to testing officials test programs typically separate flight tests by about 6 months; 16 a longer interval between tests gives officials better opportunities to evaluate test results understand problems and incorporate solutions into the next test; and 17 the approved level of funding does not match the Navy program office's estimate of how much it needs to implement the program on schedule. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1996réf. 91266Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1996. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 33 3 pages. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA is facing the difficult task of fulfilling its mission with significantly fewer dollars. NASA's present strategy for absorbing its most recent funding reductions through fiscal year 2000 focuses on cutting infrastructure. If NASA fails to find and implement sufficient infrastructure cost-reduction opportunities meeting its budget targets through fiscal year 2000 will require program adjustments-stretching out reducing the scope or terminating efforts and/or postponing new initiatives. GAO reviewed the status of NASA's efforts to achieve reductions and efficiencies in its infrastructure principally facilities and the challenges it faces. In the early 1990s NASA was planning an infrastructure to support a projected annual budget of more than $20 billion and a civil service workforce of about 25000 by the turn of the century. However NASA has been directed by the Administration to reduce its future years' budget levels. In FY 1994 budget request NASA's total funding for fiscal years 1994 through 2000 was reduced by 18 percent or $22 billion. In the FY 1995 budget request total funding was reduced again by an additional 13 percent. To absorb these reductions NASA focused on adjusting programs. The Space Station program was restructured and given an annual budget ceiling of $2.1 billion. The scope of the Earth Observing System program was reduced. Funding was terminated for the Space Exploration Initiative the National Launch System and the National Aerospace Plane. The Comet Rendezvous and Asteroid Flyby project was canceled. NASA's current facility closure and consolidation plans will not fully achieve the agency's goal of decreasing the current replacement value of its facilities by about 25 percent about $4 billion in 1994 dollars by the end of fiscal year 2000. More importantly these plans will not result in substantial cost reductions by that date. Also although NASA is about half way to its goal of lowering the number of its full-time equivalent employees to 17500 by fiscal year 2000 it faces major uncertainties in achieving additional workforce reductions. NASA has also had problems in evaluating some cost-reduction opportunities; environmental cleanup costs could affect future facility disposition efforts; and its efforts to share facilities with DOD have progressed slowly. NASA faces barriers to accomplishing additional consolidations and closures that to date it has not been able to overcome on its own. Closing facilities relocating activities and consolidating operations in fewer locations with fewer employees have been slowed by parochial concerns about the effects of such actions on missions personnel and local communities. These concerns have been exacerbated by perceptions of the lack of fairness and impartiality in the decision-making process. In the face of these concerns NASA must still reduce its infrastructure further. Ultimately if further progress in identifying and implementing infrastructure reductions is limited a process that uses an external independent group similar to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission may be needed. To help determine the need for an independent group to facilitate closures and consolidations of NASA facilities Congress may wish to consider requiring NASA to submit a plan outlining how it intends to met its reduction goals. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1819réf. 91335Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office August 18 1994. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 46 pages. A "Report to the Chairman Committee on Government Operations House of Representatives". Federal procurement Contract administration Aerospace contracts Contract modifications Contract costs Contractor performance Work measurement standards Small business contractors Human resources training Contractor responsibility. United States General Accounting Office paperback
2002réf. 91336Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 2002. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 50 4 pages. Footnotes. Figures. Tables. This is a "Report to the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics Committee on Science House of Representatives". In response to a Congressional request this report discusses the mechanisms that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA has in place to capture disseminate and apply past lessons learned towards future mission success. We found that NASA's processes procedures and systems do not effectively capture and share lessons learned and therefore NASA has no assurance that lessons are being applied towards future missions. We include recommendations to the NASA administrator on ways to strengthen the agency's lessons learning processes and systems. NASA's procedures and guidelines require that program and project managers review and apply lessons learned from the past throughout a program's or project's life cycle and to document and submit any significant lessons to the agency's Lessons Learned Information System LLIS in a timely manner. NASA defines a lesson learned as knowledge or understanding gained by experience. The experience may be positive such as a successful test or mission or negative such as a mishap or failure. A lesson must be significant in that it has a real or assumed impact on operations; valid in that it is factually correct; and applicable in that it identifies a specific design process or decision that reduces or eliminates the potential for failures and mishaps or reinforces a positive result. NASA recognizes the importance of learning from the past to ensure future mission success and uses several mechanisms to capture and disseminate lessons learned. The principal source NASA has established for the agency-wide collection and sharing of lessons is the LLIS a Web-based lessons database that managers are required to review on an ongoing basis. In addition NASA uses training program reviews and periodic revisions to agency policies and guidelines to communicate lessons. Several NASA centers and key programs also maintain lessons learned systems that are geared toward their own staff. Recently NASA has taken steps to improve the way it captures and shares information by developing a business strategy called knowledge management. Knowledge management can be defined as the way that organizations create capture and reuse knowledge to achieve their objectives. According to NASA officials knowledge management has the potential to link agency staff with the knowledge and resources they need to complete tasks faster better and cheaper. In pursuit of knowledge management NASA has developed a strategic plan established a management team to coordinate knowledge management activities at NASA's centers and initiated several information technology pilot projects. Despite the processes and procedures in place to capture and share lessons learned there is no assurance that lessons are being applied toward future missions success. A GAO survey of NASA program and project managers revealed weaknesses in the collection and sharing of lessons learned agency-wide. While some lessons learning does take place our survey found that lessons are not routinely identified collected or shared by programs and project managers. Respondents reported that they are unfamiliar with lessons generated by other centers and programs. In addition many respondents indicated that they are dissatisfied with NASA's lessons learned processes and systems. Managers also identified challenges or cultural barriers to the sharing of lessons learned such as the lack of time to capture or submit lessons and a perception of intolerance for mistakes. They further offered suggestions for areas of improvement including enhancements to LLIS and implementing mentoring and "storytelling" or after-action reviews as additional mechanisms for lessons learning. While NASA's current knowledge management efforts should lead to some improvement in the sharing of agency lessons and knowledge they lack ingredients that have been shown to be critical to the success of knowledge management at leading organizations. Cultural resistance to sharing knowledge and the lack of strong support from agency leaders often make it difficult to implement an effective lessons learning and knowledge sharing environment. We found that successful industry and government organizations have overcome barriers by making a strong management commitment to knowledge sharing developing a well defined business plan for implementing knowledge management providing incentives to encourage knowledge sharing and building technology systems to facilitate easier access to information. The application of these principles could increase opportunities for NASA to perform its basic mission of exploring space faster better and cheaper more successfully. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1998réf. 91246Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1998. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 23 1 pages. Footnotes. Illustrations. Tabular data. This is a "Report to Congressional Requesters". This report responds to a Congressional request that the GAO review the National Missile Defense NMD program funding requirements and schedule and technical risks. Specifically you asked us to determine 1 why the Department of Defense DOD significantly increased the program's near-term funding in its May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review 2 how funding increases authorized and appropriated by Congress for the program in fiscal years 1996 through 1998 have been used or are planned to be used and 3 DOD's planned level of future funding for the NMD program and planned uses for those funds. You also asked for an assessment of the program's current schedule and technical risks. We provided an initial assessment of the schedule and technical risks in our December 12 1997 report to you. This report updates that assessment. The primary mission of NMD is to defend the United States against an intercontinental ballistic missile attack consisting of several missiles launched from a rogue nation. It would also have some capability against an accidental launch from nuclear powers such as Russia or China. The United States has been developing technologies for use in an NMD system for a number of years. In April 1996 DOD changed the purpose of the NMD program from a technology readiness program to a deployment readiness program and designated NMD as a major defense acquisition program. Under the technology readiness program the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization BMDO developed and matured technologies for possible use in an NMD system. Under the current deployment readiness program BMDO plans to integrate the technologies into a system that can be made operational. The deployment readiness program is commonly known as the "33" program. The goal of the NMD 33 program is to develop and demonstrate by fiscal year 2000 an initial limited capability that could be deployed by fiscal year 2003. The deployment decision is to be based on ongoing assessments of the threat and will not be made until fiscal year 2000 at the earliest. If DOD concludes at that time that the threat does not warrant deployment by fiscal year 2003 development will continue. While BMDO is still determining the specific design of the initial NMD system its features will include 1 space- and ground-based sensors to provide early warning of attacking missiles; 2 ground-based radars to identify and track the threatening warheads; 3 ground-based interceptors to collide with and destroy incoming warheads; and 4 a battle management command control and communications system. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1988réf. 35690Washington DC:: U.S. General Accounting Office 1988. Paperback. NEAR FINE. 8.5"x11" pale blue paperback staplebound 42 pages. Small sticker and "received" stamp on cover otherwise like new. We provide professional service and individual attention to your order daily shipments and sturdy packaging. FREE TRACKING ON ALL SHIPMENTS WITHIN USA. U.S. General Accounting Office, paperback
1992réf. 80751Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1992. Contemporary Xerox copies. Six individually stapled items held together by a binder clip. Good. 1 31 pages. Together with copies of the testimonies of John Deutch 10 pages Lewis Branscomb 11 pages William Brinkman 5 pages and Eric Bloch 14 pages. Also included at the Opening Remarks of Chairman George E. Brown Jr. 5 pages. Dr. Deutch testified in his capacity as an Institute Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and referred to his holding several positions at the Department of Energy during the period 1978 to 1980. Professor Branscomb testified in his capacity as the Director Science Technology and Public Policy Program as the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Professor Branscomb had served as the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Executive Office of the President and was thus the President's Science Advisor. William F. Brinkman testified as the Executive Director Research Physics Division of AT&T Bell Laboratories. William Frank Brinkman was an American physicist who served as president of the American Physical Society 2002 and was the head of the Office of Science at the United States Department of Energy 2009-2013. He was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in 1984 and won the George E. Pake Prize in 1994. Erich Bloch was a Distinguished Fellow Council on Competitiveness. Erich Bloch 1925 - 2016 was an electrical engineer and administrator. He was involved with developing IBM's first transistorized supercomputer 7030 Stretch and mainframe computer System/360. He served as director of the National Science Foundation from 1984 to 1990. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: We are pleased to be here today to testify on the Department of Energy's DOE nuclear weapons laboratories. As you requested our testimony focuses on three areas: 1 the research development and testing RD&T capabilities of the Los Alamos and Livermore National Laboratories; 2 the recent trends in staffing and funding at DOE's weapons laboratories; and 3 options identified by the laboratories and DOE for consolidating the Los Alamos and Livermore RD&T programs. This testimony provides a baseline for future congressional deliberations on these issue. Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories maintain a deliberately redundant nuclear warhead research development and testing RD&T infrastructure. The redundancy between Los Alamos and Livermore was intended to stimulate competition in the nation's efforts to design nuclear warheads. With the end of the Cold War however the nature of the nuclear warhead RD&T effort at the laboratories has been changing rapidly. Changes in the world coupled with the possibility of substantial budget cuts in the nuclear weapons area brings into question whether the nation still needs or can financially sustain the laboratories' current level of redundancy. In summary although Los Alamos and Livermore have duplicative RD&T capabilities in general over the years their independent approaches have led to each developing specialized knowledge and capabilities. Over the past several years both RD&T funding and staffing have declined significantly at the laboratories. With this recent and anticipated continued decline in resources devoted to nuclear weapons RD&T some consolidation of the laboratories' functions has already occurred and more is in process. The laboratories believe the potential savings are small relative to the funds needed to maintain the entire nuclear weapons complex. The laboratories believe however that savings are possible by avoiding additional duplicative facilities in the future. Both laboratories strongly prefer the current two-laboratory structure for weapons design. However Los Alamos officials believe that if the nation is to maintain its nuclear competence in the event of further significant cuts in nuclear weapons RD&T the current structure may need to be radically altered. In addition they believe that any new configuration must maintain the current benefits of competition and peer review. United States General Accounting Office unknown
1986réf. 83634Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1986. Presumed First Edition First printing. Wraps. Good. 55 1 pages. Footnotes. Appendix I is Selected Literature Reviewed. This report examines scientific and policy implications of nuclear winter. It is based on extensive review of relevant literature and detailed discussions with a wide range of scientists researchers and policy analysts within and outside of government. It provides an overview of what is known about nuclear winter and of ongoing research addressing areas of scientific uncertainty. It also outlines potential implications for defense strategy arms control and foreign policy-making and points out the absence of a consensus on the need for policy changes at this time. The Office of Science and Technology Policy after reviewing the report in draft suggested that GAO by discussing potential policy implications was giving more validity to the nuclear winter theory that was warranted and suggested the tenor of the report be changed. GAO did not agree. Nuclear winter is a severe and prolonged global climatic cooling effect that is hypothesized to occur after widespread firestorms following a large-scale nuclear war. The hypothesis is based on the fact that such fires can inject soot into the stratosphere where it can block some direct sunlight from reaching the surface of the Earth. It is speculated that the resulting cooling would lead to widespread crop failure and famine. When developing computer models of nuclear-winter scenarios researchers use the conventional bombing of Hamburg and the Hiroshima firestorm in World War II as example cases where soot might have been injected into the stratosphere alongside modern observations of natural large-area wildfire-firestorms. "Nuclear winter" or as it was initially termed "nuclear twilight" began to be considered as a scientific concept in the 1980s after it became clear that an earlier hypothesis that fireball generated NOx emissions would devastate the ozone layer was losing credibility. It was within this context that the climatic effects of soot from fires became the new focus of the climatic effects of nuclear war. In these model scenarios various soot clouds containing uncertain quantities of soot were assumed to form over cities oil refineries and more rural missile silos. Once the quantity of soot is decided upon by the researchers the climate effects of these soot clouds are then modeled. The term "nuclear winter" was a neologism coined in 1983 by Richard P. Turco in reference to a one-dimensional computer model created to examine the "nuclear twilight" idea. This model projected that massive quantities of soot and smoke would remain aloft in the air for on the order of years causing a severe planet-wide drop in temperature. Turco would later distance himself from these extreme conclusions. After the failure of the predictions on the effects of the 1991 Kuwait oil fires that were made by the primary team of climatologists that advocate the hypothesis over a decade passed without any new published papers on the topic. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1997réf. 72-1488General Accounting Office GAO. 1997. 1997. 235p. Oversize. White wraps. Fine Copy. Paperback. Fine. General Accounting Office (GAO). 1997. Paperback
1997réf. 79427Washington DC: General Accounting Office National Security and International Division June 1997. Presumed First Edition First printing White cover not usual blue cover--reprint/. Wraps. Good. 235 pages. Oversized book measuring 11 inches by 8/1-2 inches. Postage sticker and part of a shipping label roughly removed on rear cover. This report is the unclassified version of a classified report that the General Accounting Office issued in July 1996 on the Operation Desert Storm air campaign. At the request of John D. Dingell the Ranking Minority Member of the Committee on Commerce House of Representatives the Department of Defense reevaluated the security classification of the original report and as a result about 85 percent of the material originally determined to be classified has subsequently been determined to be unclassified and is presented in this report. The best available data did not permit GAO to either: 1 make a comprehensive system-by-system quantitative comparison of aircraft and weapon effectiveness; or 2 validate some of the key performance claims for certain weapon systems. Pursuant to Congressional direction GAO reviewed the Operation Desert Storm air campaign focusing on the: 1 use and performance of aircraft munitions and missiles employed during the air campaign; 2 validity of Department of Defense DOD and manufacturer claims particularly those for weapon systems utilizing advanced technology; 3 relationship between cost and performance of weapon systems; and 4 extent that Desert Storm air campaign objectives were met. GAO noted that: 1 air power clearly achieved many of Desert Storm's objectives but fell short of fully achieving others; 2 the available quantitative and qualitative data indicate that air power damage to several major target sets was more limited than DOD's title V report to the Congress stated; 3 these data show clear success against the oil and electrical target categories but less success against Iraqi air defense command control and communications and lines of communication; 4 success against nuclear-related mobile Scud and Republican Guard targets was the least measurable; 5 the lessons that can be learned from Desert Storm are limited because of the unique conditions the strike tactics employed by the coalition the limited Iraqi response and limited data on weapon system effectiveness; 6 the strong likelihood of campaign success enabled U.S. commanders to favor strike tactics that maximized aircraft and pilot survivability rather than weapon system effectiveness; 7 the Iraqis employed few if any electronic countermeasures and presented almost no air-to-air opposition; 8 as a result Desert Storm did not consistently or rigorously test all the performance parameters of aircraft and weapon systems used in the air campaign; 9 many of DOD's and manufacturers' postwar claims about weapon system performance were overstated misleading inconsistent with the best available data or unverifiable; 10 aircraft and pilot losses were historically low partly owing to the use of medium- to high-altitude munition delivery tactics that nonetheless both reduced the accuracy of guided and unguided munitions and hindered target identification and acquisition; 11 air power was inhibited by the limited ability of aircraft sensors to identify and acquire targets the failure to gather intelligence on critical targets and the inability to collect and disseminate battle damage assessments BDA in a timely manner; 12 the contributions of guided weaponry incorporating advanced technologies and their delivery platforms were limited because the cooperative operating conditions they require were not consistently encountered; 13 the important contributions of stealth and laser-guided bombs were emphasized as was the need for more and better BDA and less attention was paid to the significant contributions of less-sophisticated systems and the performance of critical tasks such as the identification and acquisition of targets; and 14 there was no apparent link between the cost of aircraft and munitions and their performance in Desert Storm. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Division paperback
1995réf. 67164Washington DC: United States Congress General Accounting Office 1995. Presumed First Edition/first printing. Wraps. Very good. Pencil ersasure residue on first page. 109 p. Includes illustrations. In the early morning of February 27 1991 during the Persian Gulf War Army Corporal Douglas Lance Fielder was unintentionally killed by U. S. soldiers who had mistaken him and his fellow engineers as the enemy. GAo was requested to determine the events that had led to the fratricide assess the adequacy of U.S. Army investigations following that fratricide and investigate allegations that Army officials hindered invistigations of the fratricide incident or influenced their outcome. From Wikipedia: "Fratricide from the Latin words frater "brother" and cida "killer " or cidum "a killing " both from caedere "to kill to cut down" is the act of a person killing his or her brother.Fratricide may also be used to refer to friendly fire incidents. It also refers to the possible destruction of one MIRV warhead by another. Targets may be arranged deliberately to increase the likelihood in a strategy called dense pack." Also from Wikipedia: "The Gulf War 2 August 1990 28 February 1991 codenamed Operation Desert Storm 17 January 1991 28 February 1991 was a war waged by a U.N. -authorized Coalition force from 34 nations led by the United States against Iraq in response to Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait. The war is also known under other names such as the Persian Gulf War First Gulf War Gulf War I or the First Iraq War before the term "Iraq War" became identified instead with the 2003 Iraq War also referred to in the U.S. as "Operation Iraqi Freedom". Kuwait's invasion by Iraqi troops that began 2 August 1990 was met with international condemnation and brought immediate economic sanctions against Iraq by members of the U.N. Security Council. U.S. President George H. W. Bush deployed U.S. forces into Saudi Arabia and urged other countries to send their own forces to the scene. An array of nations joined the Coalition. The great majority of the Coalition's military forces were from the U.S. with Saudi Arabia the United Kingdom and Egypt as leading contributors in that order. Saudi Arabia paid around US$36 billion of the US$60 billion cost. The war was marked by the beginning of live news on the front lines of the fight with the primacy of the U.S. network CNN. The war has also earned the nickname Video Game War after the daily broadcast images on board the U.S. bombers during Operation Desert Storm. The initial conflict to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait began with an aerial bombardment on 17 January 1991. This was followed by a ground assault on 24 February. This was a decisive victory for the Coalition forces who liberated Kuwait and advanced into Iraqi territory. The Coalition ceased their advance and declared a cease-fire 100 hours after the ground campaign started. Aerial and ground combat was confined to Iraq Kuwait and areas on Saudi Arabia's border. Iraq launched Scud missiles against Coalition military targets in Saudi Arabia and against Israel." United States, Congress, General Accounting Office paperback
1991réf. 100158367United states general accounting office 1991. Bon état intérieurs propres bonne tenue. in4. 1991. Agrafé. 2 volumes. United states general accounting office unknown
1999réf. 91332Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1999. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 28 pages. Footnotes. This is a "Report to the Chairman Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives". Satellite control systems are used to ensure that satellites reach their planned orbits and perform their intended missions while in orbit. There are two types of satellite control operations-platform control and payload control. Platform controls involves monitoring the health and status and managing the operations of a satellite's physical structure sometimes called the bus. Payload controls involves monitoring the health and status and managing the operations of a satellite's mission equipment. Specific satellite control functions consist of 1 locating satellites and receiving and processing data from them 2 following satellites' motion over time and 3 transmitting signals to satellites. These three functions are called telemetry tracking and commanding and are performed by a network of ground command and control centers ground antennas and communication capabilities between the centers antennas and satellites. There are two types of satellite control networks-common and dedicated. DOD operates two common networks that provide primary or backup control for communications environmental monitoring navigation and intelligence satellites. Examples include the Defense Satellite Communications System Defense Meteorological Satellite Program and Global Positioning System. DOD also operates several dedicated networks that control missile warning communications and intelligence missions. DOD has made minimal progress in integrating and improving its satellite control capabilities in accordance with 1996 national space policy. In 1992 DOD identified a need for an integrated satellite control system to achieve standardization and interoperability across military services and individual satellite programs. In 1995 the Air Force which controls most of DOD's satellites characterized its satellite control capabilities as aging inefficient and costly to operate. The Air Force initiated an effort to standardize these capabilities and achieve full implementation in 2003-a first step toward an integrated and interoperable DOD capability. Air Force officials chose to proceed with a conceptual design over operational alternatives. However in 1997 the Air Force terminated this effort because of schedule delays resulting from software development problems and the additional amount of software that needed to be written. Air Force Space Command representatives are now recommending that the use of the Air Force's existing satellite control capabilities be extended to 2005 to provide time to acquire an improved capability. Until then the Air Force will be unable to reduce approximately $400 million it spends annually to operate maintain sustain and modernize satellite control capabilities. The Navy's satellite control capabilities are not as old inefficient or costly to operate as the Air Force's capabilities. Although the Navy upgraded its capabilities in the early 1990s another upgrade is planned because the company that provided the existing capabilities no longer provides software support services. DOD has taken limited action to foster integrated and interoperable satellite control for all government space activities since it was directed to do so by the 1996 national space policy. Prior studies recommended that a high-level interagency management group be established to oversee implementation of integrated systems across agency lines. Although DOD established a senior steering group in 1998 to address national security space management and integration issues government space agencies continue to plan for satellite control capabilities on an independent basis rather than coordinate and integrate their efforts on an interagency basis. Considering the long-standing need to replace the Air Force's aging and costly satellite control capabilities and the Navy's more recent plan to upgrade its capabilities DOD has an opportunity to revitalize its effort to achieve integrated satellite control by acquiring a standardized capability. A resumed search for such a capability is appropriate because it would also provide an opportunity to review Air Force satellite control decisions for future space-based infrared and communication satellite programs that are currently in development. Commercial off-the-shelf products that could perform core functions for controlling satellites are available and several studies have advocated the use of such products. In making a selection among alternatives DOD could reduce acquisition risk by employing best commercial practices-a key element of DOD's acquisition reform initiatives. Commercial firms place a premium on demonstrated performance before making critical decisions rather than on predicted performance as was the case with the Air Force's 1995 selection. We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense take actions to revitalize efforts to 1 integrate and improve DOD's satellite control capabilities using commercial products and practices and 2 foster integration and interoperability of satellite control among government space activities. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1991réf. 91339Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1991. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 41 3 pages. Footnotes. Illustrations. Tabular data. This is a "Report to the Chairman Subcommittee on Science Technology and Space Committee on Commerce Science and Transportation U.S. Senate". Pursuant to a congressional request GAO reviewed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's NASA testing activities focusing on: 1 the adequacy of the NASA testing policies and practices; 2 NASA oversight of contractor testing; and 3 the adequacy of resources available for testing. In April 1990 NASA deployed its $1.5 billion Hubble Space Telescope to an orbit 380 miles above the earth. Soon after the agency discovered that the telescope's primary mirror was manufactured in the wrong shape severely degrading its scientific capabilities. The flaw was not detected before the telescope was launched because the mirror was not adequately tested. The Chairman Subcommittee on Science Technology and Space Senate Committee on Commerce Science and Transportation asked GAO to review NASA'S testing activities. Specifically GAO'S objectives were to assess the adequacy of testing policies and practices and the agency's oversight of contractor testing and to determine whether sufficient resources existed for testing. Because space missions are inherently risky systems cannot be easily repaired while in orbit and failures are widely publicized it is especially important that the systems' performance be thoroughly tested before launch. These complex systems are usually acquired in very limited quantities and test programs are specifically tailored for each project. According to a NASA team appointed to investigate the Hubble failure mirror tests were inadequately planned and poorly analyzed. The team further noted that NASA did not provide adequate oversight of the contractor's test program. Testing has varied from project to project. The success of many of NASA'S recent space projects indicates that in many cases testing was adequate. Tests were not effective however in detecting the Hubble mirror flaw. In other cases launch schedules have been adversely affected because tests did not identify problems soon enough. Testing practices vary because NASA has no uniform policies governing testing. Existing guidance is fragmented not well defined and varies from one NASA field center to another. In some cases hardware designed for the same mission may be tested to different standards. All centers have oversight controls to help ensure that contractors properly plan and conduct tests and report the results. Controls at some centers however could be further strengthened. Also according to a recent National Academy of Public Administration study NASA needs to retain more of its research and development work in-house to give civil service personnel the experience necessary to adequately oversee agency contractors. No standard exists for determining the amount of resources that should be devoted to testing but according to NASA officials resources are normally sufficient to conduct essential tests. However project managers must sometimes make cost-risk tradeoffs when defining the scope and extent of testing programs. Further some in-house test facilities and equipment need upgrading. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1994réf. 91327Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1994. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 31 1 pages. Footnotes. Figure. Table. This is a "Report to Congressional Requesters". The space shuttle is the only U.S. launch system capable of carrying people to and from space. It has operated for over 10 years and is likely to be used well into the next century. As the shuttle ages the National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA will be faced with increased need to update and replace various components due to obsolescence or to enhance safety. At Congress; request GAO reviewed the shuttle program lo determine 1 the assumptions NASA has made regarding the length of time the current shuttle fleet will be in operation and 2 NASA'S processes and criteria for selecting needed safety and obsolescence upgrades. NASA has not made explicit assumptions about how long the current shuttle fleet will remain in operation. However based on its budget projections and approach to defining a new launch system the current fleet cannot be replaced for at least another 12 to 15 years. NASA'S projections of its likely budgets through fiscal year 1999 will not support simultaneous development of the space station and a new launch vehicle. NASA has a process for identifying and assessing needed upgrades. However NASA does not use life-cycle cost as a criterion for evaluating potential safety upgrades and it does not always consider alternatives when selecting an approach to implementing an improvement. Without life-cycle cost estimates NASA cannot determine whether an upgrade project is affordable within the context of the program and the agency's overall budget and out-year plans. Therefore it is possible that inappropriate program decisions on upgrades may be made. NASA managers do not have a precise basis for estimating life-cycle costs for decision purposes because of uncertainty about how Iong the current fleet will remain in operation. Since the shuttle fleet must operate for at least another 12 to 15 years it would seem logical that NASA officials could use that time period as a minimum basis for estimating life-cycle costs. NASA'S approach to funding the Safety and Obsolescence Upgrade program may increase programmatic risks. The program manager believes that funding is adequate to develop upgrade projects that have already been approved. However recent budgets have not included funds for early design studies of other potential upgrades or to cover unforeseen contingencies. Not conducting early design studies to establish the feasibility of a potential upgrade could mean that projects are not started when they are needed or projects are initiated before they are adequately defined. Also the lack of contingency funds means that if approved projects encounter unexpected problems the projects may have to be stretched out and costs may increase. This situation raises questions as to whether the decision to start two new projects in fiscal year 1995 adequately reflect budget constraints and inherent technical and cost risks. In commenting on a draft of this report NASA said that it agreed in principle with our recommendations. The agency stated however that some safety upgrades are made without a full life-cycle cost analysis because of the emphasis on safety. Safety is NASAS highest priority and relative cost is a lesser consideration. We agree that NASA must heavily weigh safety considerations in such decisions. We believe however that prudent management requires an estimate of total costs to ensure that NASA managers understand the full implications of their decisions and that the projects are affordable within the context of NASA'S total budget and future plans. United States General Accounting Office paperback
2000réf. 91333Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 2000. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 20 4 pages. Footnote. Figure. Table. This is a "Report to the Chairman Committee on Commerce Science and Transportation U.S. Senate". The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's NASA space shuttle program is at a critical juncture as three key factors converge: its workforce has declined significantly since 1995 its flight rate will have to double over that of recent years to support assembly of the International Space Station and costly safety upgrades are being planned to enhance the space shuttle's safe operation until at least 2012. Several internal NASA studies have shown that the shuttle program's workforce has been affected negatively by the downsizing much of which occurred after 1995. Since 1995 the shuttle workforce has decreased by more than one-third to about 1800 full-time equivalent employees. The shuttle program has identified many key areas that are not sufficiently staffed by qualified workers and the remaining workforce shows signs of overwork and fatigue. For example indicators on forfeited leave absences from training courses and stress-related employee assistance visits are all on the rise. Moreover the program's demographic shape has changed. For example throughout the Office of Space Flight which includes the shuttle program there are more than twice as many workers over 60 years old than under 30 years old. This jeopardizes the program's ability to hand off leadership roles to the next generation and achieve a higher flight rate to support assembly of the International Space Station. In addition according to NASA it poses significant shuttle program flight safety risks. NASA has recognized the need to revitalize its workforce. For example in December 1999 it terminated shuttle program downsizing plans and initiated efforts to begin hiring new staff. In addition NASA and the Office of Management and Budget have begun an overall workforce review to examine personnel needs barriers to achieving proper staffing levels and skill mixes and potential reforms to help address the agency's long-term requirements. NASA human resource officials told us that they are now using a draft checklist we recently published as a guide in ongoing workforce planning and in discussions with the Office of Management and Budget. The checklist includes a five-part framework: strategic planning organizational alignment leadership talent and performance culture. The guide should help NASA to more clearly establish a linkage between human capital programs and the agency's mission goals and strategies. In addition the Government Performance and Results Act requires a performance plan that describes how an agency's goals and objectives are to be achieved. These plans are to include a description of the 1 operational processes skills and technology and 2 human capital information and other resources required to meet goals and objectives. In reviewing NASA's fiscal year 2000 annual performance plan we found that the plan does not adequately describe how the agency's strategies and human capital resources will help it achieve performance goals. NASA's fiscal year 2001 plan however addresses at least some human capital issues in that it includes an objective to improve workforce health monitoring. In addition in June 2000 the President directed the heads of all executive branch federal agencies to integrate human resource management into planning budgeting and mission evaluation processes. The directive requires each agency to include specific human resource management goals and objectives in its strategic and annual performance plans beginning October 1 2000. The President's June 2000 directive provides further emphasis on the need to integrate human capital requirements with the strategic planning process continued management emphasis will be critical to the success of NASA's human capital planning. In addition NASA will need to take steps to ensure it has the right people to manage the shuttle program Because the President has now directed NASA and all other executive branch agencies to include human capital goals and objectives in their strategic and annual performance plans GAO is not making recommendations in this report. We will monitor NASA's progress in establishing and achieving its human capital goals as part of our annual performance plan assessments. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1999réf. 91247Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1999. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 38 pages. Illustration. Tabular Data. Footnotes. This is a "Report to Congressional Requesters". When completed around 2004 the goal of the International Space Station ISS is to provide the United States and its international partners with an Earth orbiting facility that supports human habitation and scientific research in a microgravity environment. Because of Russia's ongoing problems in funding its share of the space station's construction costs the National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA is concerned that Russia may also not be able to fulfill its commitments to fund ISS operations costs. NASA estimated that the annual cost to operate the completed space station will average $1.3 billion or $13 billion over a 10-year mission life. NASA anticipates sharing these costs with its international partners and it hopes to further reduce funding requirements through sharing with commercial users or through more efficient commercial operations. As requested by you and the late Representative George E. Brown Jr. we reviewed NASA's estimate for the cost to operate the space station after assembly is completed. Specifically we were asked to determine 1 if any space station-related costs are not included in NASA's estimate; 2 the level of uncertainty in the cost estimate for operations especially with regard to the potential impact of changes in Russian participation; and 3 how NASA funding requirements will be reduced by sharing costs with international partners or through commercial use and operations. NASA's $1.3 billion estimate does not include all funding requirements related to space station operations. NASA does not prepare budget estimates on a full-cost basis because it has not completed implementation of its full cost accounting system. Additional items that will have to be funded in the future within the space station budget include costs for upgrading obsolete systems and operating an alternative propulsion module. NASA has not developed detailed estimates for potential upgrades to combat component obsolescence and improve performance but space station officials believe that a robust enhancement program could cost $100 million or more per year. NASA has not estimated the cost of operating an alternative propulsion module being procured to provide reboost if Russia is unable to provide that function. Items that we determined to be space station-related that are funded in other NASA budget lines include space shuttle flights civil service personnel principal investigators and space communications; these are estimated to cost a total of $2.5 billion in fiscal year 2004. When NASA implements full cost accounting in 2001 some costs currently in other NASA budget lines will be included in the space station budget. In commenting on our draft report NASA stated that shuttle flights should be allocated to the overall cost of operating the space station using a marginal cost of $84 million per flight rather than an average cost of $435 million. We believe the average cost per flight more accurately represents NASA resources related to operating the space station. There is a high degree of uncertainty in NASA's estimate for the cost to operate the space station from 2005 to 2014. NASA's original estimate of $13 billion for operating the space station was developed to aid in evaluating life-cycle costs of redesign options rather than to accurately forecast budget needs. This estimate did not consider end-of-mission costs for either extending the life of the space station beyond 10 years or decommissioning it. The estimate was also developed for an earlier space station configuration that has since been modified. NASA does not prepare detailed budget estimates for the space station and other programs beyond fiscal year 2004 the last year of its current 5-year budget-planning period. NASA recently began an effort to review its operations cost estimate and develop a long-range funding profile that would better reflect annual requirements over the 10-year operations period. Adding to the uncertainty of future costs the full impact on operations if Russia is unable to fulfill its obligations is not known at this time. NASA would incur costs to operate an alternative propulsion module but does not yet know whether there will be a shortfall in Russian logistics flights or how such a shortfall would be spread among the shuttle and international partner resupply vehicles. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1996réf. 91328Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1996. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 38 2 pages. Footnotes. Figures. Tables. This is a "Report to the Ranking Minority Member Committee on Commerce House of Representatives". The GAO reviewed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's NASA actions to improve cost reporting for the International Space Station program and the cost and schedule status of that program. The International Space Station ISS is one of the nation's largest research and development projects. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA Japan Canada the European Space Agency and Russia are building it as a permanently orbiting laboratory to conduct materials and life sciences research under nearly weightless conditions. NASA estimates its development and operations cost at $17.4 billion from October 1993 through the completion of assembly which is currently scheduled for June 2002. Cost reporting by NASA contractors and subcontractors at the Johnson Space Center including some working on major parts of an earlier version of the current ISS was the subject of a congressional hearing in July 1994. At the hearing NASA promised to improve performance management of its development contracts. GAO was asked by Representative John D. Dingell who was then Chairman Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the former House Committee on Energy and Commerce to review the program's cost and schedule status and NASA's actions to improve cost reporting. NASA's ISS program includes a prime contract with the Boeing Company to develop the U.S. portion of ISS a large number of smaller contracts to develop the ground-based and on-orbit capability to use and operate it and other contracts to develop on-orbit research facilities and conduct research. In mid-1993 a $2.1-billion annual funding limitation was imposed on the program. Performance measurement systems establish detailed baselines to measure the extent to which tasks are on schedule and within budget. Such systems are intended to provide early warning of cost and schedule problems to enable corrective actions to negate or minimize their impacts. Over the past several years ISS flight hardware has been produced. As of April 1996 the ISS prime contract was about $89 million over cost and about $88 million behind schedule. Overall the prime contract is 45-percent complete and these variances are within planned funding levels. However many cost threats to the development program remain and financial reserves needed for unexpected contingencies remain limited over the next few years. If available reserves ultimately prove inadequate program managers would have to either exceed the annual funding limitation or defer or rephase other activities thus possibly delaying ISS's schedule and likely increasing its overall cost. NASA has made progress toward ensuring that the ISS prime development contractor and its major subcontractors implement effective performance measurement systems for managing their contracts but a complete performance measurement system is still not in place. Also NASA has made slower progress implementing effective performance measurement systems on its contracts for developing ground-based and on-orbit capabilities for using and operating ISS. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1994réf. 91338Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1994. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 27 1 pages. Footnotes. Figures. Tables. This is a "Report to the Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management Committee on Governmental Affairs U.S. Senate". The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's NASA goal is to launch assemble and operate an earth-orbiting microgravity and life sciences research laboratory-International Space Station Alpha-starting in 1997. Congress requested that we review NASA's efforts to develop a robust life and microgravity sciences research community for the space station. Specifically we reviewed 1 what NASA is doing to assess the required size of the research community needed for the space station and to ensure that such a community will be available 2 how NASA will ensure that the research selected for the space station will be the best possible and 3 whether a recently canceled Shuttle research flight adversely affected NASA's efforts to develop a research community for the space station. In June 1994 we reported to you on the impact of the expanded Russian role on space station funding and research. We stated that Russian participation in the space station would substantially increase overall station research resources. However the degree to which the U.S. research community will benefit from these increased resources has yet to be determined. NASA has taken an initial step to assess the size of the space station's research community but it is not intending to develop this community by directly soliciting proposals to do research on the space station. Instead NASA is focusing on developing a comprehensive research program that emphasizes more ground-based research and uses space flight only for research efforts that require a microgravity environment in space. To accomplish this program NASA wants to greatly increase the number of ground-based investigators. This science-oriented approach is reasonable but funding levels could jeopardize it unless NASA adjusts its funding priorities. To achieve its goal NASA would need increased funding for its life and microgravity sciences research and analysis over fiscal years 1995 to 1999-the formative years for the initial development of space station-related research. However NASA expects such funding to remain constant. The result could be a smaller than desired number of investigators in the ground-based research program from which station-based research will be selected. The existing process of using peer review panels to judge the scientific merit and microgravity-related relevance of experiments for the space station will continue. The peer review scores for 285 life and microgravity sciences research proposals show that NASA's funding decisions were generally consistent with the findings of the peer review panels: most top-rated proposals and none of the lowest rated ones were funded. But peer review panels and NASA sometimes disagreed on the scientific merit and relevance of these proposals. For example 4 of the 15 U.S. experiments selected by NASA for a July 1994 Space Shuttle research flight-the International Microgravity Laboratory-were not among those rated highest in the peer review process. NASA's efforts to increase the size of its life and microgravity sciences research community are not likely to be adversely affected by the February 1994 cancellation of the third Spacelab Life Sciences flight SLS-3. The U.S. principal investigators on that flight stated that although they were concerned about NASA's lack of communication about the flight cancellation most of them have been accommodated on other space flights and they generally will be able to meet their experiment objectives. All of the investigators with whom we spoke also plan to continue submitting proposals for future NASA research opportunities. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1997réf. 91261Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1997. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 40 pages. Report to Congressional Requesters. This report discusses 1 the Department of Defense's DOD and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's NASA requirements for surveillance of space objects and 2 DOD's space surveillance capabilities to support these requirements. This report contains recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense the Air Force the Navy and the Army; the Administrator of NASA; the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Central Intelligence; and other interested congressional committees. During the past 40 years the number of manmade space objects orbiting the earth-active and inactive satellites and debris generated from launch vehicle and satellite breakups-has increased dramatically. Knowing what objects are in space and their locations are important because of the 1 implications of foreign satellite threats to U.S. national security and 2 hazards that such objects create for multibillion dollar space programs especially large ones such as the International Space Station. DOD's existing space surveillance network is not capable of providing the information NASA needs to adequately predict collisions between space objects orbiting the earth and multibillion dollar space programs such as the space station. Moreover the existing network cannot satisfy DOD's emerging space surveillance requirements which are currently under review. DOD's plans to 1 modernize an existing surveillance network radar system and 2 develop three new ballistic missile warning systems which could contribute to performing the surveillance function do not adequately consider DOD's or NASA's surveillance requirements. These four systems are separately managed by the Navy the Air Force and the Army. An opportunity exists to consider these systems' potential capabilities to enhance the surveillance network to better satisfy requirements and achieve greater benefits from planned investment in space sensor technology. Despite NASA's dependency on DOD to provide space object information the 1996 National Space Policy makes no provision for an interagency mechanism-either organizational or funding-to ensure that DOD's surveillance capabilities satisfy NASA's requirements. Overall there is no authoritative direction formal agreement or clear plan on how DOD and NASA could consolidate their space surveillance requirements for a common capability. A coordinated interagency plan that considers all existing and planned space surveillance capabilities could be beneficial in making cost-effective decisions to satisfy a consolidated set of national security and civil space surveillance requirements. Unless DOD and NASA can agree on such a plan an opportunity may be missed to simultaneously 1 achieve efficiencies; 2 better ensure the safety of the planned multibillion dollar space station; and 3 help satisfy national security needs including the U.S. forces' future needs for space asset information. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1999réf. 91264Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1999. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 34 pages. Report to Congressional Requesters. The purpose of the $1.3 billion X-33 Program cosponsored by the NASA and the Lockheed Martin Corporation is to develop and demonstrate advanced technologies and techniques needed for future reusable launch vehicles RLV including lightweight internal fuel tanks advanced rocket engines a durable heat shield and rapid-turnaround low-cost operations. The X-33 vehicle will be a half-scale model of Lockheed Martin's planned single-stage-to-orbit SSTO Venture Star RLV an operational vehicle that will be based on and developed after the X-33. Lockheed Martin and NASA will base the decision to proceed with developing the Venture Star in part on the results of the X-33 Program. NASA would potentially be one of Lockheed Martin's primary customers for the cargo-only flights and is the only anticipated customer for passenger flights. The passenger flights would carry crewmembers to and from the International Space Station. NASA and Lockheed Martin are conducting the X-33 Program under a cooperative agreement a financial instrument with which a government entity and one or more public or private organizations jointly fund and implement an activity to achieve common objectives. Such a partnership was encouraged by the National Space Transportation Policy of 1994 as a means of 1 establishing NASA as the lead agency for technology development and demonstration of reusable space transportation systems and 2 positioning the government and the private sector to make decisions on the development of an operational reusable launch system. NASA and Lockheed Martin X-33 program managers anticipate that the program will achieve technical requirements such as demonstrating the feasibility of building large liquid hydrogen fuel tanks made of graphite composite material. However the program will not meet some original cost schedule and performance objectives. Problems encountered by Lockheed Martin while working toward the X-33 Program's technical requirements have caused cost increases delay of the test vehicle's first flight and revision of some performance objectives. The technical problems occurred during development and fabrication of the X-33 vehicle's internal fuel tanks rocket engines and thermal protection system the three key advanced technologies the program seeks to demonstrate. Resolving these technical problems caused Lockheed Martin's estimated contribution to grow $75 million above the original estimate of $211.6 million to $286.6 million. However part of the increase will be borne by the government. Procurement regulations allow companies to recover allowable independent research and development costs by including them as overhead in the pricing for other government contracts. Thus Lockheed Martin's and its partners' shares may actually be lower. In addition estimated government costs for NASA civil service personnel working on the program not included in NASA's X-33 program budget also increased. Together these estimated costs increased from $216.9 million to $274.3 million as of March 1999. As a result we believe a more accurate representation of the estimated government's share of the X-33 Program is $1.23 billion while industry's estimated share is $125.4 million. Several issues will need to be evaluated before NASA decides to use Venture Star RLVs to support the International Space Station. First the results of the X-33 Program must provide sufficient information for NASA to determine that the risks have been sufficiently reduced and that continuation of activities leading to the agency's use of Venture Star as a customer is warranted. Second even though Venture Star RLVs are intended to be commercially owned and operated government financial incentives will likely be needed to initiate such a venture. Third NASA would have to pay for either two crew modules or modifications to Venture Star vehicles if the crew return vehicle being developed for the International Space Station is chosen as a means for Venture Star to carry people. Fourth because the Venture Star RLV would not carry as much cargo as the space shuttle additional flights would be needed. The more frequent docking activities may reduce the amount of stable time available for some science operations. United States General Accounting Office paperback
1991réf. 68570Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1991. Presumed first edition/first printing. Wraps. Very good. No dust jacket. Cover has slight wear and soiling. 166 p. Includes illustrations. Footnotes. In February 1991 GAO sponsored a conference "U.S. Communications Policy: Issues for the 1990s " in response to increasing congressional interest in this area. The conference brought together government officials academicians and industry executives to explore and debate four critical policy issues in a series of round table discussions: how communications infrastructure should develop; the role of communications policy in promoting economic growth; allocations of the electromagnetic spectrum to support the growth of communications services; and whether the U.S. communications regulatory structure was effective. In preparing this publication the GAO relied primarily on information developed during the four panel discussions. United States General Accounting Office paperback
